





The First Amendment’s Real Lochner 
Problem 
Genevieve Lakier† 
One of the most common criticisms of contemporary free speech law is that it 
is too Lochnerian. What critics usually mean by this is that First Amendment doc-
trine, by extending significant constitutional protection to advertising and other 
kinds of commercially oriented speech, makes the same mistake as the Supreme 
Court made in Lochner v New York and other late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Due Process Clause cases: namely, it grants judges too much power to  
second-guess the economic policy decisions of democratically elected legislatures. 
This Article challenges that argument—not to reject the idea that contempo-
rary free speech law resurrects Lochner, but instead to reconceive what that means. 
It argues that contemporary free speech law is not Lochner-like in failing to defer to 
the legislature’s economic policy decisions. Instead, it repeats the errors of the  
Lochner Court by relying upon an almost wholly negative notion of freedom of 
speech and by assuming that the only relevant constitutional interest at stake in free 
speech cases is the autonomy interest of the speaker. The result is a body of law that, 
not just in its commercial and corporate speech cases, but in many other cases as 
well, replicates Lochner-era due process jurisprudence in both its doctrinal structure 
and its political economic effects.  
What this means is that the First Amendment’s Lochner problem will not be 
solved—as the conventional critiques suggest—by simply denying commercial and 
corporate speech constitutional protection or by weakening the strength of the pro-
tection the First Amendment provides to speech of this kind. It will only be solved by 
reconceiving freedom of speech as a positive rather than a negative right and one 
that guarantees, to listeners as well as speakers, the right to participate in a public 
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sphere that is diverse along both racial and class lines. Rethinking the First Amend-
ment in this manner, this Article argues, will raise many difficult questions and 
make what are currently easy free speech cases much harder to resolve. But there is 
ultimately no other way to vindicate the democratic values the First Amendment is 
intended to protect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ghost of Lochner v New York1 haunts contemporary free 
speech law. Over the past four decades, numerous scholars and 
jurists have argued that the Supreme Court’s expansive free 
speech jurisprudence “threatens to revive the long-lost world of 
Lochner”;2 that it “reconstitute[s] the values of Lochner v. New 
York as components of freedom of speech”;3 and that it “return[s] 
[constitutional law] to the bygone [Lochner] era.”4 What critics 
usually mean when they argue that contemporary free speech law 
revives Lochner is that, by extending constitutional protection to 
commercial advertising, to corporate speech, and to other kinds 
of profit-oriented expression—or by extending too much protec-
tion to speech of this sort—contemporary free speech law repeats 
 
 1 198 US 45 (1905). 
 2 Robert Post and Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 Harv L 
Rev F 165, 182 (2015). 
 3 Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries Jr, Commercial Speech: Economic 
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va L Rev 1, 30–31 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 4 Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, 564 US 552, 591 (2011) (Breyer dissenting). 
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the error the Court made in its 1905 decision in Lochner: it grants 
judges too much power to second-guess the economic policy deci-
sions of democratically elected legislatures. Like freedom of con-
tract doctrine in the Lochner era, free speech law authorizes, on 
this view, “an illegitimate intrusion by the courts into a realm 
properly reserved to the political branches of government.”5 
One can well understand why critics would want to analogize 
contemporary free speech law to Lochner-era freedom of contract 
jurisprudence. There are, after all, notable similarities in how the 
two bodies of law have been mobilized, as well as the interests 
they have been used to advance. Just as in the late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-centuries, when businesses invoked their 
constitutional due process rights to protect economic interests 
they could not protect via the ordinary political process, today 
businesses invoke their First Amendment rights to do the same.6 
And just as in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, 
when the success of businesses in making due process claims lim-
ited the government’s ability to regulate the market, the remark-
able success that businesses have recently enjoyed as litigants in 
First Amendment cases limits the government’s ability to regu-
late both the economic and political markets in order to promote 
welfarist aims. Claims of First Amendment Lochnerism capture, 
indisputably, close and interesting parallels in the role of courts 
and constitutional adjudication between what some have called 
the First and Second Gilded Ages.7 
Yet, notwithstanding these historical parallels, there is rea-
son to be skeptical of claims that the Court has revived Lochner 
by extending too much constitutional protection to commercial 
and corporate speech. Critics argue that rigorous scrutiny of 
speech of this kind protects only economic liberty—the kind of lib-
erty protected by the Lochner Court—and does little to protect the 
political or personal liberty that the First Amendment values, but 
this simply isn’t true. Although complicated arguments can be 
made about whether protecting commercial advertising or the 
nonadvertising speech of corporations does anything to advance 
individual expressive freedom, there is no question that, when ad-
dressed to a public audience, speech of this kind can and does help 
 
 5 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873, 874 (1987). 
 6 John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and 
Implications, 30 Const Commen 223, 246–48 (2015). 
 7 See, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A The-
ory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 NYU L Rev 1, 25–26 (2004). 
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to shape political attitudes and beliefs. This means that, when 
courts closely scrutinize the government’s justifications in com-
mercial and corporate speech cases, they do not simply protect 
economic liberty; they also protect democratic interests that have 
long been of central First Amendment concern. 
This Article thus contests the claim that contemporary free 
speech law resurrects Lochner by extending too much protection 
to commercially oriented speech. It does so, however, not to chal-
lenge the idea that First Amendment doctrine enacts a species of 
Lochnerism, but to recast it. It argues that First Amendment 
scholars are not wrong when they assert that contemporary free 
speech law repeats the errors of the Lochner Court; they  
are simply wrong in what they identify as the error that is being 
repeated. 
Contemporary free speech law, this Article argues, is not 
Lochner-like because it fails to show sufficient deference to the 
legislature’s economic policy decisions. This is not its problem. To 
the contrary: in many contexts, contemporary free speech law de-
fers too much to the economic policy decisions of the political 
branches to adequately vindicate the democratic and self- 
expressive interests that the First Amendment is supposed to  
protect. This is true, for example, of the law governing rights of 
access to private property.8 One might make a similar argument 
about copyright law and the many other areas of law where free 
speech interests take a backseat to property interests.9 
Contemporary free speech law is instead Lochner-like in how 
it conceives of the liberty it protects. Although today Lochner is 
remembered most often through the prism of Justice Oliver  
Wendell Holmes Jr’s famous dissent, which argued that the prob-
lem with the majority opinion was that it showed insufficient def-
erence to the New York legislature’s determination that a  
maximum-hours law was wise economic policy,10 at the time many 
critics considered the Lochner Court’s most serious error to have 
nothing to do with judicial-deference rules. The problem with the 
majority opinion in Lochner, these critics argued, was not its  
 
 8 See notes 275–80 and accompanying text. 
 9 For arguments that copyright law inadequately protects free speech values, see 
generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints 
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (1999); L. Ray Patterson, Free 
Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand L Rev 1 (1987). 
 10 Lochner, 198 US at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting). 
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failure to defer but instead its failure to recognize that, under con-
ditions of pronounced economic inequality, the freedom of work-
ers could be enhanced, not undermined, by legislative restrictions 
on what terms and conditions they could contract for. It was its 
embrace of “an academic theory of equality in the face of practical 
conditions of inequality,” they claimed, that led the Lochner Court 
to reach the wrong conclusion.11 
A similar criticism can be made about the contemporary First 
Amendment. Just as it once did in its freedom of contract cases, in 
recent decades the Supreme Court has embraced a highly aca-
demic conception of freedom of speech—one that largely fails (and 
in some contexts, adamantly refuses) to consider the economic and 
social forces that as a practical matter shape the exercise of First 
Amendment rights. The result has been the creation of a body of 
law that, like Lochner-era substantive due process, insists that 
most legislative efforts to protect the expressive freedom of the 
less powerful by limiting the expressive freedom of the more pow-
erful are constitutionally impermissible. It is this feature of con-
temporary First Amendment doctrine, this Article argues, that 
makes it Lochner-like. More to the point—it is this feature of  
contemporary First Amendment doctrine that has made it, like 
Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine, a powerful sword for re-
inforcing the power of the propertied and a shield against govern-
ment efforts at redistribution. 
If scholars wish to critique the doctrine for its Lochnerian 
tendencies, it is this they should critique. By instead focusing on 
the decision to extend constitutional protection to commercial and 
corporate speech, critics avoid having to tackle the hard questions 
raised by the Lochner analogy: namely, what a First Amendment 
jurisprudence organized around a less academic conception of ex-
pressive freedom would look like. They also unduly limit the scope 
of their critique by suggesting that the First Amendment’s  
Lochner problems are either confined to the commercial and cor-
porate speech cases, or extend only to other cases involving com-
mercially oriented speech. If we understand the true lesson of 
Lochner to be that constitutional rights cannot effectively be en-
forced without taking account of the economic, political, and social 
conditions that impact their exercise—as indeed, we should—
then the First Amendment’s Lochner problems cannot be so easily 
contained. 
 
 11 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale L J 454, 454 (1909). 
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This Article thus reconceives the Lochner analogy in an effort 
to think more creatively about how to solve it. The argument pro-
ceeds in four parts. Part I describes how the analogy to Lochner 
has been used to criticize both the Burger Court’s decision to ap-
ply heightened scrutiny to laws regulating commercial advertis-
ing and corporate speech, as well as the increasingly strict scru-
tiny the Court has applied in such cases in recent years. 
Part II explains why the claim that the Court’s commercial 
and corporate speech cases resurrect Lochner by extending pro-
tection to speech that lacks constitutional value is wrong. Even if 
we leave aside the complex question of whether and to what ex-
tent the First Amendment protects individual expressive auton-
omy, protection of commercial advertising and at least some kinds 
of corporate speech can be justified by the First Amendment’s core 
interest in preserving a robust and diverse marketplace of ideas. 
This means that the extension of constitutional protection to com-
mercial advertising and to corporate speech does not represent, 
as critics allege, a break from the principles that guided First 
Amendment jurisprudence up until the 1970s. Instead, it repre-
sents the logical extension of those principles. 
Part III argues that the real source of the similarities be-
tween contemporary free speech law and Lochner-era freedom of 
contract jurisprudence is that both construe the constitutional 
right they vindicate as a strong but limited negative autonomy 
right: as a right that guarantees freedom from intentional gov-
ernment interference with an individual’s autonomy, but one that 
provides almost no protection whatsoever against private inter-
ference and constraint.12 It was this feature of Lochner-era juris-
prudence that produced a body of law that was insensitive to 
 
 12 By “negative right,” I mean a right that guarantees negative liberty—that is, free-
dom from interference by others. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 6–7 (Oxford 
1958). When I use the term “positive right,” I mean a right that guarantees positive liberty, 
which we might define broadly as “not freedom from, but freedom to.” Id at 16–19. See also 
Steven J. Heyman, Positive and Negative Liberty, 68 Chi Kent L Rev 81, 81 (1992) (“In 
broad terms, negative liberty means freedom from—from interference, coercion, or re-
straint—while positive liberty means freedom to, or self-determination—freedom to act or 
to be as one wills.”) (emphasis in original). The distinction between positive and negative 
freedom has been the subject of considerable criticism. Theorists have argued that it is 
incoherent to speak of negative freedom because the mere absence of government coercion 
cannot, on its own, guarantee individual freedom, given the numerous other sources of 
constraint that exist. See, for example, T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 
Obligation and Other Writings 200–01 (Cambridge 1986) (Paul Harris and John Morrow, 
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questions of economic inequality and hostile, as a result, to 
worker-protective economic regulation like the bakery law struck 
down in Lochner. And it is because courts today rely upon a sim-
ilarly strong but similarly limited conception of the right to free-
dom of speech that they interpret the First Amendment to protect 
the right of property owners to control the expressive uses to 
which their property gets put, but to provide very little protection 
to listeners, or to those who lack property that they can use to 
participate in public debate. The strongly anti-redistributive cast 
of contemporary free speech law is not, in other words, primarily 
a consequence of how broadly the First Amendment applies. It is 
instead the consequence of what courts today understand freedom 
of speech to mean and to require. 
As Part III also shows, however, courts have not always con-
ceived of freedom of speech in as limited a fashion as they do to-
day. During both the New Deal and Warren Court eras, the Court 
employed a more capacious view of freedom of speech: one that 
understood it as a positive, not a negative, right. Indeed, the 
Court conceived the First Amendment to guarantee individuals 
perhaps the most important positive right they could possess in a 
democratic society: namely, the right to participate in the for-
mation of democratic public opinion, and in the democratic polit-
ical process more broadly. The New Deal and Warren Courts did 
not always do a terribly good job enforcing this positive right, but 
they understood that this is what freedom of speech had to mean 
if the First Amendment was to play its “historic” role as a guard-
ian of American democracy.13 It was only in the 1970s that a ma-
jority of the Court began to interpret freedom of speech as the 
conservative minority on the New Deal Court had once argued it 
should be interpreted: as a negative right—that is, as a right that 
guarantees noninterference from the state but little more. This 
shift in the Court’s understanding of freedom of speech produced 
 
eds). This may be true. It nevertheless remains the case that the idea—that what consti-
tutional rights guarantee is freedom from government coercion and little more—has 
played a tremendously important role in American constitutional jurisprudence and prac-
tice. When I use the terms positive and negative rights, I use them therefore to describe 
competing conceptions of the nature of constitutional rights and freedoms, not to make 
claims about the possibility of a purely negative freedom. 
 13 See Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 102–03 (1940) (“Freedom of discussion, if it 
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which in-
formation is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exi-
gencies of their period” and to make “effective and intelligent use of the processes of pop-
ular government to shape the destiny of modern [ ] society.”). 
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a body of law that was remarkably reminiscent, in both doctrinal 
structure and political economic effects, to Lochner-era due pro-
cess jurisprudence. Critics are therefore correct when they trace 
the Lochnerization of the First Amendment to changes in free 
speech doctrine instituted by the Burger Court. They are simply 
incorrect in what they identify as the nature of that change.14 
Part IV concludes by sketching out the normative implica-
tions of this history. As it demonstrates, the debate over the na-
ture of the First Amendment’s Lochner problem is not an aca-
demic one by any means. Different views of the First 
Amendment’s Lochner problem lead to different conclusions 
about how it should be fixed. If the problem is that the First 
Amendment has gotten too big or too strong, the obvious solution 
is to narrow its scope and weaken the strength of its protections. 
But if the problem is instead the almost entirely negative concep-
tion of freedom of speech that underpins contemporary First 
Amendment jurisprudence, then the solution cannot be to simply 
limit the class of cases in which the First Amendment protection 
applies or to weaken the protections afforded to advertising and 
other kinds of commercial speech. The solution must be to reimag-
ine freedom of speech as a positive right, and as a right that con-
sequently protects individuals against both public and private 
power. This is, obviously, no easy task to accomplish. But it is the 
only satisfactory solution to the ills that beset contemporary free 
speech law. 
I.  LOCHNER AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
There are few opinions in Supreme Court history that are 
more widely disliked than the Court’s 1905 decision in Lochner. 
Indeed, to claim that an opinion is like Lochner, or that it per-
forms the same move as the Lochner Court (in contemporary 
 
 14 In arguing that the Lochner-like features of contemporary free speech are a prod-
uct of how courts understand the right to freedom of speech, not how they conceive its 
boundaries, this Article echoes the argument that Professor Cass Sunstein made in his 
wonderful 1987 article, Lochner’s Legacy. Like Sunstein’s article, this Article argues 
against the interpretation of the Lochner Court’s errors that Justice Holmes articulated 
in his famous dissent. See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 905–06 (cited in note 5). Like 
Sunstein’s article, it suggests instead that the problem with the Lochner Court—and with 
contemporary free speech law—is the similar conception of constitutional liberty that both 
employ. See id at 882–83. Unlike Sunstein’s article, however, it does not assume that the 
Lochnerian features of contemporary constitutional law are a permanent, even inevitable 
feature of the constitutional landscape. See id at 903. This Article would not have been 
possible without Sunstein’s pathbreaking earlier work. 
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lingo, that it “Lochnerizes”), is usually one of the most damning 
things one can say about it.15 This is because Lochner is one of a 
handful of cases that make up the anticanon of constitutional law. 
Anticanonical decisions, like Lochner, Dred Scott v Sandford,16 
and Plessy v Ferguson,17 “map out the land mines of the American 
constitutional order, and thereby help to constitute that order.”18 
They instruct courts on what not to do when interpreting the  
Constitution. 
To call an opinion or rule of decision Lochnerian is thus to 
accuse it of committing a fundamental jurisprudential error. 
What fundamental jurisprudential error that a court accused of 
Lochnerism is supposed to have made is not always self-evident, 
however. This is because Lochner has been accused of multiple 
sins, each of which can serve as the basis for the analogy.19 
In Lochner, a 5–4 majority of the Court held that a New York 
law that prohibited workers in bakeries from working more than 
sixty hours a week violated the freedom of contract guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
it interfered with the ability of employers and employees to deter-
mine for themselves the terms of their contractual relationships.20 
In concluding as much, the majority acknowledged that the gov-
ernment could limit freedom of contract in order to promote “the 
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public,” but dis-
missed the possibility that the New York law advanced any of 
these goals.21 “[T]he trade of [the] baker,” Justice Rufus Peckham 
wrote in his majority opinion, “is not an unhealthy one to that 
degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the 
. . . right of free contract.”22 Nor, the Court held, do tired workers 
pose a sufficient threat to public safety to justify the law on those 
 
 15 See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U Chi L Rev 373, 373–74 
(2003) (“Lochner v New York would probably win the prize, if there were one, for the most 
widely reviled decision of the last hundred years.”); Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foun-
dations 40 (Belknap 1991) (“For a modern judge, one of the worst insults is that she is 
reenacting the sin originally committed by the pre–New Deal Court in cases like Lochner 
v. New York.”). 
 16 60 US 393 (1857). 
 17 163 US 537 (1896). 
 18 Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv L Rev 379, 380–81 (2011). 
 19 Strauss, 70 U Chi L Rev at 374 (cited in note 15) (“The striking thing about the 
disapproval of Lochner . . . is that there is no consensus on why it is wrong.”). 
 20 198 US at 57–60. 
 21 Id at 53, 57. 
 22 Id at 59. 
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grounds.23 The majority also dismissed the possibility that the law 
was necessary to protect workers against exploitation. Bakers, 
Justice Peckham noted, were “as a class . . . equal in intelligence 
and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations.” They 
were therefore entitled “to assert their rights . . . without the pro-
tecting arm of the State interfering with their independence of 
judgment and of action” by limiting the number of hours they 
could agree to work.24 
In its unequivocal rejection of the possibility that the New 
York labor law could be justified on health or safety grounds, or 
as a means of protecting workers against exploitation, the deci-
sion powerfully demonstrates the early twentieth-century Court’s 
hostility toward what Justice Peckham described in his opinion 
as the increasing and “meddlesome . . . interference on the part of 
the legislatures of the several states with the ordinary trades and 
occupations of the people.”25 It reflects, in other words, the unease 
that at least some members of the federal judiciary felt toward 
the efforts by Progressive reformers to regulate the increasingly 
industrialized economy much more intensively than it had previ-
ously been regulated, in an effort to protect workers against the 
new physical and economic harms they faced at work. 
The doctrinal distinctions that Justice Peckham’s opinion re-
lied upon, however, and the conception of state power that it ad-
vanced were not new. Instead, they had deep roots in American 
constitutional law. As Professor Howard Gillman notes: 
[T]he essential elements of the Lochner Court’s approach to 
the bakery law—the emphasis on market liberty, the belief 
that market liberty could be interfered with if legislation pro-
moted a valid public purpose, and the suggestion that valid 
public-purpose legislation was distinct from laws that merely 
 
 23 Lochner, 198 US at 62: 
In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the connection between the 
number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of 
the bread made by the workman. The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy 
and thin to build any argument for the interference of the legislature. 
 24 Id at 57. 
 25 Id at 61, 63. 
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promoted the interests of some classes at the expense of oth-
ers—were long-standing features of nineteenth-century po-
lice powers jurisprudence.26 
Lochner was not, in other words, a doctrinally innovative deci-
sion.27 It simply applied what were at the time well-established 
legal principles to a new factual situation, albeit in a way that 
was undoubtedly sympathetic to business interests.28 
The decision was nevertheless widely criticized, both at the 
time and in the years to follow. Critics refused to believe that the 
Constitution prevented the government from protecting workers 
rendered newly vulnerable by the increasing concentration of 
wealth and power in the early twentieth-century economy.29 And 
yet Lochner suggested that not only was the New York law un-
constitutional, but so too was any labor law that could not be jus-
tified by the special characteristics of the class of laborers it pro-
tected, or the unusual dangerousness of the industry in which 
they labored.30 
 
 26 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era 
Police Powers Jurisprudence 20 (Duke 1993). Nor did the decision break new ground in 
recognizing the right to contract as one of the personal rights guaranteed by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This honor belongs to Allgeyer v Louisiana, 
165 US 578 (1897), which the Court handed down eight years before Lochner. See Thomas 
B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 Cornell L Rev 527, 534 (2015). 
 27 Prior to Lochner, the Court had not ruled on the constitutionality of the maximum-
hour laws that were springing up throughout the country, and the Court’s instruction on 
the topic was eagerly anticipated. Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 125–26 (cited in 
note 26). In this respect, Lochner was an important decision. But it was not a decision that 
generated significant doctrinal change. Id at 147–48 (noting that the dissents “triggered 
a minor adjustment in the way the Court went about elaborating the long-standing dis-
tinction between valid public-purpose legislation and invalid class legislation” in that af-
terward “the Court became more willing to attend to ‘expert’ social science data [regarding] 
the existence of unhealthful or unsafe working conditions,” but that “while this adjustment 
led the judiciary to accept some innovative forms of social legislation, it did not lead judges 
to abandon their allegiance to [Lochnerian police-powers] jurisprudence”). 
 28 Owen M. Fiss, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Troubled Begin-
nings of the Modern State, 1888–1910 163 (Macmillan 1993) (“[In striking down the New 
York law, Justice] Peckham did not . . . ‘find’ liberty of contract in the interstices of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He instead was trying to preserve the then fairly well recognized 
limits on the police power as a form of constitutive authority.”). See also Greene, 125 Harv 
L Rev at 384 (cited in note 18) (noting that one characteristic of anticanonical decisions 
like Lochner is that “traditional modes of legal analysis arguably support the[ir] results” 
and that “these cases are, in some formalistic sense, correct”). 
 29 See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 NYU L Rev 1383, 1402–28 (2001). 
 30 In recent years, defenders of the Lochner Court, most notably Professor David 
Bernstein, have argued that the bakery law it invalidated was not “a meager but  
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Critics therefore provided various, sometimes conflicting, ar-
guments for why Lochner was wrong. Some argued that the deci-
sion was wrong because it erroneously interpreted the Due  
Process Clause to protect a kind of freedom (freedom of contract) 
that had very shallow roots in the common law.31 In subsequent 
decades, this turned into the now more familiar claim that the 
Lochner Court erred by reading into the Constitution an unenu-
merated right.32 Others argued that the decision was wrong be-
cause it failed to take sufficient account of the economic realities 
of the modern workplace, and more specifically, the inequality in 
bargaining power that employers and employees possessed in the 
early twentieth-century economy.33 
 
hard-fought legislative victory” for “overworked, exploited bakery workers” but instead a 
mechanism the powerful New York bakers’ union employed “to drive small bakeshops that 
employed recent immigrants out of the industry.” David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating 
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive Reform 23 (Chicago 2011). Anti-
immigrant and anticompetitive sentiments may certainly have played a role in generating 
support for the law. There is no question, however, that the bakery law struck down in 
Lochner was part of a broader struggle by unions across the country and in all sectors of 
industry to limit working hours and guarantee better conditions for labor. See Howard 
Schweber, Lochner v. New York and the Challenge of Legal Historiography, 39 L & Soc 
Inq 242, 258–59 (2014) (citation omitted): 
The call for limitations on working hours was neither novel nor radical in 1905. 
Bakers in New York had gone on strike in 1881 demanding a twelve-hour day. 
New York passed eight-hour-day laws in 1867, 1870, and 1886, the last of which 
finally contained enforcement mechanisms. Nationally, a call for a law limiting 
the working day to eight hours was central to the creation of the first national 
labor organizations in the 1860s and remained a critical organizing issue for 
labor well into the 1930s. 
The decision in Lochner came to be reviled, therefore, not so much because its critics nec-
essarily believed that the law it struck down was so valuable but because of what it inti-
mated about the fate of the union struggle in general. See William E. Forbath, Law and 
the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 42 n 28, 52–53 (Harvard 1991). And in this 
respect, critics of the decision were correct to be concerned. As Professor William Forbath 
has chronicled in detail, during this period, employers routinely used the tool of constitu-
tional litigation to strike down worker-protective wage and hour legislation on due process 
grounds. Id at 37–97. 
 31 Friedman, 76 NYU L Rev at 1413–14 (cited in note 29) (noting that critics “regu-
larly referred to the supposed liberty of contract” recognized by the Lochner Court  
“as ‘new’ or ‘novel’” and criticized the Court for recognizing a right “without historical 
precedent”). 
 32 See, for example, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 391 (1937) (“What is 
this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”); Strauss, 70 U Chi 
L Rev at 378–81 (cited in note 15). 
 33 Colby and Smith, 100 Cornell L Rev at 537–38 (cited in note 26): 
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Others, meanwhile, argued that the decision was wrong be-
cause it showed insufficient deference to the New York legisla-
ture’s view that the bakery law was wise economic policy. This 
was the argument that Justice Holmes made in his now-famous 
dissent.34 Because the Constitution is “made for people of funda-
mentally differing views,” Justice Holmes asserted, judges should 
respect “the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law” 
and overturn statutes only if “a rational and fair man necessarily 
would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamen-
tal principles as they have been understood by the traditions of 
our people and our law.”35 The majority therefore erred, Justice 
Holmes argued, when it struck down the New York law because 
it did not violate (at least on his view) fundamental principles of 
American law as reasonable men would understand them.36 
In subsequent years, critics seized on all of these accounts of 
the Lochner Court’s errors as the basis for charges of Lochnerism. 
Critics argued that decisions in which the Court recognized a due 
process right to contraception and abortion replicated the Lochner 
Court’s sins by reading unenumerated rights into the Constitu-
tion.37 In other cases, critics argued that judges resurrected  
Lochner by failing to adequately take account of economic reali-
ties, such as the inequality in bargaining power that character-
ized the relationship between employers and employees.38 
When it came to the free speech cases, however, what critics 
usually meant when they accused the Court of Lochnerism was 
not that it illegitimately sought to vindicate unenumerated 
rights, employed overly vague rules of decision, or failed to take 
 
To many observers [in the early twentieth century], the Court was either uncon-
scionably oblivious or viciously hostile to the realities of the sweatshop-era work-
place and to the underlying premise of the entire labor movement: that inequal-
ities in bargaining power between management and labor can, in the absence of 
regulation, lead to egregious exploitation of the working class. 
 34 Lochner, 198 US at 74–76 (Holmes dissenting). 
 35 Id at 75–76. 
 36 Id at 76. In insisting that courts should only invalidate democratically enacted 
laws when they were patently unreasonable, Justice Holmes echoed the argument made 
by Professor James Bradley Thayer in his important 1893 article, The Origin and Scope 
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv L Rev 129 (1893). 
 37 See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale 
L J 920, 939 (1973). 
 38 See, for example, Korte v Sebelius, 735 F3d 654, 720–22 (7th Cir 2013) (Rovner 
dissenting) (“One flaw of the Lochner jurisprudence is that while the Court purported to 
protect the constitutional rights of workers as well as employers, it blinded itself to the 
reality that employees frequently did not possess bargaining power enabling them to pur-
sue and protect their own liberty interests.”). 
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adequate account of economic inequality. What they meant in-
stead was that the Court failed to show adequate deference to the 
policy judgments of democratically elected legislatures. 
A. The First Wave of First Amendment Lochner Critiques 
Critics began to make arguments of this sort very soon after 
the Court first began to interpret the First Amendment as a pow-
erful instrument of countermajoritarian protection during the 
New Deal period. As early as 1941—only ten years after the 
Court, for the first time in its history, struck down a state law on 
free speech grounds39—Professor Walton Hamilton and George 
Braden claimed in an article in the Yale Law Journal that the 
Court’s free speech jurisprudence was doing what liberty of con-
tract once did: illegitimately transferring to judges power that 
properly belonged to the democratically elected branches of gov-
ernment.40 Similar arguments would be made repeatedly over the 
next seventy years, even if the specific details of the Lochner  
analogy shifted over time. 
Initially, critics argued, à la Justice Holmes, that the only 
way the Court could prevent its First Amendment jurisprudence 
from playing the same undemocratic role in American political 
life that its Due Process Clause jurisprudence once had was by 
interpreting the Speech Clause very narrowly, to prohibit only the 
most egregious and unreasonable infringements on expressive 
freedom. This is what Hamilton and Braden argued: in allowing 
courts to strike down laws that “men not devoid of reason” could 
believe did not infringe upon “the traditional freedom of the indi-
vidual,” the Court’s free speech decisions granted judges, they 
claimed, too much discretion to interfere with the policy decisions 
of the political branches.41 
Justice Felix Frankfurter, a great fan of Justice Holmes’s 
Lochner dissent, similarly argued in his dissent in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v Barnette42 that the Court should only 
strike laws down on First Amendment grounds when there was 
 
 39 Stromberg v California, 283 US 359, 369–70 (1931). 
 40 Walton H. Hamilton and George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the Su-
preme Court, 50 Yale L J 1319, 1349 (1941) (“A few years ago a bench headed by the pre-
sent Chief Justice read ‘liberty of contract’ out of the due process clause and promptly read 
freedom of speech into its place.”). 
 41 Id at 1352. 
 42 319 US 624 (1943). 
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no basis for believing that “legislators could in reason have en-
acted [them].”43 Any broader conception of the scope of constitu-
tional review, Justice Frankfurter insisted, would enable the “ar-
bitrary exercise of [judicial] authority.”44 It would commit the 
same jurisprudential error as Lochner had, by allowing judges  
to override the wishes of the democratic majority whenever they 
desired. 
Justice Frankfurter and Hamilton and Braden were not 
alone in construing the lesson of Lochner to be the danger of em-
powering courts to perform anything other than the most limited 
form of constitutional review. Other important Progressives—in-
cluding such well-respected figures as Judge Learned Hand—also 
argued that the only kind of judicial review appropriate in a plu-
ralist democracy like the United States was the very deferential 
rationality review that Justice Holmes advocated in his Lochner 
dissent.45 
This was not the view that the New Deal Court adopted, how-
ever, when it finally broke from the police-powers jurisprudence 
that characterized the Lochner era. Although the Court turned 
away from Lochner by altering the deference rules that applied in 
constitutional cases, rather than by altering other features of its 
constitutional doctrine (as some suggested),46 the deference re-
gime it created did not go as far as Justice Holmes’s Lochner dis-
sent suggested it should. In United States v Carolene Products 
Co,47 the Court held that in cases involving “regulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions,” courts should adopt 
a Holmesian deference rule, or something close to it.48 However, 
 
 43 Id at 647 (Frankfurter dissenting). 
 44 Id at 648. 
 45 See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1958 
51–52 (Harvard 3d ed 1960). 
 46 See, for example, Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, 25 Harv L Rev 489, 513 (1912) (arguing that, rather than deferring to the legisla-
ture, courts should interpret the meaning of constitutional rights and duties by looking at 
“the social facts upon which law . . . is to be applied”). 
 47 304 US 144 (1938). 
 48 Id at 152: 
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or gen-
erally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that  
it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the 
legislators. 
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when laws appeared “on [their] face” to violate an enumerated 
constitutional right or to “restrict[ ] those political processes 
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesir-
able legislation” or to affect “discrete and insular minorities,” the 
Court suggested that courts should not simply defer to the legis-
lative judgment so long as it could be made to seem reasonable; 
instead, they should apply “more exacting [ ] scrutiny” of legisla-
tive ends and means.49 In subsequent cases, it adopted this sug-
gestion as settled law.50 
Rather than adopting the single, very deferential standard of 
review that Justice Holmes advocated for in his Lochner dissent, 
the New Deal Court fashioned a two-tiered or “bifurcated” system 
“of constitutional review in which judges would defer to legisla-
tive regulation of the economy but scrutinize legislative regula-
tion of noneconomic rights, including the right to free speech.”51 It 
did so because a majority of its members had come to believe—
just as Justice Holmes himself had—that although judicial en-
forcement of economic rights like the right to contract under-
mined the vibrant pluralist democracy the Constitution was in-
tended to create, judicial enforcement of civil rights such as the 
right to freedom of speech enhanced it, by preventing the majority 
from being able to use its control of the government apparatus to 
undermine the representativeness of the political system writ 
large.52 
Although the bifurcated system of review was initially quite 
controversial, the idea that courts should vigorously enforce free 
 
As Professor Jack Balkin notes, this language suggests that courts should “not strike down 
the legislation unless the [c]ourt cannot invent a scenario in which a rational legislature 
might have produced the bill before it.” J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw U L Rev 275, 
290 (1989). 
 49 Carolene Products, 304 US at 152–53 n 4. 
 50 See, for example, Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 (1942); American Federa-
tion of Labor v Swing, 312 US 321, 325 (1941); Schneider v State, 308 US 147, 161 (1939). 
 51 G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free 
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 Mich L Rev 299, 309 (1996). 
 52 Id at 334 (noting that the Court justified granting special protection to speech 
rights because of “their indispensable connection to the maintenance of democratic prin-
ciples”); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv L Rev 713, 715 (1985): 
[The Court’s decision in] Carolene promises relief from the problem of legitimacy 
raised whenever nine elderly lawyers invalidate the legislative decisions of a 
majority of our elected representatives. The Carolene solution is to seize the high 
ground of democratic theory and establish that the challenged legislation was 
produced by a profoundly defective process. By demonstrating that the legisla-
tive decision itself resulted from an undemocratic procedure, a Carolene court 
hopes to reverse the spin of the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
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speech and other civil rights but not the economic rights that were 
of such concern to courts during the Lochner era soon became 
widely accepted.53 The result was that, after Justice Frankfurter 
retired in 1962, the argument that the Court acted illegitimately 
when it struck down speech regulations that were not patently 
unreasonable almost entirely disappeared, from both the cases 
and the law reviews. 
B. The Second Wave of Lochner Criticisms 
The widespread acceptance that the bifurcated system of re-
view had achieved by the 1960s did not mean that claims of First 
Amendment Lochnerism entirely disappeared, however. Critics 
continued to compare the contemporary free speech cases to  
Lochner-era freedom of contract cases, just as Hamilton and 
Braden did. But the analogy they drew was a different one. 
Rather than arguing that the Court repeated the errors of the 
Lochner Court when it struck down speech regulations that rea-
sonable men might find reasonable, critics now made a more nu-
anced claim: namely, that the Court resurrected Lochner when it 
interpreted the First Amendment to strike down laws that did not 
threaten the vitality of the democratic system, or any other social 
good that courts were authorized to protect under the terms of 
what was coming to be known as the New Deal settlement.54 
Justice Hugo Black was perhaps the first prominent jurist to 
make this argument. He did so in his dissenting opinion in Tinker 
v Des Moines Independent Community School District55 in 1969.56 
The case involved a free speech challenge brought by students 
who were suspended from school after they wore black armbands 
to protest the Vietnam War.57 The majority held that the suspen-
sions violated the students’ free speech rights because the First 
 
 53 As Professor David Strauss notes, although, since the mid-1950s, “many justices 
have sat on the Court . . . with different methodological and political commitments,” what 
has united all these justices is their “rejection of the Thayer[ian] view” of the judicial func-
tion. Strauss, 70 U Chi L Rev at 377 (cited in note 15). The result has been that “[t]he 
Court has not limited itself to measures that no rational person could defend; it has con-
sistently asserted a much more prominent role for itself.” Id. Nor did even the Court’s 
conservative critics advocate a Thayerian approach. See Colby and Smith, 100 Cornell L 
Rev at 566 (cited in note 26). 
 54 See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term Foreword: We 
the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4, 14 (2001). 
 55 393 US 503 (1969). 
 56 Id at 525–26 (Black dissenting). 
 57 Id at 504 (majority). 
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Amendment allowed school officials to penalize students for their 
on-campus speech only when it threatened to substantially dis-
rupt school activities or intrude upon the rights of others.58 This 
rule was necessary, the Court argued, to ensure that the nation’s 
future leaders learned not only reading and writing at school but 
also how to engage in the “robust exchange of ideas” that played 
such an important role in American politics, and public life more 
broadly.59 
Justice Black dissented not because he believed, like Justice 
Frankfurter, that heightened scrutiny was almost never appro-
priate in First Amendment cases. To the contrary: Justice Black 
made clear that he believed the First Amendment imposed signif-
icant constraints on the government’s power to “regulate or cen-
sor the content of speech” in other contexts.60 Justice Black did 
not believe, however, that the First Amendment imposed signifi-
cant constraints on the government’s power to regulate or censor 
speech in school.61 This was because he disagreed with the major-
ity about the political importance of student speech. “[S]tudents,” 
Justice Black argued, are not “sent to the schools at public ex-
pense to broadcast political or any other views to educate and in-
form the public.”62 They are instead sent to school to learn things 
they do not know.63 It should therefore, he argued, be school offi-
cials, rather than courts, that determined how much student ex-
pression was pedagogically appropriate.64 By applying heightened 
 
 58 Id at 511. 
 59 Tinker, 393 US at 512–14 (alteration in original and quotation marks and citation 
omitted): 
The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools. . . . The classroom is peculiarly the market-
place of ideas. The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection. 
 60 Id at 517 (Black dissenting). 
 61 Id at 521–22. 
 62 Id at 522. 
 63 Tinker, 393 US at 522 (Black dissenting): 
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as worthless 
or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of experience and 
wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders. It may be that the Nation 
has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that “children are to be seen not heard,” 
but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought that taxpayers send 
children to school on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach. 
 64 Id at 524. 
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scrutiny where it was not justified by the need to prevent govern-
ment interference with the democratic political process, Justice 
Black warned, the Court threatened to “resurrect[ ] that old  
reasonableness-due process test” that “prevailed in Lochner.”65 It 
arrogated to the judicial branch power that it was not entitled to, 
just as the Lochner Court once had.66 
Justice Black’s efforts to analogize Tinker to Lochner proved 
unpersuasive. Although it was true that, as a historical matter, 
schools were not viewed as important forums for political expres-
sion but instead were conceived as places in which children were 
taught “good order” and respect for authority, this view had 
largely broken down by the 1960s.67 Instead it had come to be 
widely accepted that schools should not only teach children writ-
ing and reading and math, but also the principles of democratic 
citizenship—including, among these, the principle of dissent.68 
The result was that no other member of the Court joined Justice 
Black’s opinion, and, in subsequent years, few others echoed his 
argument about the Lochner-like features of the Court’s student-
speech doctrine.69 
This did not mean, however, that others did not share the 
concern that Justice Black expressed in his Tinker dissent—
namely, that the Warren and later Burger Courts’ increasingly 
expansive free speech jurisprudence threatened to extend the 
First Amendment beyond what a democratic rationale could bear. 
It simply meant that it was not the Court’s school-speech cases 
that emerged as the focus of this concern. Arguments about the 
Lochnerization of the First Amendment instead came to focus on 
the Court’s commercial and corporate speech cases. 
 
 65 Id at 519–20. 
 66 Id at 515 (“The Court’s holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be an entirely 
new era in which the power to control pupils by the elected ‘officials of state supported 
public schools . . .’ in the United States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme 
Court.”) (alteration in original). 
 67 For expression of the older view, see State v Mizner, 45 Iowa 248, 250–51 (1876) 
(reversing a lower court ruling barring teachers from using corporal punishment on female 
students over eighteen years old on the grounds that such a rule “might destroy the au-
thority of the teacher and be utterly subversive of good order” in the school). 
 68 See Justin Driver, The Schoolhouse Gate: Public Education, the Supreme Court, 
and the Battle for the American Mind 78–79 (Pantheon 2018) (noting Tinker’s overwhelm-
ingly positive public reaction). 
 69 Of the contemporary members of the Court, only Justice Clarence Thomas has 
followed Justice Black in suggesting any connection between the student-speech cases and 
Lochner. See Morse v Frederick, 551 US 393, 420–21 (2007) (Thomas concurring). 
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In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc70 in 1976, a 7–1 majority of the Court held that 
“purely commercial advertising”—which it defined as speech that 
“does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction’”—was en-
titled to First Amendment protection, and that the state of  
Virginia could not therefore constitutionally prohibit pharmacies 
from advertising the prices of their prescription drugs.71 The hold-
ing represented a major doctrinal shift. Three decades earlier, in 
Valentine v Chrestensen,72 the Court had held—in a unanimous, 
albeit extremely brief, opinion—that the First Amendment con-
straints that applied when the government regulated other kinds 
of speech did not apply when the government regulated purely 
commercial advertising.73 Over the next three decades, the Court 
defined the category of purely commercial advertising increas-
ingly narrowly, but continued to assume that speech of this sort 
lay beyond the scope of First Amendment concern.74 
In explicitly overturning Valentine, Virginia Pharmacy un-
settled over thirty years of precedent. It also suggested that, from 
here on out, legislatures would possess significantly less power 
than they had thus far to regulate what was, by the 1970s, an 
important segment of the market economy. The opinion was care-
ful to note that the Court’s holding did not mean that legislatures 
would not be able to regulate commercial advertising at all. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun made clear, for exam-
ple, that legislatures would still be able to prohibit false as well 
as misleading advertising, and suggested that they would also be 
able to require advertisements to “appear in such a form, or in-
clude such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as 
are necessary to prevent [their] being deceptive.”75 He strongly 
suggested, however, that legislatures would no longer be able to 
enact what he called “paternalistic” advertising laws—laws that 
 
 70 425 US 748 (1976). 
 71 Id at 755, 762, 770. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the case. 
 72 316 US 52 (1942). 
 73 Id at 54. 
 74 See, for example, Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809, 822 (1975) (concluding that the 
First Amendment applied to abortion ads because the ads “contained factual material of 
clear ‘public interest’”); New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 256–57, 266 (1964) 
(concluding that the First Amendment applied to an ad paid for by supporters of the civil 
rights movement that “communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, 
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose 
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern”). 
 75 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24. 
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prohibited advertising because the legislature feared that con-
sumers would use the information it conveyed in harmful ways.76 
The opinion also unequivocally held that legislatures would no 
longer be able to totally ban the advertising of lawful goods or 
services.77 
The reaction was strong and immediate. Although some com-
mentators celebrated the decision, others sharply criticized it for 
excessively constraining the power of the democratic legislature. 
Many of those who made the latter argument invoked Lochner to 
do so. In an influential law review article published three years 
after the decision was handed down, Professors Thomas Jackson 
and John Calvin Jeffries Jr argued, for example, that the decision 
in Virginia Pharmacy “reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New 
York as components of freedom of speech.”78 Professor Edwin 
Baker similarly argued that the extension of constitutional pro-
tection to advertising augured a return to the Lochner era.79 And 
in a dissent he wrote four years after Virginia Pharmacy was 
handed down, Justice William Rehnquist—the only member of 
the Court to have dissented from the original opinion—argued 
that, by extending significant constitutional protection to com-
mercial advertising, the Court 
return[ed constitutional law] to the bygone era of Lochner v. 
New York, . . . in which it was common practice for this Court 
to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based 
on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for 
the State to implement its considered policies.80 
What these critics meant when they accused Virginia Phar-
macy of returning constitutional law to the Lochner era was not 
that the decision literally introduced into First Amendment law 
the doctrinal distinctions that led the Lochner Court to overturn 
 
 76 Id at 769–70 (arguing that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures like  
Virginia’s from “keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that compet-
ing pharmacists are offering” in their misguided efforts to prevent the public from misus-
ing that information). 
 77 Id at 773 (“What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dis-
semination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that 
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, 
we conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.”) (citation omitted). 
 78 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 30–31 (citation omitted) (cited in note 3). 
 79 C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 Iowa 
L Rev 1, 2 n 5 (1976). 
 80 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 US 557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist dissenting). 
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the New York bakery law. What they meant was instead the same 
thing that Justice Black meant when he accused the Tinker Court 
of Lochnerism: namely, that the decision illegitimately aggran-
dized judicial power by preventing the democratic legislature 
from being able to regulate even democratically unimportant 
speech. 
Commercial advertising is democratically unimportant, they 
argued, because it has nothing to say about the political realm. 
As Jackson and Jeffries noted: “The typical newspaper advertise-
ment or television commercial makes no comment on governmen-
tal personnel or policy. It does not marshal information relevant 
to political action, nor does it focus public attention on questions 
of political significance.”81 This meant, critics insisted, that  
the democratic arguments the Court had relied on for four  
decades at that point to justify heightened scrutiny of protected 
speech did not justify extending the same heightened scrutiny to 
commercial ads.82 
Nor, critics argued, does constitutionalizing the regulation of 
commercial advertising protect any other important First Amend-
ment interest—in particular, its interest in safeguarding from 
state control a sphere of individual expressive autonomy. Since 
the early twentieth century, the Court had recognized that the 
First Amendment protects not only the robust political debate 
necessary to ensure a healthy system of democratic government, 
but also the individual right “to think as you will and to speak as 
you think”—and that it does so both as a means of vindicating 
democratic principles and as an end in itself.83 
 
 81 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 15 (cited in note 3). 
 82 See id (arguing that because commercial advertising concerns only “economic ra-
ther than political decisionmaking,” the “structure of representative democracy yields no 
inference of [its] inviolability”); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 787–88 (Rehnquist dissent-
ing) (citation omitted): 
The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view that 
the First Amendment is “primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision 
making in a democracy.” I had understood this view to relate to public decision 
making as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision 
of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of  
shampoo. 
 83 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis concurring). See also 
Barnette, 319 US at 642 (concluding that a compulsory flag-salute law was unconstitu-
tional because it “invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control”); Stanley v  
Georgia, 394 US 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that 
a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may 
read or what films he may watch.”). 
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Beginning in the 1960s, prominent First Amendment theo-
rists began to argue that the First Amendment’s primary purpose 
was to protect individual expressive freedom and that it was a 
mistake, as a result, to give any constitutional priority to political, 
or even public, speech.84 Critics of the Court’s advertising deci-
sions were not so sure. Jackson and Jeffries, in particular, ex-
pressed significant discomfort with this view of the First Amend-
ment, which they warned could be used to create a jurisprudence 
that undercut, rather than reinforced, democratic government by 
constraining the political branches even when doing so was not 
necessary to ensuring that the processes of political representa-
tion were working well.85 They noted, for example, that a First 
Amendment conceived primarily as an instrument of what  
Professor Thomas Emerson called “individual self-fulfillment” 
could be used to “disallow[ ] legislative choice on grounds unre-
lated to the integrity of the political process” and “thus limit[ ] the 
power of the [ ] political system that the guarantee of freedom of 
speech, at least in part, is designed to nurture.”86 
Jackson and Jeffries nevertheless agreed with Emerson, 
Baker, and others who held this view that, even if the First 
Amendment’s primary goal is to guarantee individual expressive 
freedom, Virginia Pharmacy would still be wrongly decided.87 
This is because, they claimed, commercial advertising simply is 
not a medium that individuals use to find “individual self- 
fulfillment” or to express themselves.88 Instead ads exist for one 
purpose and one purpose only: to increase sales for the products 
 
 84 See, for example, Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 591, 
593–94, 604 (1982) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only 
one true value, . . . ‘individual self-realization,’” which means that its “appropriate scope 
. . . is much broader than [a democracy-focused theory] would have it. . . . There thus is no 
logical basis for distinguishing the role speech plays in the political process.”); Thomas I. 
Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6–7 (Random House 1970) (arguing that 
freedom of expression is “[f]irst, . . . essential as a means of assuring individual self- 
fulfillment” and also “essential to provide for participation in decision making by all  
members of society . . . [not only in] the political realm . . . [but also] in religion, literature, 
art, science, and all areas of human learning and knowledge”); Baker, 62 Iowa L Rev at 8 
(cited in note 79) (“As a manifestation of the self, speech deserves protection even if it is 
not used to communicate with others.”). 
 85 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 13 n 46 (cited in note 3). This meant, they 
argued, that the Emersonian view of the First Amendment as a safeguard of expressive 
freedom existed in only “ironic relationship” to the traditional view of the First Amend-
ment as a safeguard of democratic government. Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id at 14–15. 
 88 Id at 14. 
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they advertise.89 As a result, Jackson and Jeffries argued, the only 
interests advanced by applying heightened scrutiny to the regu-
lation of advertisements are the kinds of economic liberty inter-
ests the Lochner Court protected in its freedom of contract cases. 
It was this that led them to conclude that Virginia Pharmacy “re-
constituted the values of Lochner v. New York as components of 
freedom of speech.”90 
Critics made similar arguments around the same time about 
another line of cases in which the Court applied heightened scru-
tiny to laws that regulate the nonadvertising speech of corpora-
tions, as well as corporate spending on political speech. Although 
prior to the 1970s the Court had frequently extended constitu-
tional protection to media corporations and had also made clear 
that nonprofit corporations could possess First Amendment 
rights, it had never squarely ruled on whether for-profit, nonme-
dia corporations (or what it referred to simply as “business corpo-
rations”) were protected by the Speech Clause.91 This changed in 
1978, when in First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti,92 the Court 
held that a state law that prohibited corporations from spending 
money to influence the vote on popular referenda that did not 
“materially affect[ ] any of the[ir] property, business or assets”  
violated the First Amendment by restricting, without sufficient 
justification, the speech of business corporations.93 
 
 89 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 14 (cited in note 3) (“[T]he concept of a [F]irst 
[A]mendment right of personal autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops short 
of a seller hawking his wares.”); Baker, 62 Iowa L Rev at 3 (cited in note 79): 
[I]n our present historical setting, commercial speech is not a manifestation of 
individual freedom or choice; unlike the broad categories of protected speech, 
commercial speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the world in 
a way which can be expected to represent anyone’s private or personal wishes. 
See also Emerson, Freedom of Expression at 311 (cited in note 84) (asserting that adver-
tising, like “soliciting, canvassing, [and] similar conduct that is wholly ‘commercial’ in na-
ture . . . fall[s] within the system of commercial enterprise and . . . outside the system of 
freedom of expression”). 
 90 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 30–31 (citation omitted) (cited in note 3). 
 91 Pre–Virginia Pharmacy cases involving the First Amendment rights of media cor-
porations include Red Lion Broadcasting Co v Federal Communications Commission, 395 
US 367 (1969); Sullivan, 376 US 254; Joseph Burstyn, Inc v Wilson, 343 US 495 (1952); 
and Grosjean v American Press Co, 297 US 233, 244 (1936). The Court recognized the  
First Amendment rights of a nonprofit corporation (the NAACP) in National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People v Button, 371 US 415, 428–29 (1963). For use of  
the term “business corporation,” see First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 
767 (1978). 
 92 435 US 765 (1978). 
 93 Id at 767–68, 776. 
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Although the Court refused to hold that the First Amend-
ment rights of corporate persons were identical to those of natural 
persons, it adamantly rejected the idea that the only corporations 
that possessed a constitutionally protected right to speak were 
media companies or advocacy organizations. “[T]he press does not 
have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to 
enlighten,” Justice Lewis Powell noted for the majority.94 “The in-
herent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual.”95 Two years later, 
in Consolidated Edison Co of New York v Public Service Commis-
sion of New York,96 the Court again struck down a law that regu-
lated noncommercial corporate speech—in this case, an order by 
a state agency that prohibited a privately owned public utility 
from including inserts expressing “[its] opinions or viewpoints on 
controversial issues of public policy” in the billing envelopes it 
sent to customers each month.97 
Critics argued that, like the advertising cases, these cases au-
gured a “return to the Lochner era of economic due process” by 
extending protection to speech that furthered primarily economic 
freedom, rather than the democratic or expressive freedom the 
First Amendment was supposed to protect.98 In making this argu-
ment, they acknowledged that the nonadvertising speech of  
corporations was not necessarily irrelevant to political decision-
making. To the contrary: the speech at issue in Bellotti and  
Pacific Gas & Electric Co v Public Utilities Commission of  
California99 was obviously politically relevant, and designed to 
be.100 Nevertheless, critics argued, regulations of even politically 
 
 94 Id at 782. 
 95 Id at 777. 
 96 447 US 530 (1980). 
 97 Id at 533. 
 98 C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and 
Redish’s The Value of Free Speech, 130 U Pa L Rev 646, 653 n 25 (1982); Note, The Cor-
poration and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 Yale L J 
1833, 1834 (1981) (“[B]y reaffirming and extending the entitlement of corporations to con-
stitutional rights, the Court in Bellotti rendered a decision strongly reminiscent of the 
economic due process era, one marking an important departure from post–New Deal con-
stitutional jurisprudence to date.”). 
 99 475 US 1 (1986). 
 100 The corporation that challenged the law in Bellotti wished to spend money to in-
fluence the vote on a ballot question about a proposed state constitutional amendment 
that would have permitted the legislature to introduce a graduated income tax. Bellotti, 
435 US at 769. In Pacific Gas, the corporation wished to continue to include in its billing 
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relevant corporate speech do not pose the same threat to the  
vitality of democratic public debate that regulations of noncorpo-
rate speech do. This is because, even when the government totally 
bans corporations from speaking, the natural persons who  
comprise the corporation remain perfectly free to make the  
corporation’s arguments themselves.101 Accordingly, restrictions 
on corporate speech “impinge[ ] much less severely upon the 
availability of ideas to the general public than do restrictions 
upon individual speech.”102 
Nor, critics claimed, do regulations of corporate speech im-
pede the ability of individuals to “use [ ] communication as a 
means of self-expression, self-realization, [or] self-fulfillment.”103 
This is because, even when it does not take the form of commer-
cial advertising, corporate speech reflects the economic impera-
tives of the corporate entity that pays for it, rather than the val-
ues or beliefs of the individuals who compose it.104 As a result, the 
primary interest advanced by the constitutionalization of corpo-
rate speech is not democracy or self-expression but corporate eco-
nomic liberty—and this is not an interest the First Amendment 
cares anything about. 
Although the details of the arguments differed, the conclu-
sion that critics reached about the corporate speech cases—
namely, that they represented “an important departure from 
post–New Deal constitutional jurisprudence” and a return to a 
Lochnerian vision of the Constitution as a guarantor of economic 
liberty—was identical to the conclusion that critics reached about 
the advertising cases.105 In both areas of law, critics argued that 
the extension of constitutional protection to commercial entities 
 
inserts a magazine it published that “included political editorials [and] feature stories on 
matters of public interest” as well as “tips on energy conservation, and straightforward 
information about utility services and bills.” Pacific Gas, 475 US at 5. 
 101 Bellotti, 435 US at 807 (White dissenting) (“Even the complete curtailment of cor-
porate communications concerning political or ideological questions not integral to day-to-
day business functions would leave . . . corporate shareholders, employees, and customers, 
free to communicate their thoughts.”); Note, 90 Yale L J at 1856 (cited in note 98) (“[A]llow-
ing legislatures to restrict the use of corporate property would intrude upon the speech 
rights of no individuals. Corporate owners and managers would be as free as before to 
advocate their political views.”). 
 102 Bellotti, 435 US at 807 (White dissenting). 
 103 Id at 804. 
 104 Baker, 130 U Pa L Rev at 653 (cited in note 98) (“[T]he market mechanism, by 
forcing the enterprise to make the most efficient (profit-maximizing) decisions, dictates 
the content of the enterprise’s speech, and thus separates the decision concerning speech 
content from the value decisions of either the employees or the owners of the enterprise.”). 
 105 Note, 90 Yale L J at 1834 (cited in note 98). 
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and to commercially oriented speech constituted a judicial usur-
pation of legislative power similar to that enacted by the Lochner 
Court. 
For a while, these arguments appeared to persuade the Court 
to back away from rigorously protecting commercially oriented 
speech. Two years after Virginia Pharmacy was handed down, the 
Court handed down another commercial advertising decision in 
which it asserted that commercial advertising was entitled to only 
“a limited measure of [constitutional] protection, commensurate 
with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment val-
ues.”106 Several years later, the Court held in Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates v Tourism Company of Puerto Rico107 that, be-
cause the Puerto Rican legislature possessed the “greater power” 
to ban all gambling in the territory, it also possessed the “lesser 
power” to ban all ads about gambling in the territory, even when 
it did not choose to ban the gambling itself.108 Given the tremen-
dous power that legislatures otherwise possessed to ban the sale 
of certain kinds of goods since the demise of economic due process, 
the Court’s lesser-power argument granted legislatures virtually 
unlimited power to ban whatever advertising they desired.109 At 
the same time, the Court also significantly cut back the protection 
afforded corporate speakers by the First Amendment when it 
held, in Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,110 that 
the special advantages that corporations possessed, by virtue of 
state law, justified more extensive regulation of their political 
spending than would otherwise be permitted.111 
This pullback in the protection afforded commercial advertis-
ing and corporate speech did not last forever, however. Beginning 
in the early 1990s, the Court began to show renewed solicitude 
 
 106 Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447, 456 (1978). 
 107 478 US 328 (1986). 
 108 Id at 345–46. 
 109 See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: “’Twas 
Strange, ’Twas Passing Strange; ’Twas Pitiful, ’Twas Wondrous Pitiful”, 1986 S Ct Rev 1, 
12–13 (noting that, if “advertising of any economic activity that was not itself constitu-
tionally protected activity, however legal that activity might be, was properly subject to 
government censorship . . . , then, under Posadas, there is no advertising that is not sub-
ject to government censorship”). “[T]he protection of commercial speech under the First 
Amendment,” Professor Kathleen Sullivan noted ten years later, appeared “[l]eft for dead.” 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 
Liquormart, 1996 S Ct Rev 123, 123. 
 110 494 US 652 (1990). 
 111 Id at 658–59. 
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for the free speech rights of advertisers and for-profit corpora-
tions. In 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island,112 it adamantly re-
jected the “greater power includes the lesser power” argument 
from Posadas.113 It also applied increasingly stringent scrutiny to 
the arguments the government used to justify advertising regula-
tions, as well as laws regulating corporate speech and spending.114 
The result was a resurgence of arguments along the lines of 
those that Baker, Jackson and Jeffries, and Justice Rehnquist 
made in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Critics both on and off 
the Court asserted, just as critics had decades earlier, that the 
new commercial and corporate speech cases signaled a return to 
the Lochner era. In 1999, Professor Daniel Greenwood argued, for 
example, that the “rapid expansion [of the First Amendment] into 
areas long thought impervious to constitutional law”—specifi-
cally, areas “of economic regulation we thought the courts had 
abandoned to the legislatures after the Lochner disaster”—had 
made the Speech Clause “the locus of a new Lochnerism[, ]or ra-
ther, a revival of the old Lochnerism under a new doctrinal la-
bel.”115 Nine years later, Professor Tamara Piety similarly argued 
that the commercial and corporate speech cases reflected “a sort 
of latter-day Lochnerism” by extending constitutional protection 
to speech that furthers primarily economic rather than expressive 
aims.116 
This time around, these criticisms utterly failed to persuade 
the Court to pull back the level of scrutiny it applied to regula-
tions of commercial and corporate speech. If anything, the Court 
ratcheted up the level of protection it applied in commercial and 
corporate speech cases. In Citizens United v Federal Election 
 
 112 517 US 484 (1996). 
 113 Id at 510–11. 
 114 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts 
After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Houston L Rev 697, 732 (2003) (“The Court 
concluded in the mid-1970s that commercial advertising was constitutionally protected; 
seemingly pulled back on that protection in the 1980s; but has been providing more and 
more protection since the early 1990s.”) (citations omitted); Richard L. Hasen, Election 
Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but with Speed Bumps 
and Surprising Twists, 68 Stan L Rev 1597, 1603 (2016) (“The campaign finance landscape 
changed dramatically with the emergence of the Roberts Court, turning a Court that usu-
ally voted in favor of campaign limits by a 5–4 vote into one usually voting against such 
limits by a 5–4 vote.”). 
 115 Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 Utah L Rev 659, 
659–61 (citation omitted). 
 116 Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 Cardozo L Rev 
2583, 2586 (2008). 
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Commission,117 in 2010, the Court adamantly rejected the idea 
that the corporate nature of the speaker should make any differ-
ence to the analysis in free speech cases.118 The following year, in 
Sorrell v IMS Health Inc,119 it applied exceedingly rigorous scru-
tiny to a law that regulated the sale of information to pharmaceu-
tical marketers, and ultimately struck the law down.120 
Decisions like these have led to continuing criticism of the 
Lochnerian tendencies of the contemporary commercial and cor-
porate speech cases. Some of the critics argue—just as Justice 
Rehnquist and Jackson and Jeffries once argued—that, in order 
to prevent the First Amendment from replicating the sins of the 
Lochner Court, advertising and corporate speech should be en-
tirely denied constitutional protection.121 Others accept that some 
measure of constitutional protection for commercial and corpo-
rate speech is required, but argue that contemporary free speech 
law resurrects Lochner by failing to respect the “subordinate  
 
 117 558 US 310 (2010). 
 118 Id at 340–41. 
 119 564 US 552 (2011). 
 120 Id at 557, 565–70, 580. 
 121 See, for example, Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening 
the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech Tradition, 69 Stan L Rev 1389, 1392–93 
(2017) (describing the scholarly “consensus” that “the outward creep of the First Amend-
ment” has produced a “neo-Lochner moment” in free speech law); Reza R. Dibadj, The Po-
litical Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 SC L Rev 913, 917, 919 (2007): 
Theorists have too easily tried to elevate commercial speech to the level of polit-
ical, artistic, or scientific speech at the core of the First Amendment. Commercial 
speech, however, is different.  
. . .  
At its core, commercial speech is about facilitating a monetary transaction, not 
serious political, artistic, or scientific discourse. 
See also Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the First Amend-
ment, 70 Food & Drug L J 25, 25 (2015) (arguing that in recent years “[o]bjections having 
little to do with free speech at their heart [have been] channeled into First Amendment 
challenges,” and that “most commercial speech regulation” is “fundamentally economic 
policy”); Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 Wm & Mary L Rev 1119, 1128–
30 (2015) (stating that “[f]or almost two centuries, the First Amendment was considered 
largely irrelevant to regulation of speech advancing commercial and professional activities 
because such regulation was understood to be directed fundamentally at commerce rather 
than at discourse in the public sphere,” and arguing that recent commercial speech cases 
err by “conflat[ing] [ ] spending and speaking” and by failing to “make[ ] meaningful dis-
tinctions among kinds of speech-related activities”); Coates, 30 Const Commen at 239 
(cited in note 6) (arguing that constitutional protection for corporate speech represents a 
“radical break with the history and traditions of U.S. law” and is “incompatib[le] . . . with 
American political realities”). 
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position” that commercially oriented speech possesses in the hi-
erarchy of First Amendment values.122 In all cases, however, the 
claim is that the recent cases extend more protection to corporate 
and commercial speech than it warrants, and consequently rep-
resents a “return[ ] to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York.”123 
These arguments have considerable rhetorical force. By in-
voking Lochner, critics are able to accuse the Court not only of 
reaching the wrong result in its commercial and corporate speech 
cases but also of employing a mode of constitutional jurisprudence 
that has been, in theory at least, almost universally disavowed 
for over seventy years. They also highlight the obvious similari-
ties in the effects of Lochner-era due process and contemporary 
free speech law—namely, the fact that both doctrines result in 
meaningful limits on the legislature’s ability to regulate the  
market. 
But are they correct? Is it the case that commercial advertis-
ing and corporate speech possess, at best, a subordinate status in 
the First Amendment hierarchy due to the fact that they further 
primarily economic rather than expressive ends? Is it the case, as 
a result, that the extension of close-to-full constitutional protec-
tion to commercial advertising and to the noncommercial speech 
of business corporations represents an unjustified departure—or 
what some have described as a “radical break”—from the princi-
ples that guided First Amendment jurisprudence up until the 
1970s?124 
In the next Part, I argue that the answer to these questions 
is no—that the commercial and corporate speech cases do not rep-
resent a break, radical or otherwise, from the principles that 
guided First Amendment jurisprudence over the previous four 
decades. Instead, they can be justified by the same principles that 
 
 122 For examples of critics who take this position, see Amanda Shanor, The New  
Lochner, 2016 Wis L Rev 133, 146, 150 (arguing that the state may regulate commercial 
speech more extensively than other kinds of speech due to its “subordinate [constitutional] 
status and [the fact that] it is not a speaker-oriented autonomy right” but that the  
Supreme Court’s recent advertising cases “undermin[e] the [doctrinal] features that the 
Court that created the [commercial speech] doctrine put in place to ensure that the First 
Amendment would not be the undoing of the regulatory state”); Post and Shanor, 128 Harv 
L Rev F at 170–73 (cited in note 2) (arguing that because commercial speech, unlike polit-
ical speech, does not contribute to “public discourse,” courts should protect it only to the 
extent necessary to protect the flow of accurate information to the public, and criticizing 
recent cases for not applying this rule). 
 123 Central Hudson, 447 US at 589 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
 124 Weiland, 69 Stan L Rev at 1397 (cited in note 121); Coates, 30 Const Commen at 
239 (cited in note 6). 
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led the Court in the decades prior to Virginia Pharmacy to extend 
protection to labor picketing, movies, music, pulp magazines,  
and many other kinds of nondidactic, nonexplicitly political  
expression. 
Accordingly, the Court did not violate the New Deal settle-
ment when it extended protection to commercial and corporate 
speech. Nor does it violate the New Deal settlement when (as is 
increasingly the case) it fails to significantly distinguish the pro-
tection afforded commercial and political or artistic speech. This 
is not to say that there is no respect in which contemporary free 
speech law “resurrects Lochner.” But it is not because courts in-
terpret the scope of the First Amendment too expansively, to in-
clude economically valuable but constitutionally valueless 
speech. Instead its cause must be found elsewhere—as I explore 
in Part III. 
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH THE CONVENTIONAL CRITIQUE 
To understand why the Burger Court’s decision to extend con-
stitutional protection to commercial advertising and noncommer-
cial corporate speech—or the Court’s more recent tendency to 
grant commercial advertising almost the same level of First 
Amendment protection as that afforded other kinds of speech—
does not represent the departure from the principles of New Deal 
constitutional jurisprudence that critics allege, it is necessary to 
first understand what those principles are. More specifically, it is 
necessary to understand the limiting principles the Court has em-
ployed to ensure that its vigorous enforcement of First Amend-
ment rights does not undermine the balance between judicial and 
legislative power that the New Deal settlement was intended to 
establish. Only once we understand how modern free speech law 
fits into the New Deal settlement can we understand why the ex-
tension of First Amendment protection to commercial and corpo-
rate speech does not subvert it. 
Figuring this out is somewhat more difficult than one might 
suppose, given the important role that the First Amendment 
played in motivating the central innovation of the New Deal set-
tlement—namely, the bifurcated system of review. As noted in 
Part I, a major reason for the Court’s embrace of the two-tiered 
system of review was its belief that, although courts should gen-
erally defer to the wisdom of legislative decision-making—even 
when individual rights were at stake—First Amendment rights 
were “special . . . and deserved particular judicial solicitude” due 
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to their importance to democratic government.125 It was primarily 
with the First Amendment in mind, in other words, that the New 
Deal Court developed the bifurcated system. It is no coincidence, 
in this respect, that the majority of cases cited in Carolene Prod-
ucts’ famous footnote four are First Amendment cases.126 
Despite this fact, the Court rarely referred to Carolene Prod-
ucts in its First Amendment decisions.127 Outside of the advertis-
ing cases, it also placed little emphasis on the distinction that 
Carolene Products suggested should be the central pivot of the 
New Deal settlement—namely, the distinction between laws that 
“affect[ ] ordinary commercial transactions” and laws that affect 
noncommercial activity.128 
In fact, the Court repeatedly rejected the idea that laws reg-
ulating speech that occurs in a commercial setting or advances 
commercial ends should be subject, for that reason, to mere ra-
tional basis scrutiny. In its 1945 decision in Thomas v Collins,129 
for example, the Court rigorously scrutinized—and ultimately 
struck down—provisions in a Texas law that governed how union 
organizers solicited new members, even though it acknowledged 
that the unions affected by the law were “engaged in business ac-
tivities” and that the organizers whose speech it regulated fre-
quently “receive[d] compensation” for their speech.130 “The idea is 
not sound,” Justice Wiley Rutledge insisted in his majority opin-
ion, “that the First Amendment’s safeguards are wholly inappli-
cable to business or economic activity.”131 Several years later, in 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc v Wilson,132 the Court rejected the argument 
that movies “do not fall within the First Amendment’s aegis be-
cause their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-
scale business conducted for private profit.”133 It concluded, to the 
 
 125 White, 95 Mich L Rev at 302 (cited in note 51). 
 126 Of the seventeen cases cited as support in footnote four, nine are First Amendment 
cases. Carolene Products, 304 US at 153 n 4. 
 127 In the twenty or so years after it was handed down, only two First Amendment 
decisions cited Carolene Products for the proposition that courts should apply stricter scru-
tiny when First Amendment rights were at stake than they applied when other kinds of 
rights were threatened. Both, interestingly enough, were picketing cases. See Thomas v 
Collins, 323 US 516, 529–30 (1945); Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88, 95–96 (1940). 
 128 Carolene Products, 304 US at 152. 
 129 323 US 516 (1945). 
 130 Id at 531. These facts, it is worth noting, led the Texas Supreme Court to conclude 
that rational basis scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review, and that the law was 
ultimately constitutional. Ex parte Thomas, 141 Tex 591, 596 (1943). 
 131 Collins, 323 US at 531. 
 132 343 US 495 (1952). 
 133 Id at 501. 
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contrary, that like books, magazines, and newspapers, movies 
were “a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the 
First Amendment.”134 
The Court’s willingness to extend First Amendment protec-
tion to commercially oriented speech did not mean that it was in-
sensitive to the possibility that the First Amendment could be in-
terpreted so expansively it could unravel the New Deal 
settlement. As Professor Jeremy Kessler and others have shown, 
members of the New Deal Court were deeply concerned that the 
overly aggressive enforcement of First Amendment rights might 
undermine the Court’s newly regained legitimacy, as well as the 
vitality of the regulatory state.135 The Court’s response to this con-
cern, however, was not to categorically deny protection to speech 
that was motivated by economic concerns, related to commercial 
matters, or sold in the marketplace.136 
Some members of the Court suggested that this was how the 
First Amendment should be interpreted. Justices Stanley Reed, 
Robert Jackson, and Felix Frankfurter, for example, objected to a 
series of decisions in which the Court held that laws that imposed 
a fixed license tax on those who sold books and pamphlets door to 
door violated the freedom of speech as well as the free exercise 
rights of those they regulated.137 They argued that, by extending 
protection to what was essentially commercial activity, these de-
cisions threatened the delicate balance between legislative and 
judicial power that the Court had only very recently put in 
place.138 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 Colum 
L Rev 1915, 1956–76 (2016). 
 136 See Douglas v City of Jeannette, 319 US 157, 179–81 (1943) (Jackson concurring). 
 137 Id at 181–82; Jones v City of Opelika, 319 US 103, 117 (1943) (Reed dissenting); 
Jones, 319 US at 134 (Frankfurter dissenting). 
 138 See, for example, Jones, 319 US at 131–32 (Reed dissenting):  
[W]e [do not] think it can be said, properly, that these sales of religious books 
are religious exercises. . . . And even if the distribution of religious books was a 
religious practice protected from regulation by the First Amendment, certainly 
the affixation of a price for the articles would destroy the sacred character of the 
transaction. The evangelist becomes also a book agent.  
See also id at 133: 
The limitations of the Constitution are not maxims of social wisdom but definite 
controls on the legislative process. We are dealing with power, not its abuse. This 
late withdrawal of the power of taxation over the distribution activities of those 
covered by the First Amendment fixes what seems to us an unfortunate principle 
of tax exemption, capable of indefinite extension. 
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The majority of justices on the Court unequivocally rejected 
this argument, however. They insisted that the First Amendment 
not only protects the commercial sale of expressive materials but 
also prevents local governments from requiring those who wished 
to engage in this kind of activity to pay for the privilege of doing 
so. This was the case, Justice William O. Douglas explained in his 
majority opinion in Murdock v Pennsylvania,139 because any other 
rule would give local governments the power to prevent groups 
they disliked from spreading their message from door to door, by 
making it too costly for them to do so.140 The Court recognized, in 
other words, that in our highly commodified public sphere, a great 
deal of important expression takes the form of a commodity, and 
interpreted the First Amendment accordingly. It refused, as a re-
sult, to restrict constitutional protection to only noncommodified 
speech. 
The Court instead limited the reach of the First Amendment 
in other ways. It insisted, for example, that courts did not need to 
rigorously scrutinize laws that merely incidentally restrict First 
Amendment rights. Hence, in Associated Press v National Labor 
Relations Board,141 in 1937, a five-member majority of the Court 
adamantly rejected the argument that the First Amendment pre-
vented Congress from enforcing the National Labor Relations Act 
against media companies like the Associated Press (AP).142 “The 
business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation,” 
the Court explained, “because it is an agency of the press. The 
publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the appli-
cation of general laws.”143 Because the Act did not in any way re-
strict publishers from “publish[ing] the news as [they] desire[d] it 
published,” the Court deferred to Congress’s judgment that the 
law was an “appropriate regulation[ ] . . . for the protection and 
advancement . . . [of interstate] commerce.”144 
 
 139 319 US 105 (1943). 
 140 Id at 115: 
The way of the religious dissenter has long been hard. But if the formula of this 
type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the suppression of religious mi-
norities will have been found. This method of disseminating religious beliefs can 
be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is ex-
acted town by town, village by village. 
 141 301 US 103 (1937). 
 142 Id at 130–31. 
 143 Id at 132. 
 144 Id at 129, 133. 
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The Court also applied deferential scrutiny to laws that di-
rectly regulated speech that, on its view, had nothing to contrib-
ute to public debate. In Chaplinsky v New Hampshire,145 for ex-
ample, the Court held that the First Amendment imposes no 
restrictions on the government’s ability to punish the public use 
of derogatory comments, or “fighting words,” because speech of 
this kind possesses “such slight social value” that even its total 
prohibition would not significantly undermine the search for 
truth or, presumably, any of the other goods the First Amend-
ment safeguards.146 
As these cases make clear, the Court reconciled vigorous pro-
tection for speech with the New Deal order not by restricting ju-
dicial activism to a noncommercial sphere, but by employing a 
purposive interpretation of the First Amendment’s reach: by in-
sisting, in other words, that heightened scrutiny was necessary 
only when “the regulation of communication affect[ed] a constitu-
tional value specifically protected by the First Amendment.”147 
The result was the creation of a free speech jurisprudence that, 
even as it markedly constrained legislative power in some re-
spects, imposed few constraints on it in others. 
Critics are absolutely right, therefore, when they assert that 
under the free speech principles articulated first by the New Deal 
Court, laws regulating commercial and corporate speech should 
be subject to heightened scrutiny only when they threaten inter-
ests that are, as Professors Jackson and Jeffries put it, “appropri-
ate for [ ] vindication under the [F]irst [A]mendment.”148 The mere 
fact that they regulate speech is not a sufficient reason, on its 
own, to do so. Nor could it be, given how much human conduct 
involves expressive activity, in one form or another. As Professor 
Fred Schauer notes: 
“Speech” is what we use to enter into contracts, make wills, 
sell securities, warrant the quality of the goods we sell, fix 
prices, place bets, bid at auctions, enter into conspiracies, 
commit blackmail, threaten, give evidence at trials, and do 
 
 145 315 US 568 (1942). 
 146 Id at 572. 
 147 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L Rev 1, 
9 (2000). 
 148 Jackson and Jeffries, 65 Va L Rev at 6 (cited in note 3). 
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most of the other things that occupy our days and occupy the 
courts.149 
A rule that required heightened scrutiny whenever the govern-
ment regulates speech, let alone expressive conduct, would effec-
tively constitutionalize great swathes of both criminal and civil 
law. It would threaten the bifurcated system of review as surely 
as the resurrection of a freedom to contract would—and perhaps 
more so. 
Critics are wrong, however, when they conclude from this fact 
that the First Amendment should be understood to impose little 
or no constraint on the government when it regulates commercial 
advertising or the speech of business corporations. This is because 
when the government regulates commercial advertising and at 
least some kinds of corporate speech, its actions do threaten free 
speech values. They threaten, more specifically, what the Court 
insisted again and again was the primary social good that the 
First Amendment protected: namely, the “free political discus-
sion” necessary to ensure that “government may be responsive to 
the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be ob-
tained by peaceful means.”150 As a result, we do not have to an-
swer the difficult question of whether and to what extent individ-
uals engage in self-expression when they write or pay for 
advertisements, or when they speak or pay for speech in a corpo-
ration’s name. 
Even if we think of the First Amendment exclusively as an 
instrument for “assur[ing] [the] unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people,” a strong argument can be made that when the gov-
ernment regulates purely commercial advertising or regulates at 
least some kinds of corporate speech, its actions can threaten 
First Amendment values, and therefore should be subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny.151 This is because of two other prin-
ciples of modern free speech jurisprudence that critics of the com-
mercial advertising and corporate speech cases tend to ignore. 
The first is the principle that speech need not touch explicitly 
on politics to contribute to the free political discussion necessary 
to ensuring responsive democratic government. The Court made 
 
 149 Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Explo-
ration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv L Rev 1765, 1773 (2004). 
 150 De Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 365 (1937). 
 151 See Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484 (1957). 
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this clear very early on when, in Stromberg v California152 in 1931, 
it struck down a California law that made it a crime to “display[ ] 
a red flag . . . as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to orga-
nized government” because it found that the law could be used to 
punish those who raised the red flag to symbolize purely “peaceful 
and orderly opposition to government” and therefore interfered 
with the “free political discussion” that the First Amendment 
guaranteed.153 In holding as much, the Court took for granted that 
speech can have political significance even when it makes no ex-
plicit political claims and is designed to appeal primarily to its 
audience’s emotional, as opposed to cognitive, faculties—as the 
raising of the red flag clearly was.154 
In later cases, the Court extended constitutional protection 
to much less obviously political kinds of speech because it recog-
nized that those too could contribute, however indirectly, to polit-
ical debate. In Winters v New York,155 for example, the Court 
struck down a New York law that prohibited the distribution of 
what were colloquially known as “true crime magazines.”156 Like 
the flag raising prohibited by the California law, the magazines 
prohibited by the New York law made no explicit political claims. 
Instead, they consisted almost entirely of highly sensationalized, 
albeit generally true, stories of violent crime.157 Unlike the raising 
of the flag, true crime magazines were not intended to advance a 
radical political agenda, nor were they closely associated with a 
particular political viewpoint. Instead, they served crassly com-
mercial ends.158 The Court nevertheless held that the magazines 
were “as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best 
of literature” even though Justice Reed acknowledged in his ma-
jority opinion that the justices were unable to identify anything 
 
 152 283 US 359 (1931). 
 153 Id at 361, 369. 
 154 Only Justice Pierce Butler, in his dissent, challenged the assumption that the rais-
ing of a red flag constituted the kind of expressive activity that was protected by the 
Speech Clause. Id at 376 (Butler dissenting) (questioning “whether the mere display of a 
flag as the emblem of a purpose, whatever its sort, is speech within the meaning of the 
constitutional protection of speech and press”). 
 155 333 US 507 (1948). 
 156 Id at 519–20. 
 157 See Jean Murley, The Rise of True Crime: Twentieth Century Murder and Ameri-
can Popular Culture 19–21 (Praeger 2008). 
 158 The magazines did tend to advance, on their surface at least, conservative law-
and-order messages. However, these messages were undermined by the sensationalism of 
the stories they contained. Id at 23 (noting that the true crime magazines tended to “jux-
tapose[ ] a sharp emphasis on law enforcement . . . with an equally strong but opposing 
impulse to sensationalize crime and make it more interesting to readers”). 
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“of any possible value to society” in their contents.159 It did so be-
cause it recognized that even if its members were not affected by 
the stories the magazines told, others might be. As Justice Reed 
noted, “Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda 
through fiction. What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s 
doctrine.”160 
In other cases, the Court employed a similarly capacious view 
of what speech matters politically. In Joseph Burstyn, for exam-
ple, the Court extended Winters’s logic to conclude that movies 
were also entitled to full First Amendment protection. “It cannot 
be doubted,” Justice Tom Clark wrote for the majority, “that mo-
tion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of 
ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety 
of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doc-
trine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all ar-
tistic expression.”161 In concluding as much, the Court overruled 
an early twentieth-century decision which found that movies 
were not entitled to free speech protection because they were 
“spectacles . . . mere representations of events, of ideas and sen-
timents published and known.”162 “The importance of motion pic-
tures as an organ of public opinion,” it asserted, “is not lessened 
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to  
inform.”163 
Meanwhile, in Thornhill v Alabama,164 the Court extended 
protection to labor picketing—to speech that, on its face, con-
cerned solely the private economic relationship between workers 
and their employer—because it recognized that pickets conveyed 
valuable information to the public about what was “[i]n the cir-
cumstances of [the] times” a pressing political issue: namely, la-
bor unrest.165 They had the capacity to affect public attitudes 
about political matters, in other words, even when they said noth-
ing about politics per se. 
The New Deal Court’s willingness to extend First Amend-
ment protection to overtly nonpolitical, even spectacular kinds of 
expression was an important reason why critics such as Professor 
 
 159 Winters, 333 US at 510. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501. 
 162 Mutual Film Corp v Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 US 230, 244 (1915). 
 163 Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501. 
 164 310 US 88 (1940). 
 165 Id at 102. 
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Hamilton, Braden, and Justice Frankfurter accused it of  
Lochnerism. Indeed, one of the two cases that Hamilton and 
Braden invoked to illustrate the excessive power that the Court 
had aggrandized to itself in its free speech jurisprudence was 
Thornhill.166 (The other was another labor picketing case, Milk 
Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v Meadowmoor Dairies.167) Jus-
tice Frankfurter, meanwhile, invoked the specter of Lochner not 
only in his dissenting opinion in Barnette (a symbolic speech 
case), but in the dissenting opinion he wrote in Winters. “The 
painful experience which resulted from confusing economic  
dogmas with constitutional edicts,” Justice Frankfurter argued, 
“ought not to be repeated by finding constitutional barriers to a 
State’s policy regarding crime, because it may run counter to our 
inexpert psychological assumptions or offend our presuppositions 
regarding incitements to crime in relation to the curtailment of 
utterance.”168 
Rather than evidence of an unjustified judicial intrusion into 
the prerogatives of the democratic legislature, however, what de-
cisions such as Winters, Joseph Burstyn, and Thornhill reflect is 
the Court’s quite sophisticated understanding of how it is that 
citizens in a democratic society come to form, or alter, their polit-
ical beliefs. Scholars have accused the modern free speech tradi-
tion of being overly rationalist in its assumptions about how com-
munication occurs in the mass public sphere. Professor Stanley 
Ingber has argued, for example, that a central assumption of the 
modern free speech tradition is that “people can use reason to fo-
cus on the substance of a message and to distinguish and reject 
the emotional and irrational appeals of its packaging.”169 In fact, 
what cases such as Winters and Joseph Burstyn make clear is that 
the Court has, for decades now, recognized that the emotional and 
irrational aspects of speech play an important role in shaping 
popular attitudes and beliefs about political, and other, matters—
 
 166 Hamilton and Braden, 50 Yale L J at 1352 & n 140 (cited in note 40). 
 167 Id at 1352 & n 141, citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v Meadowmoor 
Dairies, Inc, 312 US 287 (1941). 
 168 Winters, 333 US at 527 (Frankfurter dissenting). 
 169 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 
35. See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First 
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U Ill L Rev 799, 801 (asserting that the assumption that underlies 
the “vast majority of First Amendment cases . . . is that audiences are capable of rationally 
assessing the truth, quality, and credibility of core speech”); Jerome A. Barron, Access to 
the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv L Rev 1641, 1678 (1967) (critiquing 
the “essentially rationalist philosophy of the [F]irst [A]mendment”). 
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that they are not just part of the package, but an intrinsic part of 
the message that is communicated. What these cases also make 
clear is the Court’s refusal to allow an overly rationalistic—and 
perhaps also overly elitist—view of how communication occurs in 
the public sphere from unduly limiting the First Amendment’s 
reach. 
Certainly, the effect of decisions such as Winters, Joseph 
Burstyn, and Thornhill was to extend constitutional protection to 
the vast body of expression that contributed to the mid-twentieth-
century mass public sphere. In this respect what these decisions 
also reflect is the Court’s efforts during this period to craft a free 
speech jurisprudence that guaranteed protection not only to the 
elite and well-educated but to the “little people” as well.170 They 
point, in other words, to the egalitarianism of the New Deal 
Court’s free speech jurisprudence, generally—an egalitarianism 
that I explore in more detail in Part III. 
For our part, they mean that critics of the Court’s commercial 
and corporate speech cases have been asking the wrong question. 
To determine whether commercial advertising or noncommercial 
corporate speech possesses democratic and therefore constitu-
tional value, the relevant question is not whether speech of this 
sort explicitly comments on governmental policy or marshals in-
formation that is directly relevant to policy action. 
Nor, for that matter, is the relevant question whether speech 
of this sort expresses ideas or messages that otherwise could not 
be publicly expressed. In none of the cases discussed above did 
the Court condition constitutional protection on a showing that 
the ideas or messages conveyed by the movies, magazines, or mu-
sic subject to regulation could not be expressed in other venues 
and by other means. This is because of another important princi-
ple of modern free speech jurisprudence that critics of the corpo-
rate speech cases tend to ignore: namely, that the government 
cannot inoculate itself against constitutional scrutiny simply by 
providing speakers with some other venue in which to speak. As 
the Court noted in Schneider v State171 in 1939, and reaffirmed on 
many occasions later, “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty 
of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it 
 
 170 Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141, 146 (1943). The phrase “little people” is of 
course a patronizing one. As such, it aptly illustrates the New Deal Court’s often awkward, 
but nevertheless valiant, efforts to surmount its own elitism. 
 171 308 US 147 (1939). 
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may be exercised in some other place.”172 This principle reflects 
the Court’s recognition of the fact that speech is nonfungible: 
where one speaks can matter tremendously to what one conveys, 
and even when the government merely limits where and how 
speech occurs, its actions can significantly affect the formation of 
public opinion.173 This is obviously as true of speech that is the 
product of a corporate author as it is of any other kind of speech. 
As a result, whether a natural person could convey the same mes-
sage that a corporation wishes to communicate is utterly irrele-
vant to the first-order question of whether corporate speech has 
constitutional value. 
Instead, the only question that courts need to ask to deter-
mine whether the direct regulation of commercial or corporate 
speech threatens free speech values, and therefore warrants 
heightened scrutiny, under the principles laid down by the New 
Deal Court, is: Is speech of this kind capable of affecting public 
attitudes about the important social and political issues of the 
day, either directly, via tactics of didactic persuasion, or indi-
rectly, by means of the “subtle shaping of thought”?174 When 
phrased as such, the answer to the question is undoubtedly yes, 
both with respect to the speech protected by the corporate speech 
cases and commercial advertising. 
A. Corporate Speech 
This conclusion is obvious when it comes to noncommercial 
corporate speech, like the speech at issue in Bellotti and Consoli-
dated Edison. After all, in both those cases, the corporations 
wished to speak about what the Thornhill Court called “matters 
of public concern.”175 It is hard to think of more obviously im-
portant public questions than the merits of a graduated income 
 
 172 Id at 163. See also Struthers, 319 US at 150 (Murphy concurring); Thornhill, 310 
US at 105–06. 
 173 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 68 (1987): 
Although rules prohibiting demonstrations in the curtilage of a jailhouse, noisy 
protests near a school, and leafletting on the grounds of a state fair may have 
little effect on the vast majority of speakers, they may have a significant effect 
on those speakers whose messages are tied directly to the jail, the school, or the 
state fair. By denying these speakers access to what are the most logical targets 
of their expression, such regulations deprive them of access to the most im-
portant audience and prevent them from utilizing especially dramatic and effec-
tive means of communication. 
 174 Joseph Burstyn, 343 US at 501. 
 175 Thornhill, 310 US at 101. 
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tax, or the costs and benefits of nuclear power plants.176 Further-
more, like the movies, magazines, and labor pickets to which the 
Court extended protection in the cases cited above, the corporate 
speech in both cases addressed a general public audience. It thus 
presumably had as much ability to affect public attitudes and be-
liefs as those other kinds of speech. 
This means that the Court was correct to conclude in both 
Bellotti and Consolidated Edison that, given the existing prece-
dents, the appropriate standard of review was not the deferential 
scrutiny applied to laws that regulate “ordinary commercial” ac-
tivity but the more stringent scrutiny applied when First Amend-
ment rights are at stake. This is the case notwithstanding the fact 
that—in Bellotti, and in campaign finance cases that built on  
Bellotti, such as Citizens United—the government did not regu-
late the corporation’s speech directly, by dictating what it could 
or could not say in its own voice, but instead regulated it indi-
rectly, by limiting its ability to spend money on speech.177 
Some critics have argued that this distinction matters: that 
even if rigorous judicial scrutiny is appropriate when the govern-
ment directly regulates what corporations say, a more deferential 
standard of review is appropriate when the government regulates 
corporate spending on speech. Judge J. Skelly Wright famously 
argued, for example, that the spending of money on speech should 
be treated as conduct, rather than “pure speech,” and that laws 
regulating such spending should be subjected to the much more 
deferential scrutiny applied to incidental regulations of speech, 
like the generally applicable business laws at issue in Associated 
Press v NLRB.178 But, as the discussion earlier makes clear, the 
Court only applied deferential scrutiny in Associated Press be-
cause it found that doing so would not significantly impede the 
ability of the members of the AP to communicate what they 
wanted to say.179 The same is not necessarily true of laws that 
restrict spending on speech. To say that one may not pay for 
 
 176 See Bellotti, 435 US at 769; Consolidated Edison, 447 US at 532. 
 177 The statute challenged in Bellotti prohibited corporations from spending money to 
influence “the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially 
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.” Bellotti, 435 US at 
767–68. The law challenged in Citizens United prohibited corporations (and unions) from 
using general treasury funds to pay for speech that “expressly advocate[d] the election or 
defeat of a candidate.” Citizens United, 558 US at 320–21. 
 178 J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L J 1001, 
1006 (1976). 
 179 Associated Press, 301 US at 133. 
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speech is, in many contexts at least, tantamount to saying that 
one cannot speak. This makes the application of deferential scru-
tiny in corporate spending cases hard to square with the modern 
precedents and the principles that inform them. 
The fact that the Court was operating squarely within the 
modern free speech tradition when it interpreted the First Amend-
ment to require exacting scrutiny of the ballot law in Bellotti or 
the regulatory ban in Consolidated Edison doesn’t mean, of course, 
that it couldn’t have crafted an exception for the speech of business 
corporations. But the decision to do so would have constituted the 
deviation from New Deal principles, not the opposite. This is not, 
it is worth pointing out, because heightened scrutiny of laws that 
regulate corporate speech is necessary to protect the interests of 
the corporate speaker, who may indeed have “no soul to damn and 
no body to kick.”180 Heightened scrutiny is necessary to protect the 
right of the public to hear what the corporation has to say—as 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bellotti held quite explicitly.181 
Scholars have both criticized and praised the commercial and 
corporate speech cases for shifting the focus of First Amendment 
jurisprudence away from what they claim was its earlier focus on 
the rights of the speaker and focusing instead on the rights of the 
audience.182 But in fact the New Deal Court was vitally concerned 
with the right of the public to access speech, not just the right of 
the speaker to express it. In Thornhill, for example, the Court de-
clared the purpose of the free speech guarantee to be to “supply 
the public need for information and education with respect to the 
 
 180 John C. Coffee Jr, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich L Rev 386, 386 (1981). 
 181 Bellotti, 435 US at 777 (“The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity 
for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpora-
tion, association, union, or individual.”) (emphasis added). 
 182 For scholars who have made claims of this sort, see, for example, Burt Neuborne, 
The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 Brooklyn L Rev 
5, 6 (1989) (arguing that the commercial speech cases represent the shift toward “a hearer-
centered free speech doctrine” and away from “the speaker-centered [F]irst [A]mendment 
doctrine developed during the last sixty years in the areas of religion, politics, science, and 
art”); Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 14 (cited in note 147) (arguing that constitutional protection 
for commercial speech is justified by the right of listeners, “the need to receive information, 
rather than [by] the rights of speakers” and that this distinguishes it from other kinds of 
speech—including political, artistic, and scientific speech—that are justified by the rights 
of speakers to participate in “public discourse”); Shanor, 2016 Wis L Rev at 145–46 (cited 
in note 122) (arguing that although First Amendment protection for commercial speech 
has been “framed . . . as a listener-based right . . . , paradigmatic [that is, noncommercial] 
First Amendment speech is generally protected not because of the value of the speech to 
its audience but due to the right of the speaker to speak”). 
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significant issues of the times,” and insisted that unions had to be 
free to engage in labor pickets not so that they could advance their 
economic self-interest but so that members of the public could 
learn about the causes, and nature, of labor disputes and on that 
basis, make “effective and intelligent use of the processes of pop-
ular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial soci-
ety.”183 Five years later, the Court again asserted that the purpose 
of the First Amendment was to allow the public to access “the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and  
antagonistic sources.”184 
The fact that the First Amendment has traditionally cared 
about the rights of the audience means that many of the questions 
that preoccupy scholarly discussion about the corporate speech 
and campaign finance cases—such as, whether corporations can 
speak like natural persons, or whether the spending of money is 
itself an expressive act—are simply beside the point, at least 
when it comes to the threshold question of whether heightened 
scrutiny applies.185 Even if we assume that spending is not an in-
trinsically expressive act, and even if we assume that corpora-
tions have no constitutional value as speakers in their own right, 
it is nevertheless the case that the direct as well as indirect regu-
lation of corporate speech threatens the First Amendment rights 
of the audience to access a “diverse and antagonistic” public 
sphere whose terms, and limits, are not set by the government. 
This doesn’t mean, of course, that speech of this kind cannot be 
regulated. But it does mean that the same constraints that apply 
when the government regulates noncorporate speech should ap-
ply when it regulates speech of this kind. 
B. Advertising 
The same is true when the government regulates commercial 
advertising, although the analysis here is less straightforward, 
given the explicitly nonpolitical nature of the speech. But here 
too, once one takes the implicit, affective, and aesthetic content of 
commercial advertising into account, it becomes obvious that 
 
 183 Thornhill, 310 US at 102–03. 
 184 Associated Press v United States, 326 US 1, 20 (1945). 
 185 For an argument on the first point, see Charles R. O’Kelley Jr, The Constitutional 
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation Af-
ter First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 Georgetown L J 1347, 1351 (1979). For a nuanced 
analysis of arguments about the expressive nature of spending money, see Deborah  
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even “purely” commercial ads like the ads in Virginia Pharmacy 
have the capacity to shape public attitudes about important mat-
ters of public concern in at least two ways—the first of which the 
Court has discussed in some detail, the second of which it has not. 
1. Advertising as information. 
First, even if commercial advertisements do not explicitly 
comment on political debates, they do provide their audience a 
great deal of information about “who is producing and selling 
what product, for what reason, and at what price.”186 In Virginia 
Pharmacy, the Court argued that information of this kind was 
constitutionally valuable for two reasons: first, because it helps 
ensure that when consumers make purchasing decisions, they are 
“intelligent and well informed” and thereby makes the operation 
of the market system more efficient;187 second, because it enables 
citizens to form intelligent decisions about whether, and to what 
extent, the economy should be regulated.188 The Court’s first ar-
gument for why the information that commercial ads provide is 
constitutionally valuable is far from satisfying. Market efficiency 
is simply not a value the First Amendment has been understood, 
in its modern incarnation, to protect. To the contrary: the cases 
strongly suggest that under the New Deal settlement it is the leg-
islature, not the judiciary, that has responsibility for determining 
how efficient the market should be.189 
The Court’s second argument for why the information that 
commercial advertisements communicate is constitutionally val-
uable is more persuasive, however. This is because, under the 
New Deal settlement, it is the responsibility of the courts to en-
sure that voters have the necessary authority to oversee the dem-
ocratic branches’ regulation of the market. Ensuring the free flow 
of information about who is selling what at what price obviously 
helps voters do so. 
To see this, one need only consider the advertisements in  
Virginia Pharmacy. In that case, state law prohibited pharmacies 
 
 186 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 765. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See, for example, Williamson v Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc, 348 US 483, 487–88 
(1955). See also Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 9 (cited in note 147) (“The First Amendment does 
not require courts to scrutinize government actions that directly interfere with the effi-
ciency of the market, as for example by setting prices or prohibiting products. Why then 
should the First Amendment be concerned with the more indirect effects of advertising 
regulations on market efficiency?”). 
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from advertising by almost any means the prices of the prescrip-
tion drugs they sold.190 The result was that it was very difficult for 
consumers in Virginia to learn about the significant price differ-
ences that existed in different pharmacies across the state.191 This 
made it difficult not only to price shop, but also to evaluate the 
wisdom of the Virginia legislature’s decision not to regulate phar-
maceutical prices. That decision was by no means politically un-
controversial. Since the late 1950s, consumer advocates had been 
urging state and federal lawmakers to impose price caps or take 
other measures to prevent the price gouging that many claimed 
pervaded the industry.192 These calls for reform almost entirely 
failed to result in meaningful price control legislation.193 Instead, 
the only way in which Virginia and many states regulated phar-
maceutical prices was by banning advertising about them—a 
state of affairs that some attributed to the power of the pharmacy 
lobby.194 
One could, consequently, interpret the Virginia law as an ef-
fort by the legislature to protect the political as well as the eco-
nomic status quo by depriving citizens of the information neces-
sary to change it. Even if this were not the case, the fact that there 
was significant political debate about how to regulate drug prices 
in the 1960s and 1970s makes it difficult to see why the ads pro-
hibited by the Virginia law touched any less on matters of public 
concern than the speech punished by the antipicketing law struck 
down in Thornhill. In both cases, the legislature restricted the 
public dissemination of speech that, although such speech did not 
comment explicitly on political matters, nevertheless communi-
cated information that was directly relevant to contemporary po-
litical debates (debates about how to regulate drug prices in the 
first case, and debates about how to regulate labor in the second 
 
 190 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 752. 
 191 As the Court noted, the price of the same drug could vary by as much as 650 per-
cent. Id at 754. 
 192 See Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory 
Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 Berkeley Tech L J 853, 867 (2003)  
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 194 Dale A. Danneman, Retail Drug Advertising Bans Are Bad Medicine for Consum-
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omitted): 
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case). The same reasoning that led the Thornhill Court to con-
clude that the First Amendment protects labor pickets should 
therefore lead to the same conclusion about commercial ads—at 
least commercial ads that provide information about politically 
controversial products, services, or industries.195 This turns out to 
include a wide swathe of advertising. 
Indeed, one can easily find many other examples of “purely 
commercial advertising”196 that nevertheless provides politically 
relevant market information. Consider in this respect the gam-
bling ads at issue in Posadas. In that case, a Puerto Rican casino 
brought a First Amendment challenge to a law that prohibited 
casinos that operated in the territory from advertising their ser-
vices to local residents.197 The government argued that the law 
was intended to prevent residents from patronizing the casinos, 
and to thereby prevent the social problems that would be created 
were Puerto Ricans to gamble in significant numbers.198 Critics 
have suggested that the real motivation for the law may have 
been more nefarious—that, like the ban on drug-price advertising 
in Virginia, the advertising ban was an anticompetitive measure 
that worked to preserve the economic power of established indus-
try players.199 Whatever the law’s true motivations, it is indisput-
able that one of its effects was to make the decision to legalize 
gambling in Puerto Rico less salient to voters. This was a decision 
that generated significant opposition, both in 1948, when it was 
first made, and in the decades that followed.200 Like the Virginia 
 
 195 This is certainly what the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
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ban on drug-price advertising, the law thus helped preserve the 
political as well as the economic status quo. 
These examples demonstrate how difficult it can be to distin-
guish between economically relevant and politically relevant in-
formation in a post–Carolene Products world—that is, in a world 
in which decisions about economic policy are left almost entirely 
up to the democratic political process. In such a world, it makes 
sense to conclude, as the Court did in Virginia Pharmacy, that 
any ad that communicates to its readers information about “who 
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at 
what price”201 has the capacity to impact public attitudes and be-
liefs about what, under the New Deal settlement, is supposed to 
be a core matter of public concern—namely, whether and how to 
regulate the market. 
2. Advertising as art. 
What the Court has described as the “informational function” 
of commercial advertising202 does not entirely explain, however, 
why advertising as a genre receives the constitutional protection 
it does. This is because, although many commercial ads communi-
cate information about who is selling what, where, and at what 
price, many ads do not. A significant portion of contemporary ad-
vertising spending goes to what we might call “image” as opposed 
to informational advertising.203 Image ads persuade consumers to 
buy the products they advertise not by providing them with infor-
mation about the wonderful features of that product but instead 
by associating that product with positive images or ideas.204 
 
side effects, especially infiltration by organized crime, as had occurred in nearby Cuba.” 
Dennis Merrill, Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century 
Latin America 187 (UNC 2009). In the decades after, opposition to the casinos only con-
tinued to grow. Dennis Merrill, Negotiating Cold War Paradise: U.S. Tourism, Economic 
Planning, and Cultural Modernity in Twentieth-Century Puerto Rico, 25 Diplomatic Hist 
179, 197–98 (2001). 
 201 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 765. 
 202 Central Hudson, 447 US at 563. 
 203 Mark Snyder and Kenneth G. DeBono, Appeals to Image and Claims About  
Quality: Understanding the Psychology of Advertising, 49 J Personality & Soc Psych 586,  
586 (1985). 
 204 See id at 586–87. See also William Leiss, Stephen Kline, and Sut Jhally, Social 
Communication in Advertising 43 (Routledge 2d ed 1990) (noting that “the information 
model has never had much relevance for national consumer product advertising” because 
“[t]he explicit function of spectacular image-based . . . advertising is not so much to inform 
as it is to persuade”). 
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A good example of an image ad is the Coca-Cola “Hilltop” ad 
from the early 1970s. In the ad, dozens of attractive young people, 
of different skin colors and wearing clothing from different re-
gions of the world, sing “I’d Like to Buy the World a Coke” while 
holding bottles of Coca-Cola in their hands.205 The ad was fa-
mously successful. It is credited with helping Coca-Cola reform 
its image as the “stodgy” soda and outperform its rival, Pepsi-
Cola, in sales among young people.206 Yet it communicated very 
little, if any, novel information to its audience. In 1971, it was not 
news to anyone that Coca-Cola was a beverage, that it was sold 
in glass bottles with a red and white label, or that it was brown 
in color. Nor did the song, or the slogan that appeared at the end 
of the ad (“It’s the real thing. Coke.”) communicate any novel mar-
ket information. After all, what the ad meant by saying that Coke 
was the real thing was not that it was “really” Coke but that it 
was really good at bringing people together.207 It is difficult to see 
how information of this kind—if we can call it that—had any 
bearing on debates about how to regulate the soda industry, as-
suming they existed. It is consequently difficult to justify consti-
tutional protection for this ad, or the many similar image ads that 
populate magazines and television, by making an argument about 
the political relevance of the market information they provide. 
And yet nothing in any of the First Amendment cases suggests 
that the Hilltop ad should be treated any differently than the drug 
price ads in Virginia Pharmacy. 
Although the Court has never really explained why image 
ads are entitled to constitutional protection, it is easy enough to 
understand. These ads may not provide consumers much infor-
mation about existing market conditions, but they possess the ca-
pacity to shape public attitudes in another way. By putting into 
circulation highly curated images of “the good,” they help natu-
ralize, reaffirm—and sometimes reshape—social values. 
 
 205 See Coca-Cola, 1971 - ‘Hilltop’; “I’d like to buy the world a Coke”, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VM2eLhvsSM (visited Apr 28, 2020) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 206 See Douglas B. Holt, How Brands Become Icons: The Principles of Cultural Brand-
ing 233–34 (Harvard Business 2004). 
 207 This was made clear by the slogan of Coca-Cola’s previous advertising spot, enti-
tled Friendly Feelings, which included the slogan “Coca-Cola, it’s the real thing, like 
friendly feelings.” Jeff Chang, Who We Be: A Cultural History of Race in Post-Civil Rights 
America 61 (St. Martin’s 2014). 
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Consider once again the Hilltop ad. The ad encouraged its 
viewers to drink Coca-Cola by linking the beverage to an im-
portant symbol of youth culture—the flower power movement—
and to the values it promoted (optimism, peace, cosmopolitan-
ism). By doing so, the ad helped Coca-Cola position itself as the 
young people’s drink. But it also reshaped popular conceptions of 
the flower power movement, by denuding it of its harder edges—
its association with antiwar activism for example—and by sug-
gesting that all that was necessary to achieve international peace 
and brotherhood was shared consumption of a sugary good.208 
Or consider another successful advertising campaign: the 
“You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby!” campaign produced by the 
Philip Morris Tobacco Company to sell its Virginia Slims ciga-
rettes to women. The campaign is famous—perhaps infamous—
for using the iconography of the feminist movement to sell ciga-
rettes to a female audience.209 But the relationship did not go only 
one way. By linking its cigarettes to women’s empowerment, 
Philip Morris managed not only to make its cigarettes attractive 
to female consumers; it also shaped consumers’ conception of 
what an empowered woman looked like. This is one reason why 
the ads were regarded with ambivalence by at least some contem-
porary feminists.210 The campaign domesticated feminism by  
feminizing it—but it also popularized the movement by defanging 
it, rendering it more attractive, less threatening, and more  
mainstream.211 
 
 208 See Laura A. Hymson, The Company That Taught the World to Sing: Coca-Cola, 
Globalization, and the Cultural Politics of Branding in the Twentieth Century *204 (un-
published dissertation, 2011) (on file with author) (“The [H]illtop commercial . . . leveraged 
Coca-Cola’s global reach as a promise of peace and unity to American consumers in a way 
that made them feel good about Coke and about being American” even while “disavow[ing] 
continuing racial unrest [in the United States and elsewhere] and the international fears 
of nuclear war and communism.”). 
 209 See Emily Westkaemper, Selling Women’s History: Packaging Feminism in  
Twentieth-Century American Popular Culture 164 (Rutgers 2017). 
 210 For example, Ms. magazine struggled to decide whether Virginia Slims advertise-
ments could run in its pages, notwithstanding the magazine’s editorial policy to avoid ads 
that objectified women. Id at 188. The magazine printed one Virginia Slims ad, and also 
featured a mail-in offer for a Virginia Slims promotional calendar but, after readers pro-
tested, the magazine refused to print further ads. Id. Other self-described feminists cele-
brated the ad campaign as evidence of women’s progress, however. Id at 178–80. 
 211 See Andrew Wernick, Promotional Culture: Advertising, Ideology, and Symbolic 
Expression 36 (Sage 1991): 
Virginia Slims . . . construct[ed] an ambiguous image of female-ness which en-
capsulated the ambivalence of those women most likely to be drawn towards a 
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Advertisers’ ability to sell sometimes utterly prosaic commod-
ities by linking them symbolically to otherwise unrelated ideas, 
institutions, or practices led the sociologist Raymond Williams to 
describe modern advertising as “a highly organized and profes-
sional system of magical inducements . . . functionally very simi-
lar to magical systems in simpler societies.”212 For our purposes, 
what it means is that even when they do not provide much verifi-
able information about the products they promote, ads possess 
constitutional value for the same reason that movies and video 
games do: because they not only amuse, entertain, and distract 
but also shape public attitudes about all kinds of matters that 
have nothing to do with how best to regulate the market. They do 
so by “creat[ing] structures of meaning” that “mould[ ] and re-
flect[ ] our life today.”213 Or as Professor Andrew Wernick puts it: 
“[T]he brand-imaging of mass produced consumer goods links 
them symbolically to the whole world of social values. . . . By rep-
resenting such values as just part of the visual furniture, the ad 
naturalizes them, and to that extent reinforces their hold.”214 
We may not like the fact that commercial ads possess this 
power. Concern with the detrimental effect that ads can have on 
public attitudes is in fact an important reason why governments 
seek to regulate them.215 It nevertheless means that, under New 
Deal principles, ads are as much entitled to constitutional protec-
tion as are the other expressive commodities (such as movies, 
magazines, television shows, and pop songs) that populate the 
contemporary public sphere and that shape public attitudes by 
 
gender-marked cigarette. At its heart was a compromise formula in which old 
(patriarchal) and new (liberal-egalitarian) conceptions of female gender identity 
were both given a place. 
 212 Raymond Williams, Advertising: The Magic System, in Raymond Williams, ed, 
Problems in Materialism and Culture 185 (Verso 1980). 
 213 Judith Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertis-
ing 11–12 (Marion Boyars 1978). 
 214 Wernick, Promotional Culture at 22–23 (cited in note 211). 
 215 This was certainly true of the gambling ads at issue in Posadas. As the government 
explained, the reason it prohibited casino ads targeted at a domestic audience was because 
it feared that the ads would make gambling appear too enticing and would thereby under-
mine the “moral and cultural patterns” that (it claimed) organized Puerto Rican society. 
Posadas, 478 US at 341. More recent advertising regulations also seek to limit what ad-
vertisers can portray in order to mitigate the presumably detrimental cultural effects of 
the ads that they produce. For example, the British trade group, the Advertising Stand-
ards Authority, prohibits advertisers from depicting human bodies in a “socially irrespon-
sible” manner—that is, in a manner that valorizes being unhealthily thin. See Social Re-
sponsibility: Body Image (Advertising Standards Authority, June 14, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/776Y-4A3T.  
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telling their audience attractive stories about how the world is, or 
how it could be. This is not because the messages that ads com-
municate are necessarily socially valuable ones. We may think, to 
the contrary, that they are overly materialistic,216 inevitably con-
servative,217 or simply not as valuable as the messages communi-
cated by political or artistic speech.218 Nevertheless, cases like 
Winters and Joseph Burstyn make clear that courts should closely 
scrutinize how and why they are regulated, because to do other-
wise would be to vest the government with largely unconstrained 
power over an important site of public meaning-making and, ul-
timately, politics. 
C. Implications 
The preceding discussion suggests that it is not the Virginia 
Pharmacy Court’s conclusion that advertising is entitled to First 
Amendment protection that is difficult to reconcile with the prin-
ciples that undergird modern free speech law.219 Nor is it the as-
sertion in Bellotti that corporate speech that touches on matters 
of public concern is “at the heart of the First Amendment[ ]” that 
is difficult to do so.220 Instead, it is the Court’s rather offhand as-
sertion in Valentine in 1942 that the First Amendment “imposes 
no [ ] restraint on government as respects purely commercial ad-
vertising” that is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the New 
Deal precedents.221 
In fact, a strong argument could be made that the decision in 
Valentine is not the cornerstone of the New Deal settlement that 
scholars such as Professors Jackson and Jeffries have suggested 
it is. Rather, Valentine reflects the much narrower and more ra-
tionalistic view of the democratic public sphere that characterized 
the pre–New Deal case law, and that led courts to deny constitu-
tional protection not only to commercial advertising but to plays 
and movies as well.222 It is certainly the case that the distinction 
 
 216 See Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 
Case W Res L Rev 411, 467–68 (1992). 
 217 See Wernick, Promotional Culture at 42–43 (cited in note 211). 
 218 See Eberle, 42 Case W Res L Rev at 458 (cited in note 216). 
 219 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 762. 
 220 See Bellotti, 435 US at 776. 
 221 Valentine, 316 US at 54. 
 222 See, for example, Mutual Film Corp, 236 US at 244–45 (denying constitutional 
protection to movies on the ground that they are mere “spectacles” rather than “part of 
the press of the country or [ ] organs of public opinion”). See also John Wertheimer, Mutual 
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the Valentine Court drew—between speech that “communicat[es] 
information and disseminat[es] opinion” and “commercial adver-
tising”—was not a novel invention but a feature of the case law 
that was at that point many decades old.223 
This suggests that in overruling Valentine, the Court did not 
break with the principles of the modern free speech tradition. It 
merely ensured that they applied more consistently.224 
This does not mean, of course, that those principles are cor-
rect. One might think, just as Hamilton and Braden or Justice 
Frankfurter thought, that the New Deal Court interpreted the 
First Amendment more expansively than democratic principles 
can justify when it invalidated regulations of speech that were not 
patently unreasonable—and that, for that reason, decisions such 
as Winters, Joseph Burstyn, and Virginia Pharmacy were wrongly 
decided (even perhaps Lochnerian). 
If one believes, however, in the premise of the modern consti-
tutional system—namely, that courts can and should play an ac-
tive role in defending the institutions of democratic government 
against what Justice Louis Brandeis called “the occasional tyran-
nies of [ ] majorities”225—then it proves extremely difficult to ex-
plain why courts should rigorously scrutinize the laws regulating 
movies and magazines or, for that matter, political speech, but 
not laws regulating commercial advertising. The fact that they 
are a product of commercial motives obviously impacts what com-
mercial advertisements say and how they say it, but it also means 
that ads penetrate where more self-consciously political or artistic 
genres of expression may not.226 
 
Film Reviewed: The Movies, Censorship, and Free Speech in Progressive America, 37 Am 
J Legal Hist 158, 161–70 (1993) (discussing the lack of constitutional protection for plays 
as well as movies). 
 223 Valentine, 316 US at 54. For earlier cases that relied on this distinction, see  
Coughlin v Sullivan, 126 A 177, 177 (NJ 1924); People v Johnson, 191 NYS 750, 751 (Gen 
Sess 1921); Pavesich v New England Life Insurance Co, 50 SE 68, 80 (Ga 1905). 
 224 It was not the only decision in which the Court did so. Virginia Pharmacy can be 
understood as only one in a series of decisions that the Court handed down over the course 
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in which it revised its earlier, unduly narrow, judgment of 
what kinds of speech contribute to the “unfettered interchange of ideas” that the First 
Amendment protects. See, for example, Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 484, 487–89 
(1957) (extending constitutional protection to sexually explicit but not prurient speech); 
New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 288, 292 (1964) (extending protection to neg-
ligent defamatory falsehoods about public officials); Cohen v California, 403 US 15, 21 
(1971) (extending protection to profanity). 
 225 Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis concurring). 
 226 See Williams, Advertising: The Magic System at 184–85 (cited in note 212): 
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The result is that laws that restrict the dissemination of com-
mercial advertisements, or limit what they can say, may pose as 
great a threat to the vitality of the democratic public sphere as 
movie censorship laws or other repressive speech regulations.227 
Consider in this respect a law (enacted, say, in 1953) that, in or-
der to preserve “social order,” banned the public circulation of any 
commercial ad that included images of white and black people in-
teracting in an intimate manner. Surely we would all recognize 
such a law as political, in its aims and effects, even if the speech 
it regulated was purely commercial? And surely we would all rec-
ognize that one of the effects of such a law would be to burden 
civil rights activists who wished to use commercial advertising to 
subvert prevailing segregationist social norms?228 
This suggests that the New Deal Court was correct when it 
insisted that, if the First Amendment is to protect the “unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
 
Advertising is . . . in a sense, the official art of modern capitalist society: it is 
what “we” put up in “our” streets and use to fill up to half of “our” newspapers 
and magazines: and it commands the services of perhaps the largest organized 
body of writers and artists, with their attendant managers and advisers, in the 
whole society. 
 227 This point should not be overstated. The commercial motives of advertisers tend 
to make them rather conservative in their messaging, as many have noted. Hence, laws 
that restrict the content of commercial ads will be less likely to prevent truly novel or 
heterodox ideas from entering the public sphere than laws that restrict the content of art-
house movies or plays. On the other hand, the fact that ads are such a pervasive feature 
of the modern public sphere means that they may possess more power than other genres 
of expression to normalize contested ideas and beliefs. This explains why both individuals 
and groups seeking to promote particular, contested social values tend to pay a great deal 
of attention to the content of commercial ads. They obviously recognize the political power 
of the genre. See, for example, Devour Succumbs to Tasteless Advertising (American Fam-
ily Association, Sept 12, 2016), archived at https://www.perma.cc/V96V-8N8U; Tovia 
Smith, Backlash Erupts After Gillette Launches a New #MeToo-Inspired Ad Campaign 
(NPR, Jan 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Y6GL-2EFX. 
 228 Civil rights activists indeed tried to do just that. To give only one example: in 1963, 
members of the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) attempted to get the Coca-Cola Com-
pany to include images of white and black people sharing a Coke in its advertisements. 
Hymson, Coca-Cola at *231 (cited in note 208). The attempt was only partially successful. 
Coca-Cola’s president, Paul Austin, agreed to include integrated images in Coca-Cola ads 
that ran in Ebony magazine but refused to do so in magazines that appealed to a primarily 
white audience because he feared backlash from Coke’s southern white consumers. Id at 
*231–32. To appease CORE, Austin proposed running ads in these magazines that in-
cluded images of both white and black people drinking Coke, but not at the same table. Id. 
The incident nevertheless suggests that the CORE activists recognized that Coca-Cola 
advertising represented an important site for the representation—and perhaps reconfigu-
ration—of ideas of race, equality, and community. 
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changes desired by the people,”229 it must apply not only to ex-
pressly political speech but also to crassly commercial speech, like 
the true crime magazines in Winters, not despite but in some re-
spects because of its power to entertain, distract, and seduce. The 
Court simply erred in how broadly it understood this principle to 
apply. 
Some have argued that even if this is true—even if the First 
Amendment should be interpreted to extend some protection to 
commercial advertising and to other kinds of commercially ori-
ented speech—commercial speech nevertheless is entitled to only 
a lesser degree of protection than other kinds of speech because 
of its commercial orientation. Professors Robert Post and Amanda 
Shanor recently argued, for example, that the same rules that ap-
ply in political and artistic speech cases should not apply in cases 
involving commercial advertising because advertisers, when they 
speak, “are not participating in democratic self-determination 
[but] are instead transacting business in the marketplace.”230 Oth-
ers have argued that lesser protection for commercial advertising 
is necessary to ensure that the government can effectively regu-
late the marketplace. Justice Rehnquist made this argument in 
his dissent in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Ser-
vice Commission of New York,231 and numerous First Amendment 
scholars have made similar arguments in recent years to criticize 
the strength of the protection courts today provide to commercial 
advertising and advertisers.232 
It is far from obvious, however, why the commercial orienta-
tion of commercial ads—or for that matter, corporate expres-
sion—should fundamentally alter the constitutional calculus in 
 
 229 Roth, 354 US at 484. 
 230 Post and Shanor, 128 Harv L Rev F at 171–72 (cited in note 2). 
 231 447 US 557 (1980). 
 232 See, for example, id at 595–99 (Rehnquist dissenting); Shanor, 2016 Wis L Rev at 
146, 150 (cited in note 122) (arguing that the state may regulate commercial speech more 
extensively than other kinds of speech due to its “subordinate [constitutional] status and 
[the fact that] it is not a speaker-oriented autonomy right” but that the Supreme Court’s 
recent advertising cases “undermin[e] the [doctrinal] features that the Court that created 
the [commercial speech] doctrine put in place to ensure that the First Amendment would 
not be the undoing of the regulatory state”); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutional-
ism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L & Contemp Probs 195, 203 (Issue 4, 2014) (ar-
guing that the recent commercial and corporate speech cases represent “the Court’s march 
away from a principle that it accepted with the New Deal: [b]uying and selling enjoy no 
special constitutional status, and legislatures can regulate markets and businesses to 
make life more equitable, safe, or healthful”). 
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free speech cases. For one thing, it simply is not true that adver-
tisers are the only constitutionally protected speakers who speak 
in order to “transact[ ] business in the marketplace” rather than 
to “participat[e] in democratic self-determination.” The same is 
obviously true of video game manufacturers, Hollywood produc-
ers, and true crime magazine publishers. Indeed, the pervasive-
ness of these kinds of business motives among those who engage 
in public expression is a predictable consequence of the fact that 
the “free trade in ideas”233 that the First Amendment protects 
tends (like most important activities in our capitalist society) to 
be organized around market principles and to involve the buying 
and selling of goods. As a result, most of the politically or cultur-
ally important speech that circulates in public either takes a com-
modified form or occurs on a commodified platform. 
Accordingly, if all those who engaged in speech in order to 
make money rather than to contribute to the formation of demo-
cratic public opinion were denied protection, except when they 
communicated “accurate information to the public”—as Post and 
Shanor argue should be the rule for advertising234—the result 
would be a tremendously narrower and weaker First Amend-
ment. After all, as the previous discussion makes clear, a tremen-
dous amount of important political expression can take place via 
speech that neither communicates accurate factual information 
nor is intended to contribute to democratic political debates.  
Even leaving aside the problematic effects that a principled 
application of such a rule would have on the efficacy of the First 
Amendment as a safeguard of the democratic public sphere, it is 
not at all clear why it should matter, constitutionally, whether a 
speaker engages in public speech in order to contribute to the 
democratic process of self-government or in order to make hard 
cash. What the modern First Amendment protects is not, after all, 
simply the right of citizens to self-consciously participate in pro-
cesses of democratic self-representation. What it protects and, as 
I suggested earlier, has always protected, is the right of the public 
to access “the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources.”235 Unless speech that is moti-
vated by profit has nothing to contribute to public debate—and 
 
 233 Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). 
 234 Post and Shanor, 128 Harv L Rev F at 173, 177 (cited in note 2) (“Judicial review 
of regulations that constrain commercial speech should be focused primarily on the ques-
tion of whether they unduly restrict the flow of reliable information to the public.”). 
 235 Associated Press, 326 US at 20. 
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this is, as I have shown, obviously not the case—the degree of 
protection that speech receives cannot rest on the purity of the 
speaker’s motives. 
Nor is there any reason to think that advertising and corpo-
rate speech need to be considered second-class or “subordinate” 
kinds of protected speech to enable the government to regulate 
the market effectively. Advertising is a profit-oriented genre of 
expression, certainly, but so too are the movie business, the tele-
vision business, the book industry, and virtually all the other me-
diums of mass communication that the First Amendment today 
protects. And yet the fact that these kinds of speech are consid-
ered fully protected does not mean, and has never meant, that the 
government cannot regulate the conditions of their production, 
the terms on which they are sold, and in limited respects,  
their content, in order “to make life more equitable, safe, or 
healthful.”236 
This is not to say that the vigorous protection that courts 
have in recent years extended to commercial advertising and to 
other kinds of commercially oriented speech has not made it 
harder for the government to regulate the market. It certainly 
has. It has, for example, made it much more difficult for legisla-
tures to shape consumer behavior by using what Justice 
Blackmun described in Virginia Pharmacy as “highly paternal-
istic” speech regulations.237 This can pose a significant obstacle to 
legislatures that want to reduce teen smoking by limiting ciga-
rette advertising.238 
 
 236 Purdy, 77 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 232). 
 237  Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 770. 
 238 Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun’s absolutist language, courts have not found 
the antipaternalism principle to totally foreclose laws of this sort. See, for example, Dis-
count Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc v United States, 674 F3d 509, 518 (6th Cir 2012) (up-
holding significant portions of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act 
against a constitutional challenge); National Association of Tobacco Outlets, Inc v City of 
Providence, 731 F3d 71, 74 (1st Cir 2013) (upholding city ordinances designed to limit the 
marketing and sale of cigarettes to minors against a First Amendment challenge). Even 
the Court has held that, when it comes to cigarette advertising, “[t]he State’s interest in 
preventing underage tobacco use is [not only] substantial . . . [but] compelling.” Lorillard 
Tobacco Co v Reilly, 533 US 525, 564 (2001). Nevertheless, the First Amendment antipa-
ternalism principle clearly has made it considerably more difficult for the government to 
engage in this kind of market regulation. See, for example, id at 534–35, 564 (striking 
down a state ban on cigarette advertising within one thousand feet of a school or play-
ground because it unduly interfered with the ability of “tobacco retailers and manufactur-
ers . . . [to] convey[ ] truthful information about their products to adults, and [the ability 
of] adults . . . [to] receiv[e] truthful information about tobacco products”). 
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The constraint that the commercial advertising cases impose 
on the government’s ability to shape consumer behavior by limit-
ing what ads say and how they say it is not, however, different in 
kind from the constraint that the movie and magazine and news-
paper cases impose on legislative power. The same principle that 
makes it difficult for legislatures to restrict cigarette advertising 
also makes it difficult for the government to restrict images of 
smoking in movies, even when it believes, with good evidence, 
that images of smoking in movies help glamorize the consumption 
of a very dangerous and addictive product, and even when ciga-
rette companies, fueled by the pursuit of profit, spend considera-
ble sums of money playing those images in the movies.239 It is a 
mistake to conceive of the first law as economic regulation and 
the second as something else. In both cases, the modern free 
speech tradition intrudes upon the government’s power to shape 
consumer behavior; in both cases, it does so for democratic ends. 
There is no reason to think that the trade-off the First Amend-
ment requires is worse in the first case than in the second, even 
if it may have to be made more frequently, given the sheer volume 
of commercial ads. 
This does not mean that courts need to apply precisely the 
same rules in cases involving free speech challenges to commer-
cial ads, or corporate speech, as they apply in cases involving free 
speech challenges to other kinds of protected speech. There are, 
as I explore in more detail in the next Part, specific features of 
commercial advertising that justify the somewhat different rules 
courts have traditionally applied in commercial speech cases, and 
continue to apply today. For the most part, however, these dis-
tinctive features of advertising regulation have nothing to do with 
the fact that advertising is motivated by commercial aims. 
Nor should the preceding discussion be interpreted to mean 
that the trade-offs that the contemporary commercial advertising 
and corporate speech cases make between the relevant regulatory 
and democratic interests are in all cases good ones. There is good 
reason to believe, as I show in the next Part, that many of the 
trade-offs the recent cases make are bad: that the contemporary 
commercial and corporate speech jurisprudence tends to  
overvalue the interest of speaker autonomy and undervalue the 
 
 239 It may be the case that the cigarette companies no longer do this, but at one point 
the companies spent large sums of money paying movie studios to depict smoking in their 
films. See Simon Chapman and Ronald M. Davis, Smoking in Movies: Is It a Problem?, 6 
Tobacco Control 269, 269 (1997). 
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interests promoted by government regulation. Critics are correct, 
in other words, to be concerned about the powerful deregulatory 
effects of recent commercial and corporate speech decisions like 
Citizens United and Sorrell. 
What the preceding discussion does mean, however, is that 
these (very serious) problems with contemporary free speech law 
cannot be blamed on what Morgan Weiland calls the “outward 
creep” of the First Amendment—namely, its expansion to include 
commercially oriented speech like advertising, and to protect 
commercial speakers like corporations.240 Nor can they be blamed 
on courts’ more recent tendency to treat commercial advertising 
and corporate speech as equal in value to other, less obviously 
commercial, kinds of speech. Nor, for that matter, are they an in-
evitable consequence of the intrinsically libertarian tendencies  
of the modern free speech tradition, as some have recently  
suggested.241 
Instead, as the next Part demonstrates, the economically de-
regulatory tendencies of contemporary free speech law are the 
product of changes in how the Court—and consequently, lower 
courts—have come to understand the free speech right over the 
past four decades. These changes in the judicial conception of 
what it means to possess freedom of speech have been profound—
their impact has, as I show, extended far beyond just the adver-
tising and corporate speech cases. Nevertheless, it is these 
changes in what courts understand freedom of speech to mean, 
rather than in their understanding of how broadly it applies, that 
best explains what is wrong with the holdings in Citizens United 
and Sorrell. 
By focusing on the extension of First Amendment protection 
to advertising and corporate speech, scholars miss the far more 
consequential, and in fact, far more radical, changes that have 
taken place in free speech jurisprudence over the past forty 
years—changes that have reshaped, and continue to reshape 
 
 240 Weiland, 69 Stan L Rev at 1423 (cited in note 121). 
 241 See Kessler, 116 Colum L Rev at 1922, 1925 (cited in note 135) (arguing that “eco-
nomically libertarian tendencies [ ] may be intrinsic to judicial enforcement of civil liber-
ties, regardless of the politics of individual judges,” and arguing as a result that reformers 
should “break with a legal tradition long insensitive to the deleterious impact of judicial 
civil libertarianism on political regulation of the economy”); Louis Michael Seidman, Can 
Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118 Colum L Rev 2219, 2232–33 (2018) (arguing that “First 
Amendment theory rests on libertarian assumptions at war with progressivism” and that 
“the holding of Citizens United was also more or less inevitable”). 
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many areas of free speech law besides the commercial and corpo-
rate speech cases. To see why, it is necessary to revisit one more 
time the early twentieth-century debates about Lochner’s ills, and 
what it means to enforce constitutional rights in a society charac-
terized then as now by significant inequality. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE GENEALOGY 
As I noted in Part I, in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century, critics provided many different explanations for why 
Lochner, and the other decisions in which the Supreme Court in-
validated labor laws on freedom of contract grounds, got it wrong. 
One of the explanations they provided was the Thayerian argu-
ment that Justice Holmes made in his Lochner dissent. But an-
other, in fact far more common, explanation for why the freedom 
of contract cases were incorrectly decided was that they relied 
upon an unrealistic and out-of-date conception of the modern in-
dustrial workplace, and the circumstances under which labor con-
tracts were actually forged. 
Scholars, including such respected figures as Professors  
Roscoe Pound and Robert Eugene Cushman, criticized the courts 
for producing a jurisprudence that failed to take adequate “cogni-
zance . . . of the realities of modern life.”242 They argued that the 
overly “mechanical and legalistic” approach that courts took when 
deciding Fourteenth Amendment cases prevented them from “ef-
fective[ly] [ ] investigat[ing] or consider[ing] [ ] the situations of 
fact behind or bearing upon the statutes” they analyzed, and led 
them to rely upon a nostalgic, and incorrect, view of contracting—
one which was ignorant of, or willfully blind to, the very signifi-
cant economic pressures that prevented workers from making 
meaningful choices about where and under what conditions to 
contract.243 Ultimately, it was courts’ inability to grasp the eco-
nomic and social reality of the modern workplace, these critics 
argued, that produced “rules and decisions which, tested by their 
practical operation, defeat[ed] liberty” rather than enhanced it.244 
 
 242 Robert Eugene Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 20 Mich L Rev 737, 750–51 (1922). See also Pound, 18 Yale L J at 454–
55 (cited in note 11); Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme 
Court, 40 Harv L Rev 943, 960 (1927); Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Ques-
tions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 Harv L Rev 6, 
7–8 (1924); Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Ill L Rev 461, 463, 467 (1916). 
 243 Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner at 44–45 (cited in note 30). 
 244 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum L Rev 605, 616 (1908). 
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Critics provided a number of explanations for why courts paid 
such insufficient attention to the economic conditions under 
which workers exercised their freedom of contract. They blamed 
it on the class biases of judges,245 the inadequacies of legal educa-
tion (which, Pound argued, focused too much on philosophical ar-
gument and too little on the sociological analysis of law),246 and 
the very formalistic character of legal reasoning at the time.247 
In fact, we can attribute the failure of Lochner-era courts to 
adequately account for the “realities of modern life” almost en-
tirely to the strong public/private distinction they relied upon to 
delimit the scope of constitutional rights. As Professor Joseph 
William Singer and others have demonstrated, a foundational as-
sumption of constitutional doctrine during this period was that 
there were two spheres of activity that could be strictly sepa-
rated—a “private sphere of individual contractual freedom [and] 
the public sphere of government regulation”—and that the Con-
stitution protected individual liberty only against the latter.248 
 
 245 See Cushman, 20 Mich L Rev at 748 (cited in note 242); Eaton S. Drone, The Power 
of the Supreme Court, 8 Forum 653, 657 (1890) (“Consciously or unconsciously, honestly 
or otherwise, judges on the supreme bench have been controlled or influenced by their 
political beliefs, by partisan bias, by public sentiment . . . , [and by] the theories of the 
party with which they have acted or may sympathize.”). 
 246 Pound, 18 Yale L J at 457 (cited in note 11). See also Brandeis, 10 Ill L Rev at 470 
(cited in note 242): 
[J]udge[s] came to the bench unequipped with the necessary knowledge of eco-
nomic and social science, and [their] judgment suffered likewise through lack of 
equipment in the lawyers who presented the cases to [them]. . . . It is not sur-
prising that under such conditions the laws as administered failed to meet con-
temporary economic and social demands. 
 247 See Pound, 18 Yale L J at 457 (cited in note 11) (identifying as a source of the 
problems with the freedom of contract cases the dominance of a “mechanical jurisprudence 
. . . in which deduction from conceptions has produced a cloud of rules that obscures the 
principles from which they were drawn, in which conceptions are developed logically at 
the expense of practical results and in which the artificiality characteristic of legal rea-
soning is exaggerated”); Biklé, 38 Harv L Rev at 12 (cited in note 242) (“It seems clear that 
a substantial part of the criticism which [the Court’s due process cases] aroused was due 
to the Court’s undertaking to decide for the country the controlling questions of fact on the 
basis of a priori reasoning.”). 
 248 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal L Rev 465, 478 (1988). See also 
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal L Rev 1151, 1196–1204 (1985) (ci-
tation omitted): 
The representational practice of the liberty of contract era assumed that the so-
cial world was divisible into “public” and “private” spheres of action, implicitly 
corresponding to the “presence” or “absence” of the individual’s free will. When 
conduct was “purely” private, an expression of the autonomous free will of the 
affected parties, there was no basis for the imposition of legislative power. 
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What this meant in practice was that courts construed the Con-
stitution to protect individuals against constraints on their lib-
erty that were the intended result of government regulation of the 
private sphere, but refused to construe the Constitution to protect 
individuals against constraints on their liberty that were the 
product of private decision-making—even private decision- 
making that was enforced by means of the legal mechanisms of 
tort, contract, and property law.249 To the contrary: courts insisted 
that what the Constitution guaranteed was the freedom of private 
individuals to decide the terms of their relationships with one an-
other and to enforce those decisions, if necessary, by using the 
courts.250 Hence, they interpreted the Constitution to allow the 
government to intrude upon this realm of private ordering only 
when doing so was necessary to advance a limited number of im-
portant purposes—most of which had to do with protecting the 
system of private ordering itself or safeguarding the welfare of 
the community as a whole.251 
The sharp divide that courts drew in this period between the 
public and the private realms helps explain their strong antipa-
thy toward “class legislation”—to legislation, that is, that re-
stricts a constitutionally protected liberty or property right of 
some private citizens in order to protect the constitutionally pro-
tected liberty or property of others.252 After all, if what the Con-
stitution guarantees is a private sphere in which individuals can 
negotiate their relationships for themselves, efforts by the gov-
ernment to reorder the terms of those relationships are obviously 
illegitimate, at least so long as those subject to the regulation are 
 
 249 See Peller, 73 Cal L Rev at 1202 (cited in note 248): 
Private law generally was conceived as the realm where the judiciary carried out 
the prior intentions of social actors. . . . In private law, the judiciary was con-
ceived as a neutral mediator for the enforcement of individual intent, just as in 
constitutional law legislative power was limited to the neutral public interest. 
 250 See Singer, 76 Cal L Rev at 479 (cited in note 248) (“Freedom of contract meant 
that the parties were free to make or not make contracts, and that when they made con-
tracts the courts would enforce the terms to which the parties had agreed.”). 
 251 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (noting that an “especially 
distinctive” feature of the Lochner Court’s approach was its “sharp limitation of the cate-
gory of permissible government ends” and insistence that “[e]fforts to redistribute re-
sources and paternalistic measures were both constitutionally out of bounds”); Gillman, 
Constitution Besieged at 97–98 (cited in note 26) (describing the requirement that govern-
ment intervention into the public sphere should benefit the public as a whole); Singer, 76 
Cal L Rev at 479 (cited in note 248) (noting that contracts could not be enforced if “there 
was a defect in free will, such as fraud, duress, or incapacity”). 
 252 Peller, 73 Cal L Rev at 1198 (cited in note 248). 
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autonomous actors, capable of exercising their constitutional 
rights on their own behalf.253 
Courts’ assumption during this period that what the Consti-
tution guarantees is a private sphere of freedom from government 
control—and one organized, in large part, via the mechanisms of 
the private market—also helps explain why, notwithstanding the 
cries of formalism, courts were willing to pay attention to certain 
kinds of facts—for example, to the extraordinary physical dangers 
that workers in specific industries faced—but refused, for the 
most part, to integrate into their constitutional analysis any con-
sideration of the economic and social facts that realist critics 
wanted them to.254 A constitutional doctrine that allows the gov-
ernment to limit freedom of contract when necessary to protect 
workers against particularly hazardous working conditions does 
not appear to pose an existential threat to the independence of 
the private market. But a constitutional doctrine that allows the 
government to limit freedom of contract whenever necessary to 
correct for inequalities in economic and social power does—at 
least if one assumes, as the Court clearly assumed, that inequal-
ity of this kind is a natural and inevitable result of a market sys-
tem.255 Hence, although courts on occasion acknowledged the eco-
nomic constraints that workers in concentrated industries faced 
when making decisions about when and how to sell their labor, 
for the most part they left out of their analysis any consideration 
of how economic inequalities affected freedom of contract, or any 
 
 253 As Cushman noted, courts allowed legislatures to protect persons who were “in-
fants, lunatics, wards, or [ ] under some other definite legal disability” against private 
exploitation and abuse. Cushman, 20 Mich L Rev at 748 (cited in note 242). But it did not 
allow the legislature to do the same with respect to workers, like the bakers in Lochner, 
who possessed ordinary “intelligence and capacity.” Lochner, 198 US at 57. 
 254 See, for example, Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 393–98 (1898) (examining in some 
detail the peculiar dangers faced by laborers in underground mines and upholding a  
maximum-hours statute for them); Muller v Oregon, 208 US 412, 421–23 (1908) (examin-
ing in some detail the effects of extended labor on women’s “physical structure and the 
performance of maternal functions” and upholding a maximum-hours law, and concluding 
that a maximum-hours law that applied only to female laborers was constitutionally per-
missible because it was “not imposed solely for [the] benefit [of the workers] but also 
largely for the benefit of all”). 
 255 As the Court declared in Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1 (1915), “[I]t is from the 
nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property 
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are 
the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.” Id at 17. 
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of the other freedoms that the Fourteenth Amendment guaran-
teed.256 Doing so was simply too threatening to the doctrinal  
status quo. 
Rather than an oversight, or the consequence of an inade-
quate legal education, we can thus understand the economically 
insensitive character of constitutional law during the Lochner era 
as the predictable result of a jurisprudence that insisted on con-
struing constitutional rights as largely negative autonomy 
rights—as rights that entitled the individual to freedom from gov-
ernmental regulation, but not rights that entitled the individual 
to anything more positive (such as a meaningful choice about 
where and how to contract). 
The result was, nevertheless, a body of law that appeared in-
creasingly out of touch with the modern world—one that insisted 
on treating as a sphere of freedom what appeared to many exactly 
the opposite. It was the sharp divide between legal doctrine and 
social reality that ultimately produced the crisis of legitimacy 
that resulted in the New Deal revolution. As Professor  
Barry Friedman notes, it was “because the Lochner-era judges en-
gaged in formalist legal reasoning, without attention to the felt 
necessities of the time, that they earned the contempt of their  
contemporaries.”257 
This helps explain why, when the New Deal Court finally 
broke with Lochner-era jurisprudence, it did so by rejecting the 
sharp distinction between the public and private realms on which 
it had previously relied. The Court made as much clear in its land-
mark decision in West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish,258 in 1937, when 
it declared that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause 
 
 256 In Holden, for example, the Court acknowledged that workers in mines and their 
employers “do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to a certain extent, 
conflicting” and concluded that “[i]n such cases self-interest is often an unsafe guide, and 
the legislature may properly interpose its authority.” Holden, 169 US at 397. It made clear, 
however, that this inequality justified legislative intervention only when the work the la-
borers performed was particularly hazardous. Id at 396: 
While the general experience of mankind may justify us in believing that men 
may engage in ordinary employments more than eight hours per day without 
injury to their health, it does not follow that labor for the same length of time is 
innocuous when carried on beneath the surface of the earth, where the operative 
is deprived of fresh air and sunlight, and is frequently subjected to foul atmos-
phere and a very high temperature, or to the influence of noxious gases, gener-
ated by the processes of refining or smelting. 
 257 Friedman, 76 NYU L Rev at 1388 (cited in note 29). 
 258 300 US 379 (1937). 
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was a “liberty in a social organization which requires the protec-
tion of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, mor-
als, and welfare of the people” and made clear that one of these 
evils which menaced the welfare of the people was the evil created 
by the private “exploitation of a class of workers who are in an 
unequal position with respect to bargaining power.”259 In National 
Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,260 the 
Court similarly insisted that the right of employees to collectively 
organize had to be recognized as a “fundamental right” given the 
unequal bargaining power that existed between employer and 
employee.261 
Professor Edward Corwin, in an article published in The New 
Republic just a few months later, argued that these decisions 
were revolutionary because they recognized something that ear-
lier decisions had not: namely, that “‘liberty’ is . . . something that 
may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of government; 
indeed, something that may require the positive intervention of 
government against those other forces.”262 The Court’s recognition 
of this fact, Corwin argued, “mark[ed] a development of profound 
significance in our constitutional history.”263 
In fact, the Court’s recognition that private action could result 
in a denial of constitutional rights would prove less revolutionary 
than Corwin may have anticipated—at least when it came to its 
freedom of contract cases—due to the fact that, a few years after 
West Coast Hotel was handed down, the Court effectively decon-
stitutionalized the entire area of law. The significant deference the 
Court gave the legislature when it came to decisions that impli-
cated freedom of contract rendered its understanding of what that 
freedom meant largely irrelevant to the disposition of cases, or to 
the operation of governmental power writ large.264 
 
 259 Id at 391, 399. 
 260 301 US 1 (1937). 
 261 Id at 33. 
 262 Edward S. Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (The New Republic, Aug 4, 1937), 
archived at https://perma.cc/2YH3-F73N. 
 263 Id. 
 264 As Professor Jack Balkin notes, “West Coast Hotel could have been seen as the clar-
ion call for a new doctrine of substantive economic justice, where economic rights were 
based not upon parameters derived from the common law but from evolving notions of eco-
nomic fairness.” Balkin, 83 Nw U L Rev at 295 (cited in note 48). Instead, it became merely 
a pit stop on the way to Carolene Products. See id at 296. 
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In other areas of law, however—for example, its First Amend-
ment cases—the Court continued to play an active role in enforc-
ing constitutional limits on state action. It was in this context, 
then, that the New Deal Court’s “revolutionary” approach to the 
interpretation of constitutional liberties—and more specifically, 
its sensitivity to the threat that private economic power posed to 
constitutionally protected liberty—made itself felt. 
A. The Public and Private Divide in the New Deal Cases 
Consider in this respect the Court’s 1945 decision in  
Associated Press v United States.265 The case involved a First 
Amendment challenge to a district court opinion that found that 
the Associated Press violated the Sherman Antitrust Act when it 
enacted bylaws that prevented its member newspapers from sell-
ing news to nonmember newspapers and allowed member news-
papers to block competitors from membership.266 The district 
court enjoined the AP from enforcing these bylaws and the AP 
appealed.267 It argued that the injunction violated the First 
Amendment rights of both it and its members by requiring them 
to accept into the association, and to share news with, newspapers 
in whose pages they did not want their articles to appear.268 The 
government, for its part, argued that this restriction on the free-
dom of AP newspapers was justified by the government’s “vital” 
interest in ensuring “the dissemination of news from as many dif-
ferent sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is 
possible.”269 
The case thus posed essentially the same question as that 
posed in Lochner: Could the government restrict the constitution-
ally protected freedom of powerful private actors (bakery owners, 
members of the AP) in order to protect the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of less powerful others (bakers, those excluded 
from membership in the AP, the reading public)? But if in  
 
 265 326 US 1 (1945). 
 266 Id at 4, 19. 
 267 See United States v Associated Press, 52 F Supp 362, 375 (SDNY 1943). 
 268 Reply Brief for Tribune Company and Robert Rutherford McCormick, Associated 
Press v United States, Nos 57, 58, 59, *19 (US filed Nov 13, 1944) (available on Westlaw 
at 1944 WL 42540) (arguing that if the Sherman Act is enforced as the lower court dic-
tated, “AP must admit to membership and therefore ‘utter’ its news dispatches to every 
applicant newspaper” and that “no ‘clear and present danger’ justifies such a compulsive 
decree”). 
 269 Brief for the United States, Associated Press v United States, Nos 57, 58, 59, *91 
(US filed Nov 1944) (available on Westlaw at 1944 WL 42539). 
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Lochner, the Court answered this question with a resounding no, 
in Associated Press the Court reached the opposite conclusion. It 
upheld the district court’s injunction because it recognized that 
even if there was no difference in the “intelligence and capacity” 
of those included and those excluded from the organization, their 
economic circumstances were not the same. Because it was ex-
tremely difficult for nonmember newspapers to, as the Court put 
it, “g[et] along without AP news,” members of the AP possessed 
the economic if not the legal power to make it much more difficult 
for competitor newspapers to exercise their freedom of press.270 
This meant, the Court concluded, that it was constitutionally per-
missible for the government to limit the AP’s ability to exclude 
newspapers from its organization and to prevent the sharing of 
members’ news.271 “It would be strange indeed,” Justice Black 
wrote in his majority opinion, “if the grave concern for freedom of 
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment 
should be read as a command that the government was without 
power to protect that freedom.”272 He went on: 
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument 
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides pow-
erful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on the 
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to 
the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a 
free society. Surely a command that the government itself 
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose re-
straints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. . . . 
Freedom of the press from governmental interference under 
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that 
freedom by private interests.273 
As this passage makes clear, the Associated Press Court rec-
ognized what the Lochner Court had not: namely, that private 
economic power could limit the exercise of constitutional rights 
just as government coercion could, and that government interven-
tion into the private sphere could consequently protect, not 
merely threaten, constitutional liberty. As a result, in this and 
 
 270 Associated Press, 326 US at 17–18. 
 271 Id at 21–22. 
 272 Id at 20. 
 273 Id. 
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other decisions, it refused to invalidate laws like the Sherman 
Antitrust Act that limited the freedom of media producers but did 
so in order to promote a more “diverse and antagonistic” public 
sphere.274 To the contrary: it interpreted those laws as not only 
constitutionally permissible but as means by which the legisla-
ture in its own right furthered First Amendment values. 
Nor did the Court limit itself to affirming the constitutional-
ity of legislative interventions of this sort into the private sphere. 
In contexts where either the legislative or executive branches did 
not do enough to safeguard diverse and inclusive participation in 
public debate, the Court did so itself, by interpreting the First 
Amendment to require positive rights of access to important pub-
lic spaces. In what would come to be known as its public forum 
cases, for example, the Court rejected the Lochner-era rule that 
categorically denied constitutional protection to speakers who 
were excluded from publicly owned land.275 It held instead that, 
when it comes to parks, streets, and sidewalks, the government 
not only has to grant speakers rights of access to those spaces, but 
also had to bear the costs of their speech—including the security 
costs that offensive or otherwise unpopular speakers could cre-
ate.276 In Marsh v Alabama,277 the Court extended essentially the 
same rule to private property owners who sought to exclude 
speakers from privately owned streets, parks, and sidewalks.278 
In these and other cases, the New Deal Court effectively re-
jected the idea that what the First Amendment guarantees is no 
 
 274 For other examples of the government’s intervention into the private sphere on 
similar grounds, see National Broadcasting Co v United States, 319 US 190, 216–19 
(1943); Associated Press, 301 US at 123–24. 
 275 See Davis v Massachusetts, 167 US 43, 47–48 (1897). This rule reflected the more 
general view that prevailed during this period that when the government acted within the 
system of private ordering, rather than regulating the terms on which it occurred—when 
it exercised, in other words, the same powers as property owner or employer that private 
individuals possessed—no constitutional constraints applied. (In such cases, courts re-
garded the government action as part of the “private,” rather than public sphere of activ-
ity, and immune as a result from constitutional scrutiny.) As Justice Holmes put it in his 
majority opinion in Ellis v United States, 206 US 246 (1907), “The Government purely as 
contractor, in the absence of special laws, may stand like a private person.” Id at 256. See 
also Davis, 167 US at 47 (“For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public 
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member 
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house.”). 
 276 See Terminiello v City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949); Schneider, 308 US at 163; 
Hague v Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 US 496, 515–16 (1939); Lovell v City 
of Griffin, 303 US 444, 450 (1938). 
 277 326 US 501 (1946). 
 278 Id at 507–08. 
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more and no less than a sphere of negative liberty. It insisted in-
stead that the First Amendment granted individuals something 
more positive: namely, some right to access, either as speaker or 
as listener, the “uncensored” “channels of communication” that 
citizens needed in order to effectively exercise their democratic 
role.279 It insisted, furthermore, that the constitutional interest in 
facilitating this kind of positive liberty trumped the right of both 
public and private property owners to control the uses to which 
their property was put.280 
The result was a body of law that did not, as Hamilton and 
Braden suggested in their 1941 article, simply replicate in new 
form Lochner-era due process jurisprudence. Both bodies of con-
stitutional law, it is true, vested judges with considerable power 
to strike down democratically enacted laws and had, as a result, 
a considerable deregulatory effect. Nevertheless, their deregula-
tory effects were quite different. If in the earlier period, the Court 
had interpreted the Due Process Clause as a limit on the govern-
ment’s ability to alter the existing balance of economic and politi-
cal power by restricting the freedom of the powerful and the prop-
ertied, now the Court interpreted the First Amendment as a limit 
on the government’s ability to shore up the existing balance of 
power by, among other things, enforcing the traditional right of 
property owners to exclude, when doing so made it significantly 
more difficult for some to participate in public debate. Put differ-
ently, if Lochner due process jurisprudence rendered many kinds 
of redistribution constitutionally impermissible, the New Deal 
Court’s free speech jurisprudence rendered certain kinds of redis-
tribution constitutionally obligatory—or at least, constitutionally 
permissible. 
There were limits to how much the Court was willing to con-
strain either government or private power in order to promote a 
 
 279 Id. 
 280 See id at 509: 
In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the 
deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the 
public, is not sufficient to justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern 
a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the en-
forcement of such restraint by the application of a State statute. 
See also Hague, 307 US at 515 (“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions.”). 
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more diverse and more inclusive public sphere. For one thing, nei-
ther in Associated Press nor in any other decision did the Court 
hold that the legislature was constitutionally required to ensure 
that powerful speakers did not use their economic muscle to shut 
others up, even if this is the conclusion that the logic of the opin-
ion might suggest. The Court also did not interpret the First 
Amendment to require all property owners to grant access to their 
property for those who wanted to speak on matters of public con-
cern. It merely required rights of access to sufficiently important 
public places.281 The Court also allowed the government, in some 
cases at least, to make rules for the regulation of the public sphere 
that imposed a disparate burden on the ability of those with few 
economic resources to make their voices publicly heard. In Kovacs 
v Cooper,282 for example, a bitterly divided Court upheld a law 
that banned the public use of “loud and raucous” loudspeakers 
attached to cars,283 even though, as Justice Black pointed out in 
his impassioned dissent, the law made it considerably harder for 
“people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who do 
not have enough money to own or control publishing plants, news-
papers, radios, [or] moving picture[s]” to do so.284 The Court con-
cluded that, because the law served important government aims 
and because it left open alternative means for those it affected to 
communicate their message, it was constitutionally permissible.285 
 
 281 Professor Mike Seidman has argued that the Court ultimately turned away from 
what he calls “Marsh-style reasoning” because the logic of the decision was impossible to 
reconcile with the New Deal settlement. Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Prop-
erty and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 75 U Chi L Rev 1541, 1549, 1550–51 (2008) 
(citation omitted): 
Taken to the limits of its logic, Marsh constitutionalizes virtually all of public 
policy. Every decision concerning the allocation of property rights has implica-
tions for the total amount of speech society produces. Hence, all such decisions 
become constitutionally mandatory and, therefore, outside the sphere open to 
political control. . . . Of course, this outcome was unacceptable. The liberals on 
the Court attempted to avoid it by deconstitutionalizing “neutral” background 
property law entitlements. 
But in fact, Justice Black’s opinion in Marsh made quite clear that judicial override of 
legislative property allocations was required only in a limited number of cases. Marsh, 326 
US at 506. Nothing in Marsh therefore requires, or even hints at the possibility, that prop-
erty law might be thoroughly constitutionalized, and therefore placed outside the sphere 
open to political control. 
 282 336 US 77 (1949). 
 283  Id at 89 (Reed) (plurality). 
 284 Id at 102 (Black dissenting). 
 285 Id at 89 (Reed) (plurality). 
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The Court did not assume, in other words, that the First 
Amendment guaranteed speakers and listeners absolute equality 
of opportunity to speak. The Court did assume, however, that the 
First Amendment guaranteed speakers and listeners a meaning-
ful opportunity to both speak and listen in important public 
places—and that this meant that, in some contexts, the rights of 
both public and private property owners had to give way to the 
rights of speech.286 Because it interpreted freedom of speech to 
mean more than a formal or “abstract” right the speaker held 
against the state, it also paid close attention to the economic and 
social, as well as legal, forces that limited the exercise of expres-
sive freedom and crafted doctrinal rules that attempted to ensure 
that the socially and economically powerless, as well as the so-
cially and economically powerful, had a meaningful opportunity 
to speak.287 
B. The Burger Court’s Shift 
The Court continued to employ this, what we might call “re-
alist,” conception of freedom of speech throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. Indeed, a hallmark of the Warren Court’s free speech juris-
prudence was its sensitivity to the threat that economic, social, 
and political inequality posed to the “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open” public debate that it now understood the First Amend-
ment to safeguard.288 This explains, among other things, the 
 
 286 Even the Kovacs plurality took for granted that, were the disparate impact suffi-
ciently grave, the First Amendment would prevent the government from being able to 
restrict speech, no matter how legitimate its aim. Kovacs, 336 US at 88–89. 
 287 See, for example, Terminiello, 337 US at 3–35 (striking down the breach-of-peace 
conviction of a speaker who refused to stop speaking after his speech drew a hostile, and 
increasingly violent, reaction from its audience because to do otherwise would be to allow 
the “standardization of ideas” not only by “legislatures [and] courts” but also by “dominant 
political or community groups”); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 112 (1943) (strik-
ing down a license tax that applied to sellers of expressive materials out of concern that it 
would impose too onerous a burden on “those who do not have a full purse” and would 
prevent “the needy” from being able to engage in religious evangelism). 
 288 New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964). See also John E. Nowak, 
Foreword: Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 Hastings Const 
L Q 263, 276, 280 (1980): 
The Warren Court’s constitutional rulings . . . [reflected the principle that] gov-
ernment institutions should neither approve nor tolerate the existence of private 
interests which seek to produce unfairness and inequality beyond the principles 
of the social compact. 
. . .  
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Court’s insistence in New York Times Co v Sullivan289 that the 
First Amendment protects speakers against not only criminal 
statutes or regulatory ordinances but also against civil suits 
brought by private parties, and the economic sanctions that re-
sult.290 It also explains the Court’s vigorous enforcement of the 
rule against hecklers’ vetoes in cases involving civil rights protes-
tors.291 And it explains the decision in Tinker to extend constitu-
tional protection to student speech.292 
Beginning in the early 1970s, however, there was a marked 
shift in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence away from 
the equality-promoting, context-sensitive approach that had 
characterized its free speech decisions, more or less, from the 
1930s through the late 1960s. The Burger Court, despite the fears 
of some critics, proved itself to be a sometimes-aggressive de-
fender of First Amendment freedoms.293 But it interpreted those 
freedoms quite differently than had the New Deal and Warren 
Courts. Rather than interpreting the First Amendment as a guar-
antee of expressive freedom that depended on—but nevertheless 
sometimes required deviation from—the ordinary rules of prop-
erty and contract, the Court now increasingly interpreted the 
First Amendment as a grant of almost total freedom to the prop-
erty owner to dictate the expressive uses to which his or her prop-
erty would be put. The result was a free speech jurisprudence that 
 
The Court’s most famous and innovative [free speech] decisions promoted [the 
idea] that the social compact must promote equality and must allow for free 
speech on social issues. 
 289 376 US 254 (1964). 
 290 Id at 277–78 (“What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a 
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage 
awards . . . may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal 
statute.”) (citation omitted). 
 291 See, for example, Gregory v City of Chicago, 394 US 111, 112–13 (1969); Edwards 
v South Carolina, 372 US 229, 237 (1963). 
 292 Tinker, 393 US at 508–09. Like the earlier opinion in Terminiello, the decision in 
Tinker represents the Court’s efforts to ensure that government actors, even when well-
meaning, do not act in a manner that makes government institutions an instrument of the 
censorial desires of the majority. Id at 508 (“[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression . . . 
[because a]ny variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.”), citing Terminiello, 
337 US 1. 
 293 See Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw U L Rev 1031, 1031 (1983) (“Perhaps in th[e] area [of 
freedom of speech] more than any other, the Burger Court has evinced a relatively protec-
tionist and libertarian attitude, which, though assuredly not applied with unwavering 
consistency, occasionally even surpassed the protectionist zeal of the Warren Court.”)  
(citation omitted). 
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was much more “mechanical” and “abstract” in the Poundian 
sense of the terms. 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Court’s new under-
standing of what the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of 
speech prohibits or requires was its 1974 decision in Miami  
Herald Publishing Co v Tornillo.294 The case involved a First 
Amendment challenge to a Florida law that required newspapers 
that criticized the character of political candidates to offer those 
candidates space in their newspaper to reply.295 Five years earlier, 
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co v Federal Communications Commis-
sion,296 the Court had upheld FCC regulations that imposed a sim-
ilar right of reply requirement on radio broadcasters.297 Red Lion 
was a controversial decision because it allowed the government to 
compel media companies to transmit speech “which their ‘reason’ 
tells them should not be published” notwithstanding Justice 
Black’s suggestion in Associated Press v United States that the 
First Amendment did not permit this kind of compulsion.298 The 
Red Lion Court upheld the regulations, however, for reasons very 
much in keeping with Associated Press—namely, because it found 
that they “enhance[d] rather than abridge[d] the freedoms of 
speech and press protected by the First Amendment” by ensuring 
that a diversity of viewpoints was heard on the radio notwith-
standing the concentration of control over the industry in rela-
tively few hands.299 In this respect, it represented a continuation 
of principles the Court had relied upon for over thirty years. 
It was quite significant, then, when the Tornillo Court did 
not so much overrule Red Lion as reject its entire analytic ap-
proach.300 It struck down the Florida right of reply law in Tornillo, 
 
 294 418 US 241 (1974). 
 295 Id at 244. 
 296 395 US 367 (1969). 
 297 Id at 386–401. 
 298 Associated Press, 326 US at 20 & n 18. 
 299 Red Lion, 395 US at 375, 391 (concluding that “the First Amendment confers no 
right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on ‘their’ frequencies and no right 
to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied oth-
ers the right to use”). 
 300 The Tornillo opinion did not mention Red Lion at all. This allowed the Court to 
employ a markedly different approach to the constitutional questions raised by right of 
reply laws than that employed in Red Lion. But it also meant that the opinion was not 
subsequently understood to have overruled Red Lion; instead it merely cabined its reach 
to radio and television broadcasting. See Federal Communications Commission v Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 US 726, 748 (1978). The Court’s understanding of the decision did change, 
however, considerably. In later decisions, the Court asserted that the reason broadcast 
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even though it recognized that the newspaper industry was 
plagued by many of the same problems of concentrated power as 
the radio industry.301 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice  
Warren Burger noted, for example, that because the newspaper 
business (like the radio industry) was highly concentrated, “the 
power to inform the American people and shape public opinion” 
was “place[d] in few hands.”302 Chief Justice Burger noted also 
that the problem of concentration could not be easily corrected by 
the ordinary processes of market competition, given the steep bar-
riers to entry that existed in the newspaper industry, in Florida 
as elsewhere.303 Chief Justice Burger nevertheless insisted that 
the First Amendment sharply limited the government’s ability to 
do anything about these problems. “A responsible press is an un-
doubtedly desirable goal,” he wrote, “but press responsibility is 
not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it 
cannot be legislated.”304 
The opinion suggested in fact that any law that limited the 
freedom of newspaper editors to decide the size and content of the 
newspapers they edited—no matter how small a limitation it im-
posed—would “fail[ ] to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment” because of its intrusion on editorial freedom.305 This would 
be the case “[e]ven if a newspaper would face no additional costs 
to comply with a compulsory access law,” Chief Justice Burger 
wrote, “and would not be forced to forgo publication of news or 
opinion by the inclusion of a reply.”306 This is because, he ex-
plained, “[a] newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or con-
duit for news, comment, and advertising.”307 It is instead the prod-
uct of “editorial control and judgment.”308 “It has yet to be 
demonstrated,” he added, “how governmental regulation of this 
 
media could be heavily regulated was not so much the power that broadcasters enjoyed 
due to their control of a scarce expressive resource, but the unique pervasiveness of the 
broadcast media in private homes and its accessibility to children. See id at 748–49. A 
concern with the economic power that broadcasters possessed, and its effect on the inter-
ests that the First Amendment protects, disappeared entirely from the analysis in this, as 
in almost all other areas of free speech law. 
 301 Tornillo, 418 US at 248–49. 
 302 Id at 250. 
 303 Id at 251. 
 304 Id at 256. 
 305 Tornillo, 418 US at 258. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
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crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment 
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”309 
In an article published the year after Tornillo was handed 
down, Professor Kenneth Karst argued that the breadth of the 
language in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion reflected the Court’s 
desire to not only resolve the case, but also “make a more general 
doctrinal statement.”310 If so, that doctrinal statement may have 
been that, notwithstanding the many cases in which the Court 
had said the opposite, the First Amendment did not in fact guar-
antee “the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources” but instead guaranteed some-
thing quite different: namely, a zone of individual liberty, free 
from state control. Certainly the opinion’s explicit and quite ex-
tended rejection of the idea that courts should take account of 
facts such as market concentration or media diversity when as-
sessing the constitutionality of newspaper right of reply laws 
strongly suggested that, in this context at least, the Court be-
lieved that the First Amendment interest in protecting the ex-
pressive autonomy of newspaper editors trumped the First 
Amendment interest in ensuring that members of the public had 
access to a wide range of views and information. 
In portions of his opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested 
that it was by protecting the expressive autonomy of newspaper 
editors that the First Amendment ensured, in the long-term, a 
diverse, vibrant, and antagonistic public debate.311 The opinion 
made clear, however, that even if it didn’t, the government would 
still be constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the au-
tonomy of newspaper editors—that the negative right of the 
speaker to be free of government interference prevailed over the 
positive right of the public to access a meaningfully diverse public 
debate.312 And in fact, in other decisions it handed down around 
the same time, the Court employed a similarly property- 
protective and anti-redistributive approach to the interpretation 
of First Amendment rights, even when doing so could not plausi-
bly be said to advance free speech values. 
 
 309 Tornillo, 418 US at 258. 
 310 Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U 
Chi L Rev 20, 50 (1975). 
 311 Tornillo, 418 US at 257 (arguing that “[g]overnment-enforced right of access ines-
capably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate’”), quoting Sullivan, 
376 US at 279. 
 312 Tornillo, 418 US at 258. 
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This was true, for example, of the Court’s shopping mall de-
cisions. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v  
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc,313 in 1968, the Court held that a state 
court could not constitutionally enjoin members of a union from 
picketing a store located in a privately owned shopping mall be-
cause the mall, like the company town in Marsh, performed an 
important public function—in an era of suburbanization, it pro-
vided an important site for public expression, as well as com-
merce.314 This meant, the Court concluded, that the First Amend-
ment prevented mall owners from using state property laws to 
exclude objectionable speakers from the property when that 
speech was not incompatible with the ordinary uses of the mall.315 
In holding as much, the Court did not articulate a new doctrinal 
principle but merely extended the logic of Marsh to apply to the 
new social realities of late twentieth-century America. 
Despite this fact, four years after Logan Valley was handed 
down, the Court sharply limited its reach when it held in Lloyd 
Corp v Tanner316 that speakers did not have a First Amendment 
right to access privately owned shopping malls when their speech 
did not relate to the businesses that used the mall.317 Four years 
after that, in Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board,318 the 
Court went one step further and overruled Logan Valley.319 In nei-
ther decision did the Court argue that there was anything wrong 
with Logan Valley’s analysis of the sociological importance of 
malls to late twentieth-century American public life. Instead, the 
Court rejected the idea that this social fact should matter to the 
constitutional analysis. The only facts that mattered, the Court 
asserted, were facts pertaining to the nature of the invitation the 
mall owner issued when he opened his mall up to public use. If 
the owner issued an “open-ended invitation to the public to use 
[his mall] for any and all purposes,” the Court held, then the mall 
could be considered “dedicate[ed] . . . to public use [so] as to entitle 
[speakers] to exercise therein . . . First Amendment rights.”320 But 
if not, the First Amendment did not grant speakers a right of ac-
cess to these private spaces. To hold otherwise, the Court insisted, 
 
 313 391 US 308 (1968). 
 314 Id at 318, 324–25. 
 315 Id at 324–25. 
 316 407 US 551 (1972). 
 317 Id at 564, 570. 
 318 424 US 507 (1976). 
 319 Id at 518. 
 320 Lloyd Corp, 407 US at 565, 570. 
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would be to engage in “an unwarranted infringement of property 
rights.”321 
Just as it had in Tornillo, the Court held in these cases too 
that the autonomy rights of property owners trumped the First 
Amendment rights of those who sought access to their property to 
speak on matters of public concern. The result was to render al-
most completely irrelevant to the analysis any consideration of 
the effect of the protestors’ exclusion from the mall on their ability 
to effectively communicate and, more broadly, to deconstitution-
alize the law of private property. It allowed “the formalities of ti-
tle [to] put an end to analysis,” as Justice Thurgood Marshall put 
it in his dissent in Hudgens.322 It resuscitated, in other words, the 
much more formal distinction between the public and private 
spheres that Lochner-era courts had relied upon. 
The Court employed a similarly formalist approach in cases 
involving rights of access to government-owned property. Just as 
it had during the Lochner era, the Court analogized the rights 
that the government enjoyed as property owner to the rights that 
a private person enjoyed as property owner, and concluded that 
this meant that speakers had virtually no rights of access to gov-
ernment property that didn’t happen to take the form of a park, 
street, or sidewalk.323 The Court reaffirmed, in other words, the 
priority of property rights over speech rights, even when the prop-
erty owner happened to be the government and the property hap-
pened to be a publicly important space like a military base—or in 
later cases, a library, a state fair, or an airport terminal.324 
The Court continued to assert that First Amendment rights 
of access trumped property rights when it came to publicly owned 
streets, parks, and sidewalks.325 Even in those spaces, however, 
 
 321 Id at 567. 
 322 Hudgens, 424 US at 538–39 (Marshall dissenting). 
 323 See Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 836–37 (1976) (concluding that because “[t]he 
State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under 
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” speakers have a constitutional 
right of access to government property only when the government “abandon[s] any claim 
of special interest in regulating” speech on that property); Jones v North Carolina Prison-
ers’ Labor Union, Inc, 433 US 119, 133–35 (1977). 
 324 See Greer, 424 US at 839–40 (upholding a military base policy of prohibiting par-
tisan political speech); Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc, 452 
US 640, 642, 655 (1981) (concluding that a state fair could limit speech access to a desig-
nated part of the fairgrounds); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc v Lee, 
505 US 672, 685 (1992) (holding that an airport terminal could prohibit First Amendment 
access). 
 325 Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 44–
45 (1983). 
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the Burger Court construed the scope of speakers’ First Amend-
ment rights more narrowly than the Warren Court had. In par-
ticular, the Court failed to enforce the requirement that, when the 
government regulates speech in the public forum, it must leave 
open ample alternative channels for those disparately affected by 
its regulation to advance their views.326 When analyzing the con-
stitutionality of time, place, or manner laws, the Court focused 
almost entirely on the question of whether the law furthered a 
constitutionally legitimate purpose and paid virtually no heed to 
the effect that the law might have on the expressive freedom of 
those who had ideas they wished to disseminate but no money to 
pay for speech.327 
The result of the Court’s much more negative, and much more 
abstract, approach to the delimitation of free speech rights was a 
body of law that was much more similar, both in its doctrinal 
structure and in its distributive effects, to Lochner-era due pro-
cess jurisprudence than was previously true. Not only did the 
Burger Court’s almost entirely negative view of the free speech 
guarantee lead it to ignore the social and economic facts that 
Pound and other realists criticized the Lochner Court for ignor-
ing, it also led the Court to conclude, just as the Lochner Court 
had before it, that the government could not interfere with the 
operations of the private market in order to achieve redistributive 
aims. 
Specifically, in Buckley v Valeo328 in 1976, the Court rejected 
the idea that the government could constitutionally restrict 
spending on election-related speech in an effort to prevent the 
very wealthy from using their money to buy access to politicians, 
thereby preventing those without as much money from having a 
meaningful opportunity to do the same.329 The idea that campaign 
 
 326 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Burger Court and the Political Process: Whose First 
Amendment?, 10 Harv J L & Pub Pol 21, 23 (1987) (“The [Burger] Court has, in truth, paid 
only lip-service to the ‘alternative means’ inquiry.”). 
 327 The Court held as much explicitly in Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 
791 (1989) (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is 
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.”). 
 328 424 US 1 (1976). 
 329 Id at 48–49, 143. The government had argued that a federal law that prohibited 
individuals from spending more than $1,000 annually on campaign-related speech was 
necessary to “lessen the disproportionate advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy spe-
cial interest groups, and to increase opportunities for meaningful participation by ordinary 
citizens, as voters, supporters and candidates.” Brief for the Attorney General and the 
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finance regulation was necessary in order to prevent the very 
wealthy from monopolizing the market in political influence was, 
by the time Buckley came along, a very well-established justifica-
tion for restrictions on corporate spending on campaign-related 
speech, and one the Court had previously relied on to uphold a 
campaign finance law of this sort against a First Amendment 
challenge.330 In Buckley, however, the Court declared, in a per cu-
riam opinion, that “the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amend-
ment.”331 And then, in a somewhat ironic twist, it added, “The 
First Amendment’s protection against governmental abridgment 
of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a per-
son’s financial ability to engage in public discussion.”332 
Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the opinion in  
Buckley should be regarded as “a direct heir to Lochner.”333 This 
is certainly true. By rejecting the possibility that a law that 
sought to limit the freedom of the more powerful in order to pro-
mote the interests of the less powerful could ever further a con-
stitutionally valid public purpose, the Court effectively imported 
into modern free speech law the prohibition against class legisla-
tion that played such an important role in Lochner-era due pro-
cess jurisprudence, and in Lochner itself.334 
Buckley does not demonstrate, however, as Sunstein sug-
gests, the existence of an unbroken jurisprudential tradition. It 
does not show that Lochner has, as he put it, never “been entirely 
overruled.”335 Buckley instead demonstrates the important, if ra-
ther underappreciated, shift in free speech doctrine that took 
place in the early 1970s that made it much more Lochnerian than 
it had previously been. After all, only seven years earlier, the 
 
Federal Election Commission, Buckley v Valeo, Nos 75-436, 75-437, *23 (US filed Oct 21, 
1975) (available on Westlaw at 1975 WL 171459). 
 330 See United States v International Union United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), 352 US 567, 568, 589–91 (1957). 
 331 Buckley, 424 US at 48–49. 
 332 Id at 49. 
 333 Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 5). 
 334 See Gillman, Constitution Besieged at 128–29 (cited in note 27) (“[Although]  
Peckham’s majority opinion [in Lochner] . . . does not explicitly rely on the language of 
unequal, partial, or class legislation,” it ultimately concluded that the New York law was 
impermissible because its object was “‘simply to regulate the hours of labor between the 
master and his employees,’ and [thereby] . . . use [ ] government power to favor certain 
groups at the expense of others.”), quoting Lochner, 198 US at 64. 
 335 Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 918 (cited in note 5). 
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Warren Court had held quite unequivocally that the First Amend-
ment did permit the government to restrict the speech of some in 
order to enhance the speech of others when it upheld the FCC 
right of reply regulations in Red Lion. The gulf between the view 
of the First Amendment articulated in Red Lion and in Buckley is 
significant, and startling. 
Critics are not wrong, then, when they trace the Lochnerian 
tendencies of contemporary free speech jurisprudence to changes 
that the Burger Court made to the existing body of First Amend-
ment law. They are simply wrong in what they identify as the 
pivotal decisions. It was not the decisions in Virginia Pharmacy 
and Bellotti that made free speech law skeptical of government 
power, and deferential to private interests, in many of the same 
ways that the Lochner-era due process cases were. It was instead 
all the other decisions in which the Court construed the guarantee 
of freedom of speech to protect, but to do little more than protect, 
the expressive autonomy of property owners that did so. 
In fact, the commercial speech cases represented an im-
portant exception to the Burger Court’s general tendency to prior-
itize the autonomy interests of the property owner/speaker above 
all other interests and concerns. This is because, in those cases 
and very few others, the Court continued to allow the government 
to limit what speakers could use their property to say, when doing 
so promoted what Justice John Paul Stevens described in 1996 as 
a “fair bargaining process.”336 Although the Court justified the dif-
ferent rules it applied in commercial speech cases by pointing to 
what it claimed were inherent or “commonsense” differences be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech, in fact, none of the 
differences the Court identified stand up to critical scrutiny.337 In-
stead, one can understand the different rules the Court applied 
 
 336 44 Liquormart, 517 US at 501. Another set of cases in which the Court continued 
to take seriously the threat of private power involved, ironically enough, campaign finance 
regulation. See notes 328–32 and accompanying text. 
 337 Specifically, the Court argued that because “[t]he truth of commercial speech . . . 
may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than . . . news reporting or political com-
mentary” and “there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation,” a “differ-
ent degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate 
commercial information is unimpaired.” Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24. The 
Court provided no evidence to substantiate its assertions about the “commonsense differ-
ences” between commercial speech and other kinds, and there is good reason to be skepti-
cal of them. Id at 771 n 24. As Professor Martin Redish has pointed out, many statements 
in political discourse are as easily verifiable as statements in commercial speech and many 
statements in commercial speech are hard to verify. Redish, 130 U Pa L Rev at 633 (cited 
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in commercial speech cases to reflect its recognition of the marked 
power imbalance that tends to characterize the relationship be-
tween the seller and the buyer of commercial goods and services, 
due to the fact that the seller knows things about the product that 
the buyer cannot know.338 
Certainly many of the Court’s commercial speech cases 
evince a keen sensitivity to the possibility that commercial sellers 
might exploit, manipulate, or deceive their audience, and a will-
ingness to allow the government to take action to prevent them 
from doing so.339 In this line of cases, then, and very few others, 
the Court continued to act as if “‘liberty’ is . . . something that 
may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of govern-
ment,” and that may “indeed . . . require the positive intervention 
of government against those other forces.”340 The result was a body 
of law that was much less threatening to the regulatory state than 
other areas of Burger Court jurisprudence, and much less  
“abstract” in the Poundian sense. 
Today, of course, the commercial speech cases represent less 
marked an exception to the rest of free speech jurisprudence. It 
remains the case even today, however, that the government can 
sanction commercial speech when it is false or misleading and can 
impose disclosure requirements on commercial speakers that it 
absolutely cannot impose on other kinds of speakers.341 Neverthe-
less, the increasingly strict scrutiny the Court has applied in its 
 
in note 84). Meanwhile, the commercial motives of advertisers may make them not more 
resistant to regulation but less. Id (“The possibility of regulation [might] not deter [com-
mercial manufacturers] entirely from advertising, but it might deter [them] from making 
certain controversial claims for [their] product[s].”). 
 338 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771 n 24 (noting that the commercial “adver-
tiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself 
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else”). 
 339 See, for example, Friedman v Rogers, 440 US 1, 15–16 (1979) (upholding law reg-
ulating the use of optometrical trade names because “[r]ather than stifling commercial 
speech, [the law] ensures that information regarding optometrical services will be commu-
nicated more fully and accurately to consumers than it had been in the past when optom-
etrists were allowed to convey the information through unstated and ambiguous associa-
tions with a trade name”); Bates v State Bar of Arizona, 433 US 350, 383–84 (1977) 
(“[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that 
might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite in-
appropriate in legal advertising.”); Ohralik v Ohio State Bar Association, 436 US 447, 462 
(1978) (upholding a ban on certain kinds of in-person solicitation as a constitutionally per-
missible means of protecting consumers against “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, 
overreaching, and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct’”). 
 340 Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (cited in note 262). 
 341 See Post, 48 UCLA L Rev at 26–28, 34–36 (cited in note 147). 
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commercial speech cases has obviously had a pronounced deregu-
latory effect. 
This does not mean that it is currently any less of a mistake 
than it was in 1976 to argue that modern free speech law resur-
rects Lochner by extending protection—or too much protection—
to commercial speech and speakers. This is not only because it is 
difficult, for all the reasons I suggested earlier, to see why com-
mercial and corporate speech should receive any less protection 
than movies, true crime magazines, or the many other overtly 
nonpolitical genres of mass entertainment that the First Amend-
ment fully protects. It is also a mistake because it misconceives 
the nature of the problem. 
The threat that the commercial and corporate speech cases 
pose to the government’s ability to “regulate markets . . . to make 
life more equitable, safe, [and] healthful” is not a consequence of 
the fact that they involve commercially oriented speech.342 The 
threat they pose to the government’s ability to regulate markets 
is a consequence of the Court’s increasing tendency, in these cases 
as in others, to construe the First Amendment as a grant to speak-
ers of almost-absolute freedom to use the expressive resources 
that they happen to possess or control for whatever purposes they 
desire. 
C. Current Examples 
Consider in this respect Citizens United, perhaps the most 
infamous of all the Roberts Court’s free speech cases. In that case, 
the Court invalidated a provision in the federal Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act343 (BCRA) that “prohibit[ed] corporations and 
unions from using their general treasury funds to” spend money 
on speech that advocated for or against candidates in federal elec-
tions.344 The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation that had wanted 
to use money to distribute a ninety-minute documentary about 
then–presidential candidate Hillary Clinton in the run-up to the 
2008 election but feared that if it did so it would violate the law.345 
Given that what was at stake was the ability of the corporation to 
publicly disseminate speech that clearly touched on pressing pub-
lic matters, it is hard to quarrel with the majority’s conclusion 
 
 342 Purdy, 77 L & Contemp Probs at 203 (cited in note 232). 
 343 Pub L No 107-155, 116 Stat 81 (2002), codified at 52 USC § 10101 et seq. 
 344 Citizens United, 558 US at 318–20, 365. 
 345 Id at 319–21. 
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that serious scrutiny of Congress’s means and aims was called 
for.346 Nor was this feature of the decision in any way new. By the 
time Citizens United was handed down, the Court had recognized 
corporate speech rights—and applied rigorous scrutiny—in doz-
ens of corporate speech cases.347 
What was significant about the decision was instead its as-
sertion that the government could not justify a law like the one at 
issue in the case as a means of ensuring to the not-so-wealthy a 
meaningful opportunity to influence the views of elected politi-
cians. Although Buckley had rejected the idea that the govern-
ment could restrict the campaign spending of some in order to 
increase opportunities for participation in the political process by 
others, in subsequent decisions, the Court had allowed the gov-
ernment to justify both corporate and noncorporate campaign fi-
nance restrictions on very similar grounds.348 It had retreated, 
that is, from the strong anti-redistributive position it articulated 
in Buckley because it recognized that government regulation of 
the political marketplace could further, not just threaten, the 
democratic values that the First Amendment protected. 
In Citizens United, however, the Court returned to the posi-
tion it first announced in Buckley in 1976 and reaffirmed that, 
under the First Amendment, the government has no legitimate 
“interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and 
groups to influence the outcome of elections.’”349 Notwithstanding 
considerable evidence that infusions of large amounts of money 
distort political incentives and policy positions, and thereby un-
dermine the representativeness of the system writ large, the 
Court insisted that the government could only regulate the cam-
paign spending when necessary to prevent the direct trading of 
 
 346 Id at 340. 
 347 Id at 342, citing, among others, Bellotti, 435 US at 778; Tornillo, 418 US 241;  
Sullivan, 376 US 254; Joseph Burstyn, 343 US 495. 
 348 See, for example, Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 US 377, 382, 389 
(2000) (upholding a law that limited individual campaign contributions as necessary to 
protect against “the broader threat [of] politicians too compliant with the wishes of large 
contributors”); Austin, 494 US at 655 (upholding a law limiting corporate spending on 
elections as necessary to prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas”). As Pro-
fessor Richard Hasen noted, in these cases, the Court moved very close to the “equality 
rationale” that Buckley rejected. Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of 
Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S Cal L Rev 885, 
894 (2005). 
 349 Citizens United, 558 US at 350, quoting Buckley, 424 US at 48. 
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money for political favors, and the appearance of quid pro quo cor-
ruption of this sort.350 Ultimately, it was the decision’s narrowing 
of the permissible purposes the government could rely upon to 
justify campaign finance laws that made it a significant, and  
significantly deregulatory, change from prior law—not the fact 
that the law it struck down happened to regulate the speech of 
corporations.351 
Citizens United does not demonstrate, in other words, the 
“corporate takeover of the First Amendment.”352 Indeed, the deci-
sion’s most pronounced effect has been on campaign finance reg-
ulations that do not only apply to corporations.353 It demonstrates 
the Court’s increasing tendency to construe the First Amendment 
as a shield that private market actors can wield against govern-
ment regulation, rather than (as it once did) as a mechanism for 
safeguarding free speech values against the threat posed to  
them by both private and government power. What it also  
demonstrates is the Court’s intense hostility toward what  
Lochner-era courts would have called class legislation. 
A similar story can be told about the decision in Sorrell. In 
that case, the Court showed strong disfavor to a law that made 
speaker-based distinctions. Specifically, it struck down a  
Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies from selling information 
about physician prescribing practices—information that federal 
law required them to collect—to pharmaceutical marketers with-
out the physician’s consent.354 The Court construed the fact that 
Vermont prohibited pharmacies from selling physician prescrib-
ing data to pharmaceutical marketers but did not prohibit the 
sale of data to other groups, such as public health researchers, to 
mean that the law was viewpoint discriminatory, and therefore 
presumptively unconstitutional.355 In fact, there was a good rea-
son why the legislature may have prohibited only the sale of data 
to pharmaceutical marketers and not to other groups, a reason 
 
 350 Id at 359–60. For a discussion of the evidence of what he calls “misalignment” in 
voters’ and politicians’ preferences, see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign 
Finance Law, 101 Va L Rev 1425, 1426–28, 1430 (2015). 
 351 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 877 (cited in note 5) (noting that an “especially 
distinctive” feature of the Lochner Court’s approach was its “sharp limitation of the cate-
gory of permissible government ends” through its insistence that “[e]fforts to redistribute 
resources and paternalistic measures were both constitutionally out of bounds”). 
 352 Coates, 30 Const Commen at 239 (cited in note 6). 
 353 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 Va L Rev 1, 20–21 (2012). 
 354 Sorrell, 564 US at 557–58. 
 355 Id at 564–65, 571. 
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that had nothing to do with animus against the marketers’ view-
point: namely, marketers were the only ones who threatened the 
privacy interests that the law aimed to protect, by using the data 
to target, even harass, doctors who did not prescribe their prod-
ucts with sufficient frequency.356 In his majority opinion, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy rejected this justification for the law. “It is 
doubtful,” he wrote, “that concern for ‘a few’ physicians who may 
have ‘felt coerced and harassed’ by pharmaceutical marketers can 
sustain a broad content-based rule like” the Vermont law.357 
“Many are those who must endure speech they do not like,” he 
added, “but that is a necessary cost of freedom.”358 
The decision thus confirmed what Citizens United had sug-
gested: namely, that the Court would look from now on with great 
skepticism on laws that made speaker-based distinctions, even 
when there were good, noncensorial reasons why the legislature 
may have wanted to treat some speakers differently than others. 
The result was to make it very difficult for the government to pro-
tect some members of the community against speech-related 
harms caused by others. In previous decades, the Court had up-
held laws that allowed private individuals to choose whether or 
not to receive speech that threatened their privacy—and it had 
done so even when the speech in question was high-value, not 
“purely commercial,” expression.359 The Court now insisted that 
Vermont could not do so even when the harm to the speaker’s au-
tonomy was quite minor and the privacy harms the government 
 
 356 Id at 575. See also Piety, 29 Cardozo L Rev at 2610–11 (cited in note 116) (discuss-
ing the evidence of harassing sales practices). 
 357 Sorrell, 564 US at 575. 
 358 Id. 
 359 The best example of this is the Court’s 1970 decision in Rowan v United States 
Post Office Department, 397 US 728 (1970), which upheld a federal law that required com-
mercial and noncommercial advertisers to remove from their mailing lists any homeown-
ers who did not want to receive their materials because they believed they were “erotically 
arousing or sexually provocative.” Id at 729–30, 737. The Court held that the law did not 
violate the First Amendment because “[n]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen 
to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit” and “the citizen cannot be 
put to the burden of determining on repeated occasions whether the offending mailer has 
altered its material so as to make it acceptable . . . [or] risk that offensive material come 
into the hands of his children before it can be stopped.” Id at 737–38. It therefore concluded 
that it was permissible for “Congress [to] erect[ ] a wall—or more accurately permit[ ] a 
citizen to erect a wall—that no advertiser may penetrate without his acquiescence.” Id at 
738. The Vermont law obviously did much the same, even if it operated to protect the 
privacy of the medical office, not the home. 
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acted to prevent were quite serious.360 This is what is most re-
markable about Sorrell, and it has nothing, ultimately, to do with 
the fact that it involved commercial speech. 
To argue, as Justice Stephen Breyer did in his dissent, that 
the decision resurrected Lochner by “substituting judicial for 
democratic decisionmaking where ordinary economic regulation 
is at issue” thus misses what was doctrinally innovative about 
it.361 In earlier cases—cases involving for example, the taxation of 
newspaper ink—the Court had recognized, sensibly enough, that 
when the government intentionally makes it harder for speakers 
to acquire the expressive resources they need to engage in speech, 
the First Amendment is implicated no less than when the govern-
ment intentionally restricts their speech.362 In applying more than 
rational basis scrutiny to a law that was quite explicitly intended 
to affect commercial speech, the Sorrell Court merely followed 
this precedent.363 
Where the decision broke new ground was in refusing to allow 
Vermont to prevent marketers from using information available 
to them on the private market to tailor their speech, even when 
that information posed a significant threat to doctor privacy, and 
even when the restrictions the law imposed could be overridden 
by physician consent, and even when the information that the 
pharmacies wished to sell existed solely as a consequence of gov-
ernment coercion.364 Doctors did not, in other words, consent to 
the collection of their data. They had no choice about it. Never-
theless, although the government created the commodity that 
 
 360 Marketers, after all, remained free under the law to say whatever they liked to 
doctors during their marketing pitches. They were merely restricted in the range of infor-
mation they could draw on to tailor their presentation. 
 361 Sorrell, 564 US at 603 (Breyer dissenting). 
 362 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 
US 575, 582 (1983) (holding that when the government “single[s] out the press for special 
treatment” by imposing a special tax on the ink and paper required to print newspapers, 
the “tax . . . cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an overriding govern-
mental interest”). 
 363 That the law was intended to limit marketing speech was evident from its text, 
which prohibited “[p]harmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers . . . 
[from] us[ing] prescriber-identifiable information for marketing or promoting a prescrip-
tion drug unless the prescriber consents.” Sorrell, 564 US at 558–59. 
 364 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, until Sorrell, the Court had “never found 
that the First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting the use of infor-
mation gathered pursuant to a regulatory mandate—whether the information rests in 
government files or has remained in the hands of the private firms that gathered it.” Id at 
588 (Breyer dissenting) (emphasis in original). Nor had it “ever previously applied any 
form of ‘heightened’ scrutiny in any even roughly similar case.” Id (emphasis in original). 
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marketers sought to access, the decision in Sorrell imposed  
very significant constraints on its ability to subsequently regulate 
the commodity’s circulation. In this respect, the decision  
demonstrates the same conceptual error as Lochner-era due  
process jurisprudence: like the earlier due process decisions, it ob-
scures from view the ways in which government coercion  
constructs the market that constitutional doctrine then immun-
izes from subsequent regulation.365 It construes as a site of indi-
vidual freedom what is in fact an arena of significant constraint. 
To think of Sorrell merely as a case in which the Court failed 
to show sufficient deference to the economic policy decisions of the 
legislature thus obscures what is generally Lochnerian about it: 
namely, its insistence that what the constitutional guarantees of 
liberty mean, ultimately, is that the legislature may not impose 
even a minor constraint on the freedom of powerful individuals in 
order to protect the freedom of weaker and more vulnerable oth-
ers, even when the legislature helped create the unequal power 
relationships at issue in the case. It also obscures the important 
similarities between the decision and the many other decisions in 
which the Court relied on a similarly rigid distinction between the 
public and private spheres to strike down laws that could never 
be described as ordinary economic regulation. 
Consider in this respect the decision in California Democratic 
Party v Jones,366 which struck down a California ballot initiative 
that permitted any voter registered in the state to vote in the 
party primary election of her choice, regardless of her official 
party affiliation.367 In that case too, the Court held that the gov-
ernment could not interfere with the ability of powerful private 
speakers (namely, the leaders of the major political parties) to 
control the use of an important expressive resource (namely, the 
primary process) in an effort to protect the interests of third par-
ties—in this case, the voters of California—without unconstitu-
tionally infringing the First Amendment rights of the powerful.368 
 
 365 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 874 (cited in note 5) (“Market ordering under the 
common law was understood to be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it 
formed the baseline from which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that distin-
guished [state] action from inaction and neutrality from impermissible partisanship.”). 
 366 530 US 567 (2000). 
 367 Id at 570, 586. 
 368 Id at 574–75. See also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 Colum 
L Rev 1367, 1476 n 376 (2003) (“[Even] while acknowledging that California’s use of a 
primary election system constituted a delegation of public power to private associations, 
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This was the case, the Court held, notwithstanding the very im-
portant role that the primary process played in the constitution 
of governmental authority itself, and notwithstanding its exten-
sive regulation by the state.369 
Or consider Boy Scouts of America v Dale.370 In that case, the 
Boy Scouts argued that its First Amendment rights of expressive 
association would be violated if it were forced to comply with New 
Jersey’s public accommodation law by reinstating a scoutmaster 
who it fired because he was gay.371 The Court agreed. It held that 
because enforcement of the public accommodations law against 
the Boy Scouts would limit the organization’s ability to propagate, 
in whatever way it desired, a message of moral cleanliness that 
did not include homosexuality, the law violated the First Amend-
ment.372 In holding as much, the Court again paid no attention to 
the other expressive interests at stake in the dispute—including 
perhaps most importantly the expressive interests of the scout-
master, James Dale, who lost his position not because of his  
sexual orientation but because of his willingness to publicly speak 
about his sexual orientation. As Professor Mike Seidman notes, 
Dale may very well have been “making a political point when he 
insisted on Boy Scout membership” and his performance as scout-
master may have “forcefully communicated opposition to [the] 
 
the Court held that California’s blanket primary system violated the First Amendment 
associational rights of political parties because” of “private autonomy concerns.”). 
 369 Jones, 530 US at 572–74, 581–82 (rejecting the idea that “party affairs are public 
affairs, free of First Amendment protections,” and concluding that when the state “forces 
[parties] to adulterate their candidate-selection process . . . by opening it up to persons 
wholly unaffiliated with the party,” strict scrutiny applies). As Professor Samuel  
Issacharoff notes, it was in its insistence that, because political parties are private entities, 
they enjoy a strong First Amendment claim to institutional autonomy, that the decision 
departed from, and is difficult to reconcile with, prior decisions that recognized a much 
less rigid distinction between the public and private spheres. Samuel Issacharoff, Private 
Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan 
Competition, 101 Colum L Rev 274, 278–79 (2001): 
A review of the caselaw prior to Jones reveals that, as a purely doctrinal matter, 
the claim of the major political parties to formal institutional autonomy from 
state regulation is at best a weak rights claim. . . . The reason that the rights 
claim of the political parties is weak—and here it may be useful to focus on the 
major political parties—is not simply that no such positive claims had heretofore 
been recognized in the caselaw. Rather, the ability to make a full-throated de-
mand for autonomy from state regulation is compromised by the fact that the 
present party system is so fundamentally the product of a heavily regulated elec-
toral arena. 
 370 530 US 640 (2000). 
 371 Id at 646. 
 372 Id at 650, 655, 659. 
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negative stereotypes about male homosexuals.”373 Nevertheless, 
the Court spent not a word of its opinion discussing the impact 
that nonenforcement of the New Jersey law might have on Dale’s 
free speech rights or, for that matter, on the associational rights 
of boys who signed up for the Boy Scouts without necessarily 
knowing its policy positions.374 It did so because it assumed that 
the only thing that the First Amendment protected was the neg-
ative right of the Boy Scouts to speak, not the positive right of 
men like Dale to participate in the public realm that the state 
public accommodations law had delimited. 
In all these cases, and many more, the Court interpreted the 
guarantee of freedom of speech, just as Lochner-era courts once 
interpreted the guarantee of due process, as a guarantee of pri-
vate freedom from government regulation, rather than as a guar-
antee of anything more positive.375 The result is that today, the 
First Amendment makes it difficult in many areas of law for the 
government to protect members of the political community 
against speech-related harms that are the product of private  
action, while doing nothing to ensure that “[f]reedom of speech . . . 
[is] available to all, not merely to those who can pay their  
own way.”376 
It is in this respect that contemporary free speech law “res-
urrects Lochner.” What this means is that to solve the First 
Amendment’s Lochner problem, it will not be sufficient to do what 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and, more recently, Justice Breyer have 
 
 373 Seidman, 75 U Chi L Rev at 1548–49 (cited in note 281). 
 374 As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, there was very little evidence that the Boy 
Scouts did anything to inform its members of its views on homosexuality—in fact, to the 
contrary. Dale, 530 US at 672 (Stevens dissenting) (noting that the policy on homosexual-
ity was “never publicly expressed” and that the Boy Scouts’ “public posture—to the world 
and to the Scouts themselves—remained . . . one of tolerance”) (emphasis in original). 
 375 Recent cases that similarly construe the First Amendment in a strongly negative 
and “abstract” manner include Janus v American Federation of State, County, and Munic-
ipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S Ct 2448, 2486 (2018) (holding unconstitutional on free 
speech grounds laws that require workers represented by labor unions to pay those unions 
monthly dues); National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v Becerra, 138 S Ct 2361, 
2368, 2378 (2018) (striking down a state law that required crisis pregnancy clinics to pro-
vide potential customers with information about the availability of free or low-cost medical 
services, including abortion); and, as I have elsewhere written about, Manhattan Commu-
nity Access Corp v Halleck, 139 S Ct 1921, 1934 (2019). See Genevieve Lakier, Manhattan 
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck: Property Wins Out over Speech on the Supposedly 
Free-Speech Court, 3 ACS S Ct Rev 125, 161–63 (2019), archived at https://perma.cc/GA5J 
-4SGP. This is obviously just a representative sample and doesn’t touch on what is tran-
spiring in the lower courts. 
 376 Murdock, 319 US at 111. 
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suggested courts should do to avoid repeating the errors of the 
past—namely, deny constitutional protection to commercial 
speech and corporate speakers, or limit how broadly it applies. 
Limiting the scope of constitutional protection in that way will 
only blunt the anti-redistributive force of contemporary doctrine 
to some degree, while leaving commercial speakers and audiences 
defenseless against repressive, status-quo-promoting legislation 
of the kind I discussed in the previous Part. Moreover, it will do 
nothing to ensure that those without economic resources will have 
anything like a meaningful opportunity to participate in demo-
cratic public discourse. 
To avoid repeating the errors of the Lochner Court, what is 
needed is not a change to the rules that determine when height-
ened scrutiny applies but a change to the rules that govern 
heightened scrutiny. What is needed is to resuscitate the more 
positive, and more economically sensitive, conception of constitu-
tional liberty that the New Deal and later the Warren Courts em-
ployed in their free speech cases. In the next and final Part, I 
briefly sketch out what this would look like more concretely. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
As the previous Part suggests, contemporary free speech law 
is not Lochner-like merely because, like early twentieth-century 
freedom of contract jurisprudence, it imposes significant, albeit 
limited, constraints on the legislature’s ability to engage in eco-
nomic regulation.377 It is Lochner-like in many other ways as well. 
Three similarities between contemporary free speech law and 
Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine are particularly im-
portant to highlight. The first is the tendency of both bodies of law 
to construe the guarantee of liberty (be it a substantive due pro-
cess liberty, or the right to free speech) in almost purely negative 
terms, as a right the individual possesses against the state, rather 
than as a guarantee of something positive (a minimally fair bar-
gaining process, say, or a reasonable opportunity to be heard). 
 
 377 For an example of how limited the constraints the First Amendment imposes on 
the legislature’s ability to make economic policy can be when those rules shore up the 
rights of property owners, one need only look at contemporary copyright law. See generally 
Benkler, 74 NYU L Rev 354 (cited in note 9). When decrying the economically deregulatory 
tendencies of contemporary free speech law, it is important not to forget the extent to 
which contemporary free speech law—like Lochner-era freedom of contract doctrine—nat-
uralizes existing market relations and the laws that create them, and thereby helps im-
munize those laws from constitutional challenge. 
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This feature of Lochner-era due process jurisprudence was well 
recognized at the time. Professor Pound argued, for example, that 
one of the factors that led courts to employ, in freedom of contract 
cases, a “legal conception of the relation of employer and employee 
[that was] so at variance with the common knowledge of man-
kind” was their “hostil[ity] to legislation,” and tendency to “tak[e] 
a minimum of law-making to be the ideal.”378 It is also a feature of 
constitutional doctrine that the New Deal Court quite self- 
consciously rejected.379 But it is a view of constitutional liberty that 
the Court has quite unequivocally embraced in its free speech cases 
over the past four decades—and not only in Tornillo, where this 
negative-rights-only conception of the First Amendment was per-
haps most explicitly laid out. The view is also present in the many 
other cases the Court has handed down since then in which it has 
interpreted the First Amendment to mean that the government 
may only limit the ability of the speaker to dictate the expressive 
uses to which his property shall be put when it can show a truly 
compelling purpose and very narrowly tailored means. 
A second similarity between the two bodies of law is the ten-
dency of both to define the sphere of negative liberty that the con-
stitution protects by reference to existing property rights. This 
was obviously true of Lochner-era freedom of contract cases.380 
But it is also true, although less obviously so, of contemporary 
free speech law, as the previous Part illustrates. The result is a 
 
 378 Pound, 18 Yale L J at 454, 457 (cited in note 11). 
 379 In his influential opinion in Barnette, for example, Justice Jackson declared it to 
be the difficult but important task of the Court to “translat[e] the majestic generalities of 
the Bill of Rights, conceived” when the reigning “philosophy [was] that the individual was 
the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental 
restraints,” into rules that could work in a society “in which the laissez-faire concept . . . 
has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly 
sought through . . . expanded and strengthened governmental controls.” 319 US at 639–
40. See also notes 275–87 and accompanying text. 
 380 Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 US 578, 589 (1897), defining the liberty guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause to include 
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his 
person . . . but the . . . right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to 
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation; 
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, 
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above 
mentioned. 
Later decisions, recognizing a due process right to control the upbringing of one’s children, 
can also be understood in property terms. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm & Mary L 
Rev 995 (1992). 
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body of law that is in some respects highly skeptical of state power 
(when it intrudes upon the expressive autonomy of another) and 
in other ways highly deferential to it (when it exercises its own 
power as employer or property owner).381 
Finally, like Lochner-era due process jurisprudence, contem-
porary free speech law relies on what Pound called an “academic 
theory of equality” and what I have called elsewhere a “formal 
equality rule.”382 Just as it did in its Lochner-era due process 
cases, the contemporary Court assumes that implicit in the guar-
antee of expressive freedom is a guarantee of equal treatment—
and specifically, a guarantee that the government will treat all 
speakers identically, regardless of the economic or social factors 
that distinguish them. It is its commitment to formal equality 
that helps explain the Lochner Court’s palpable hostility to laws 
that aimed to protect workers against employers, and that also 
explains the palpable distaste the Court showed to redistributive 
campaign finance regulation in Buckley and Citizens United.383 
These three features of contemporary free speech jurispru-
dence do a great deal to explain why it is that the First Amend-
ment has today become, as Professor Rebecca Tushnet put it, “the 
new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere with the 
regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer 
allows.”384 They also explain why the First Amendment provides 
relatively little protection to other groups—government whistle-
blowers, for example, or political protestors.385 But they are not 
 
 381 Compare Citizens United, 558 US at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental 
power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or view-
points.”), with Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 US 410, 421 (2006) (denying First Amendment pro-
tection against employer discipline to any speech made by public employees “pursuant to 
their official duties”). 
 382 Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 Colum 
L Rev 2117, 2131 (2018). 
 383 See Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at 884 (cited in note 5) (“Buckley, like Lochner, grew 
out of an understanding that for constitutional purposes, the existing distribution of 
wealth must be taken as simply ‘there,’ and that efforts to change that distribution are 
impermissible.”). 
 384 Tushnet, 70 Food & Drug L J at 26 (cited in note 121). 
 385 See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex L Rev 581, 585 (2006) (not-
ing the aggressive use in recent years of facially neutral time, place, or manner laws to 
“control [ ] just the sort of speech the First Amendment ought to protect. . . . Geometric 
precision is being utilized to marginalize dissent, to capture and confine it”); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski Jr, Whistleblowing Speech and the First Amendment, 93 Ind L J 267, 292 
(2018) (“The Supreme Court [ ] has not provided robust protection for government employ-
ees who engage in whistleblowing activities.”). 
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immutable. Nor, as the previous Part indicates, are they hard-
wired into the modern speech tradition. 
For over four decades—from the early 1930s until the early 
1970s—the Court interpreted the First Amendment, specifically 
the Speech and Press Clauses, as an affirmative guarantee, not 
just a prohibition, against certain kinds of state action. In case 
after case, it insisted that what the First Amendment provided 
individuals was not simply, and not even primarily, a sphere of 
personal liberty in which the state may not intrude, but a partic-
ular kind of social institution—namely, the democratic public 
sphere and, more broadly, the democratic system of government. 
Indeed, on very few occasions did the Court construe the First 
Amendment to protect speech that did not play an important role 
in the formation of democratic public opinion in order to vindicate 
individual expressive autonomy. (I can think, in fact, of only one 
occasion on which it did so—the 1969 decision in Stanley v  
Georgia.386) Instead, it made clear that the “core value” the First 
Amendment protected was the individual right to meaningfully 
participate, either as speaker or as listener, in a “free and unhin-
dered debate on matters of public importance.”387 
It was because it guaranteed individuals this incredibly im-
portant positive right—a right that was “the matrix, the indispen-
sable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom”—that the 
New Deal, and later Warren, Courts argued that the vigorous ju-
dicial enforcement of First Amendment rights was appropriate, 
even in a post-Lochner age.388 The crucial role that the First 
Amendment played in facilitating and protecting democratic self-
government is also what led the Court to conclude, in Marsh and 
in other cases, that First Amendment rights enjoyed a “preferred 
position” compared to other kinds of rights, such as property.389 
And it explains the Court’s insistence that First Amendment doc-
trine pay attention to how economic and social forces, not just le-
gal rules, shape the exercise of expressive freedom. After all, if 
the First Amendment protects not just individual liberty but the 
vitality of the democratic public sphere, it obviously matters 
 
 386 394 US 557, 564, 568 (1969) (holding that the government may not punish the 
possession of unprotected obscenity in the home because doing so intrudes too far on “the 
privacy of a person’s own home”). 
 387 Pickering v Board of Education, 391 US 563, 573 (1968). 
 388 See Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 327 (1937). 
 389 Marsh, 326 US at 509. 
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whether the economic and social conditions that enable it to flour-
ish do or do not exist. This is why, in many different cases, the 
Court assumed that whether state action violates the First 
Amendment depends not only on the purposes that motivate it, or 
the form it takes; what also matters are its effects on the robust-
ness and vitality of public debate.390 
To ensure that the First Amendment does in fact continue to 
perform the important, representation-reinforcing function it is 
supposed to perform in the post-Lochner constitutional order—
and that it does not prevent the government from regulating the 
market, and other spheres of “private” life, when doing so does 
not pose a threat to democratic values—it is this, more positive, 
less property-based, and less formalist view of freedom of speech 
that we would need to recapture. Doing so would not require a 
radical break with the modern free speech tradition. To the con-
trary, what the preceding Part suggests is that a more positive, 
less formalist approach in free speech cases would be much more 
in keeping with the modern free speech tradition, at least as the 
New Deal Court understood it, than the contemporary Court’s 
much more laissez-faire approach. It would, however, require sig-
nificant change to a good number of contemporary doctrinal rules. 
Taking seriously the possibility that “‘liberty’ is . . . some-
thing that may be infringed by other forces as well as by those of 
government,”391 would require, among other things, rejecting the 
idea that under the First Amendment the government “may 
[never] restrict the speech of some . . . in order to enhance the rel-
ative voice of others.”392 This is because, in cases where private 
speakers possess monopoly or oligopoly control over important 
sites of public expression—the radio waves, say, or the newspa-
pers—the formal equality rule that these cases announced will 
make it very difficult for the government to do what the New Deal 
Court thought it was incumbent on the legislature as well as the 
courts to do: namely, safeguard the vitality of public debate from 
private, as well as government, repression. If one recognizes that 
privately owned property provides an important site for the oper-
ation of the democratic public sphere, it makes no sense to inter-
pret the First Amendment as a constraint on the censorial im-
pulses of state actors but to require legislators to give free rein to 
 
 390 See notes 222–24 and accompanying text. 
 391 Corwin, The Court Sees a New Light (cited in note 262). 
 392 Buckley, 424 US at 48–49. 
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the censorial impulses of private actors. Similarly, if one pre-
sumes that the “core” First Amendment value is a political system 
in which all members of the community have a meaningful oppor-
tunity to have their say, it is difficult to see why the legislature 
acts impermissibly when it imposes limits on campaign spending 
in an effort to ensure that both the wealthy and the poor have a 
meaningful opportunity to influence the positions that politicians 
adopt. 
This is not to say that the government should have free rein 
to restrict the speech of powerful private actors. Recognizing the 
threat that the exercise of private power can pose to free speech 
values does not require ignoring the threat that government 
power can pose to those same values. The question in all cases 
should be: Does the regulation of private speech enhance the di-
versity and vitality of public debate, and the health of the system 
writ large, by preventing the monopolization of an important ex-
pressive resource? Or does it do the opposite, by requiring private 
actors to promote a government-favored point of view or by other-
wise retarding, rather than enhancing, political debate among 
private citizens? This is, more or less, the question that guided 
the Court’s analysis in the early- and mid-twentieth-century  
media-concentration cases.393 But it is a question that the contem-
porary Court’s rigid embrace of a formal equality rule takes com-
pletely off the table. 
Embracing a more positive, more materialist conception of 
freedom of speech would also require courts to take more seri-
ously than they currently do the idea that First Amendment 
rights enjoy a privileged position when compared to property 
rights. This proposition follows directly from the organizing prin-
ciple of the New Deal settlement—namely, that economic rights 
need not be safeguarded against the will of democratic majorities, 
but civil rights, such as the right to freedom of speech, do. It is 
nonetheless a view of the relationship between property and free 
speech rights that the current doctrine almost entirely rejects—
the result being to produce a jurisprudence that is much more ef-
fective in protecting the speech of some than others. 
 
 393 See, for example, Red Lion, 395 US at 392–93 (noting that if evidence emerges 
that the FCC right of reply regulations have “the net effect of reducing rather than en-
hancing the volume and quality of coverage” the Court will revisit their “constitutional 
implications”). 
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Finally, a more positive conception of freedom of speech 
would require courts to take much more seriously than they cur-
rently do the constitutional and subconstitutional interests of lis-
teners and third parties. The Court’s embrace of a largely nega-
tive view of freedom of speech—its assumption that what the 
First Amendment protects, and all that it protects, is the right of 
the speaker to be free of intentional government efforts to limit 
what she can and cannot say—has prevented it from having to 
deal with, or even recognize, the often rather significant rights 
conflicts that exist in First Amendment cases. Dale is by no means 
unique in this regard. All of the cases discussed in the previous 
Part can be reframed as cases in which the speaker’s exercise of 
his or her expressive freedom burdened—or directly precluded—
other people’s exercise of their expressive freedom, or infringed 
upon some important right or interest (for example, the doctors’ 
right to privacy in Sorrell). In none of them, however, did the 
Court spend any time considering the difficult question of how to 
weigh the competing interests. Instead, it presumed that the only 
interest of any constitutional significance was that of the speaker. 
It is this single-minded focus on the rights of the speaker that 
helps explain a great deal of what is wrong with contemporary 
free speech law. 
The result of these changes to free speech doctrine would be 
a body of law that would be much better than the contemporary 
regime in reconciling the vigorous judicial enforcement of First 
Amendment rights with an active regulatory state. This is be-
cause it would permit the government to restrict the expressive 
freedom of market participants—in some cases, significantly—
when doing so does not meaningfully hamper their ability to par-
ticipate in public discourse and meanwhile advances the kinds of 
substantial government purposes the First Amendment has tra-
ditionally required to justify the regulation of public speech.394 It 
would, for example, almost certainly lead to the conclusion that 
the data privacy law struck down in Sorrell is constitutionally un-
problematic. This is because that law did not impose anything but 
the most minimal burden on the marketers’ ability to publicly 
communicate their point of view, or to otherwise shape public  
attitudes about the pharmaceuticals they marketed. Nor did it 
threaten, in any way, the right the Court worried about in  
 
 394 See Schneider, 308 US at 161. 
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Stanley—namely, the individual “right to be let alone.”395 If any-
thing, this was the interest that Vermont was trying to protect. 
Meanwhile, the law promoted important interests—chief among 
these being the doctor’s interest in preserving the privacy of her 
prescribing practices, and the patient’s interest in a doctor- 
patient relationship that is as unconstrained as possible.396 
A view of the First Amendment that conceived it primarily as 
a safeguard of a robust, diverse, and inclusive public sphere 
would also likely lead to the conclusion that the law struck down 
in Citizens United was constitutionally permissible, although the 
question is a somewhat closer one. Although the law obviously 
made it more difficult for corporations to engage in protected po-
litical speech in the days leading up to a federal election, the bur-
den it imposed on their speech was not terribly onerous. This is 
because, under the BCRA, corporations remained entirely free to 
use the money in separate corporate-funded political action com-
mittees (PACs) to pay for whatever speech they liked, right up 
until an election.397 This suggests that the primary effect of the 
provision that the Court struck down was not to “muffle[ ] the 
voices that best represent the most significant segments of the 
economy”—as Justice Kennedy asserted in his majority opinion—
but to channel corporate spending to the more heavily regulated 
and more transparent PACs.398 Although it is true that, because 
only certain persons could contribute money to corporate PACs, 
their coffers might be more limited than the corporations’ general 
treasury funds, when one considers the many benefits associated 
with a more transparent campaign finance system, as well as the 
constitutionally protected interests of the voters to participate in 
a democratic political system in which they enjoy a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard, these restrictions on the expressive au-
tonomy of corporate speakers seem easy to justify. Meanwhile, 
there is no reason to think that the law the Court struck down 
posed any threat to individual privacy interests, or to any other 
core feature of individual autonomy. It certainly posed no threat 
to the individual right to be let alone. 
 
 395 Stanley, 394 US at 564, quoting Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 478 (1928) 
(Brandeis dissenting). 
 396 Brief for Petitioners, Sorrell v IMS Health Inc, No 10-779, *46–47 (US filed Feb 
22, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 661712). 
 397 Citizens United, 558 US at 393–94 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 398 See id at 354. 
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At the same time, a First Amendment conceived primarily as 
a safeguard of democratic government, rather than private auton-
omy, would not give the government a blank check to regulate 
speech however it desired. It should be, for example, as difficult 
to justify paternalistic speech regulations under this less  
Lochnerian conception of the First Amendment as it is under the 
contemporary, speaker-autonomy-focused approach. This is be-
cause when the government deliberately denies information to 
people for the purpose of influencing their behavior, it not only 
violates their autonomy but takes from them a fundamental pre-
rogative of democratic citizenship: namely, the power to decide, 
both for oneself and for the political community, what the appro-
priate ends to pursue and values to vindicate are.399 This explains 
why a strong prohibition against paternalism has been a core fea-
ture of the modern free speech tradition since the early twentieth 
century.400 And what it means is that the Court was correct in 
striking down the ban on pharmaceutical price advertising in  
Virginia Pharmacy, and incorrect when it upheld Puerto Rico’s 
deeply paternalistic ban on casino advertising in Posadas. 
Laws that discriminate against particular kinds of speakers 
for no good reason also pose an obvious problem to a First Amend-
ment conceived primarily as a vehicle for guaranteeing the diver-
sity and vitality of public debate. This is why the decision in  
Citizens United is less clearly incorrect, when assessed under this 
alternative view of the First Amendment, than the decision in 
Sorrell. After all, Vermont had very good reasons to think that 
pharmaceutical marketers, and only pharmaceutical marketers, 
threatened the privacy harms that it sought to prevent when it 
enacted the law that the Court struck down. It is far less obvious 
that Congress had good reasons to single out corporations for spe-
cial treatment when it enacted the BCRA. As Justice Kennedy 
noted in his majority opinion, wealthy individuals possess the 
same power as wealthy corporations to use their money to buy 
political influence.401 And in fact, wealthy individuals spend a 
 
 399 See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
Colum L Rev 334, 356 (1991) (“When the government violates the persuasion principle, it 
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 400 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & 
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great deal more on elections than wealthy corporations.402 This 
raises serious doubts that “there [was] an appropriate govern-
mental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment” 
that BCRA applied.403 Of course, Congress may have had other 
reasons to treat corporations differently under the BCRA than 
natural persons. It may have wanted to protect the rights of 
shareholders, for example, by limiting the extent to which corpo-
rate directors could use corporate moneys for political ends with 
which they disagreed. Or it might have believed, understandably 
enough given Buckley, that it could not impose restrictions on nat-
ural persons similar to those that it imposed on corporations. 
The point here is simply that a more positive, less rigidly 
speaker-autonomy-focused conception of the First Amendment 
would not mean an abdication of courts’ responsibility to safe-
guard the independence of the democratic public sphere. What it 
would do is enable a more nuanced reconciliation between free 
speech values and regulatory power than current doctrine allows. 
It would permit the government to regulate all kinds of market 
actors (not just commercial speakers) when doing so was neces-
sary to protect consumers against misleading, deceptive, coercive, 
or harassing behavior. But it would not allow the government to 
regulate commercial speech, or for that matter, any constitution-
ally valuable expression, in order to shape the views and behav-
iors of members of the public, except when it had a genuinely com-
pelling need to do so.404 
The result would be a jurisprudence that would not need to 
demarcate a particular category of low-value speech to protect 
consumers from the kinds of harms that the commercial speech 
precedents, until recently at least, have allowed the government 
to guard against. Such harms, after all, have nothing to do with 
the intrinsic value of the speech; instead, they are the product of 
the power inequality that the seller of a commercial good pos-
sesses, by virtue of his or her greater knowledge about the good 
that he or she sells. There is consequently no obvious reason why 
the government should be able to protect members of the public 
 
 402 Stephanopoulos, 101 Va L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 350) (“Almost all [2012 cam-
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 403 Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 95 (1972). 
 404 The Court has suggested, for example, that paternalistic speech regulation might 
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against these kinds of harms only when it comes to commercial 
advertising and other kinds of commercial speech.405 The result 
would be a more consistent, and coherent, body of free speech law: 
one that does not need to cabin the scope of its protections by re-
lying upon an unduly formalistic distinction between commercial 
and noncommercial speech. 
More generally, what a more positive conception of the First 
Amendment would produce is a body of law that is more sensitive 
to the multiple interests implicated in free speech disputes than 
contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, and one that 
would do what courts almost entirely fail to do today: namely, 
take seriously the constitutional interests of those who do not 
happen to own the expressive resource the government is regu-
lating. It simply cannot be that only property owners possess free 
speech rights—and yet this is essentially the result that current 
doctrine produces, at least in those areas of free speech law where 
the New Deal and Warren Courts’ precedents no longer hold 
sway. 
Precisely for this reason, however, a First Amendment that 
took seriously the threat to free speech interests posed by both 
government and private power would also make the constitu-
tional analysis in a good number of cases a lot harder than it is 
today. Consider for example Dale. Viewed through a negative au-
tonomy lens, the case is an easy one. If property owners possess 
an almost unlimited right to decide the expressive uses to which 
their property shall be put, the conclusion that New Jersey vio-
lated the First Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts when it forced 
the organization to use its property to send a message of tolerance 
and equality that it did not want to send is a very easy one to 
reach. If we did not assume as much, however, and instead pre-
sumed that the constitutionality of enforcing the public accommo-
dations law against the Boy Scouts depends on whether doing so 
promotes or threatens the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” 
public debate on public matters that the First Amendment pro-
tects, then the analysis becomes enormously more complicated. 
Then, courts would have to weigh the harm that would be created 
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were the public accommodations law enforced against the harm 
were it not to be. And to figure that out, courts would have to 
think carefully not only about the threat that enforcing the public 
accommodations law posed to the expressive freedom of the Boy 
Scouts; they would also have to think about the alternative ave-
nues that Dale possessed to speak. 
This analysis need not be open ended. In other areas of law—
for example, in its libel cases—the Court has crafted relatively 
clear-cut rules that are nevertheless responsive to the multiple 
and competing interests implicated by the regulation of defama-
tory speech. One can read the special rules that courts apply  
in advertising cases as achieving similar ends, as I suggested  
earlier. 
Courts can, in other words, do a better job than they currently 
do of reconciling the multiple, often conflicting, interests at stake 
in First Amendment cases without having to perform, in every 
case, a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis or engage in what 
the Court has at times described derisively as “ad hoc balancing.” 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court will, at least, have to engage in 
balancing of some kind, when fashioning the rules that apply in 
different regulatory contexts, and courts of all kinds will have to 
pay more attention to social and economic context than they cur-
rently do when applying these rules. 
We might worry that judges will not be able to adequately 
perform the more complicated doctrinal analysis I am calling for, 
or that the result of their doing so will be a body of law that fails 
to sufficiently protect the independence of the public sphere 
against repressive governmental regulation.406 The problem is 
that there is no good alternative. This is because, in a society 
characterized by tremendous inequality in economic and social 
power, simply pushing the reconciliation of competing rights to 
the subconstitutional arena of private law means creating a First 
Amendment jurisprudence that cannot possibly vindicate the 
freedoms it serves. 
In this sense, the difficulty of the analysis that a less laissez-
faire view of freedom of speech would produce might not be a 
drawback, but a virtue of the approach. This is because the task 
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of crafting a set of doctrinal rules that can preserve free speech 
against repression from both public and private actors without 
effectively constitutionalizing the entire legal domain is a difficult 
task, and one that courts and scholars should recognize as such. 
Current doctrine obscures the difficult questions posed when the 
government restricts the freedom of some in order to protect the 
freedom of others by making the analysis unduly formalistic—or 
to use Pound’s terminology, “abstract.” As a result, it fails to ef-
fectively vindicate free speech values by focusing to its detriment 
on only a subset of the interests at stake when the government 
regulates speech. 
What this means is that the First Amendment’s Lochner 
problem isn’t just a problem for the regulatory state; it is a prob-
lem for the First Amendment itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Over one hundred years after it was handed down, Lochner 
continues to haunt American constitutional jurisprudence. This is 
in part a product of the fact that agreement over what went wrong 
in Lochner is so incompletely theorized. As Professor Jamal 
Greene has noted, the fact that “there is disagreement, even irrec-
oncilable disagreement as to why” they were wrong makes antica-
nonical decisions like Lochner useful weapons in legal argument 
because they “enable[ ] multiple sides . . . to use the anticanon as 
a rhetorical trump.”407 But it is also a product, as this Article has 
shown, of the Court’s tendency to repeat the mistakes of its past. 
Recent concern about the Lochnerian tendencies of contempo-
rary free speech law is not merely rhetorical. There are significant 
and important similarities between Lochner-era due process juris-
prudence and contemporary free speech law—albeit, not the simi-
larities that most contemporary critics point to. These similarities 
are important to understand not only the First Amendment’s past 
but also its present and future. 
This is because another lesson Lochner teaches is that there 
may be political limits to how anti-redistributive constitutional 
doctrine can become. If the strongly anti-redistributive tendencies 
of contemporary free speech progress unabated, a political reckon-
ing may arrive sooner rather than later. If that occurs, it will be 
important to remember that the First Amendment was not always 
wedded to a laissez-faire conception of constitutional liberty and 
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that it need not always be. Recovering the past of the First Amend-
ment may be key to preserving its meaning for future generations. 
This Article begins that work. 
